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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the Italian Nobel Prize winning author, 
Luigi Pirandello, far from being merely a rather cerebral writer 
with a philosophical bent, as he has been called by many of his 
critics, should in fact be recognised to occupy a place within what 
is often referred to as the field of Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy, as a "pre-existentialist" or an existentialist avant 
la let tre. 
The idea of so categorising him is not new, but no systematic 
examination of the entire corpus of his works has ever been 
attempted from a purely philosophical point of view in order to 
draw from them a coherent and comprehenisive philosophy. In 
the field of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, Luigi 
Pirandello remains unstudied. 
This thesis deals with such existentialist themes as freedom, 
responsibility, anguish, the absurd, bad faith, the nature of 
reality, the self and the relation of the self to others. Pirandello's 
views in these areas are compared with those of the recognised 
existentialist philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, 
in order to attempt to prove a similarity great enough to enable 
Luigi Pirandello to be classed as an existentialist avant 2a Jet tre. 
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PREFACE 
The origin of the idea for this study dates back to a chance 
re-reading of some Pirandellian short stories in which I discovered, 
much to my amazement, passages which seemed hauntingly Sartrian, 
Had I been the first to notice this? Research brought to light the 
small amount of previous literature in this area and while proving 
that the idea was not, in fact, new, presented a fascinating but 
challenging invitation. Could a study examining the entire corpus 
of Pirandello's works from a rigorously philosophical point of 
view, prove the hypothesis which had been merely suggested by 
the letteratP, The present study is an attempt to respond to 
that challenge, 
Due to the difficulty and the delay which was involved in 
obtaining certain Italian books in Australia, there are several 
slight irregularities in the references to Pirandello's works, 
which, while not affecting the precision of the references, make 
them less uniform than otherwise would have been the case. No 
complete single edition of Pirandello's works could be obtained, 
Therefore, two separate editions had to be used. One includes 
the five volumes which contain the short stories, the plays, the 
essays, poetry and miscellaneous writings, and the other includes 
the two volumes in which are contained all of the novels. Because 
of the great delay in obtaining these last two volumes, references 
to several of the novels (U fu Mattia Pascal. Uno. nessuno e 
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Centomila. II turno and Si gira ...) refer instead to other editions 
in which these novels were published separately. 
Being qualified in the Italian language and wishing to remain 
as faithful as possible to the original works, I have chosen to 
use my own translations of all quoted passages from Italian works, 
The translations of passages from Sartre's L'existentialisme est 
un humanisme are also mine. The only exception to this regards 
the novel Si gira .... Due again to the delay involved in obtaining 
this volume, I have used as my source of reference the translation 
by Charles Scott Moncrieff, entitled Shoot... . 
In quoting sections of passages, the symbol C...) has been 
used to indicate that a portion has been omitted. The more usual 
symbol ... has been reserved for those instances in which the 
author himself has chosen to use it to indicate a pause or an 
incomplete thought, 
En all footnotes and bibliographic references the standard 
practice has been followed of underlining only the title of the 
volume in which collected works such as novels, plays or short 
stories have been published. Within the body of the thesis, 
however, for the sake of clarity, the titles of all works have 
been underlined. Footnotes are to be found in a separate section 
at the end of the thesis and are numbered consecutively for each 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
Where can the line be drawn between a philosopher and an 
ordinary writer? Does the distinction stem from the form of 
his writing? Is the philosophical essay de rigueurl Does 
the distinction lie in the clarity and consistency of the views 
expressed? Would this lead to the conclusion that in order to 
be termed a "philosopher", a writer must present ironclad or 
at least rigorously defended solutions to all of the problems 
he raises? In fact, while commonly assumed, especially amongst 
professional philosophers, to be somehow fundamental and obvious, 
the distinction between a philosopher and an "ordinary" writer 
is an unclear one at best. 
On what basis, then, can we argue that the Italian, Luigi 
Pirandello, far from being merely a rather cerebral writer with 
a philosophical bent, as he has been called by many of his 
critics, including Benedetto Croce, should in fact be recognised 
to occupy a place within what is often referred to as the field 
of Contemporary Continental Philosophy, as a "pre-existentialist" 
or an existentialist avant la lettre^. Leaving to one side any 
search for an exhaustive definition of the term "philosopher", 
let us proceed using two criteria: given an obvious and vast 
similarity between recognised existentialist philosophical works 
and much of the literary output of Luigi Pirandello, 1) can 
Pirandello's works be better or more fully understood in the 
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light of an existentialist interpretation? and 2) can a study of 
existentialist philosophy be made more fruitful by the inclusion 
of Pirandello's works? I shall endeavour to demonstrate that 
the answer to both o£ these questions must be an unqualified 
affirmative since an existentalist interpretation provides the 
key to many of Luigi Pirandello's works which seem sterile or 
superficial in the light of any other interpretation and since if 
indeed the novels, short stories and plays of Pirandello embody 
so fully and illustrate so well the major existentialist themes, 
then a study of this philosophy cannot but be more fruitful in 
the light of these works. What remains to be proven is the 
assumption that there is indeed an "obvious and vast similarity" 
between recognised existentialist philosophical works and those of 
Luigi Pirandello. Before attempting to establish this similarity, 
let us first proceed to a brief biographical statement, the point 
of which is to show that much of Pirandello's work comes well 
before that of the major French existentialists and then to a 
discussion of his choice of literary forms. 
A. Biographical Statement 
Luigi Pirandello was born in Agrigento Cthen known as Girgenti), 
Sicily, on June 28, 1867. After completing his studies at the liceo 
cJassico, during which time he read on his own most of the Greek 
and Latin classics, he enrolled at the University of Palermo and 
after a year transferred to the University of Rome. In 1891 
3 
he received his doctoral degree from the University of Bonn, 
where he had gone to study after a minor disciplinary problem 
at the University of Rome. His dissertation was on the Italian 
dialect spoken in Agrigento. He remained in Bonn two years before 
returning to Italy. 
Pirandello began his literary career writing poetry. (Mai 
Giocondo written between 1883 and 1888). The first volume of his 
innumerable short stories was published in 1894 ( Amori senza am ore). 
Around the same time (1893) he wrote his first novel ( L'esclusa). 
Pirandello's first play ( L'epologo - La morsa) was published in 
1898. There followed over three-hundred short stories, forty-three 
plays and seven novels as well as a series of scholarly articles 
and several essays. By 1923 Pirandello's fame was world-wide, 
primarily on account of his plays, which have been translated 
into the major languages of the world. In the Proceedings of the 
International Congress of Pirandellian Studies which took place 
on the 25th anniversary of his death, there is an entire section 
composed of fourteen articles all devoted to the history of this 
author's fame in various countries around the world: from America 
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to Egypt, from Belgium to Bulgaria. In 1934, Pirandello won the 
Nobel Prize for literature and by the time of his death in 1936, 
he was truly an international figure of great literary renown. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other hand, completed his initiation 
into Husserl's phenomenology in Berlin in 1933-34 and didn't publish 
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his principal philosophical work Being and Nothingness until 1943. 
Albert Camus was born in 1913, five years after the publication 
of Pirandello's essay on the absurd, L'umorismo. and nine years 
after the publication of his major work on personal liberty, JX 
fu Mattia Pascal, Camus' famous essay on the absurd. The Myth of 
Sisyphus wasn't published until 1942, six years after Pirandello's 
death. 
B. Choice Between Literary Forms: Essay Versus Fiction 
It is not possible to state with certainty why Pirandello 
was never recognised as a "proper" philosopher, however, there 
are several factors which undoubtedly contributed to this. Of 
course, the time and place of his life could be cited. Italy 
has always had a strong tradition of Aristotelian philosophy. 
Existentialism is not consistent with the Italian philosophical 
tradition. The opposition of the then leading philosopher of 
the day in Italy, Benedetto Croce, was certainly a contributing 
factor. "For Croce, as is well-known, it was a question of a 
sterile and inconclusive philosophising, an obscurity which could 
not but suffocate - according to the principles of the Aesthetics 
- artistic creation. But perhaps the three major causes of 
Pirandello's being relegated to the post of a philosopher manquS 
were". 
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1. the labelling of Pirandello as the philosopher of form 
versus life by Adriano Tilgher, 
2. Pirandello's preference for the novel, the play, and 
the short story, and 
3. his own specific refusal to call himself a philosopher. 
In 1922 Adriano Tilgher published a book on the contemporary 
theatre in which he reduced all of Pirandello's philosophical work 
to a statement of the doctrine of life as a continuous flux which 
is killed by the "forms" which we attach to it. This, of course, 
is indeed one of Pirandello's themes. It is not, however, his major 
one; and it must be interpreted in the light of the rest of 
his philosophy. Since it was not, and still is not by many, so 
interpreted, it was easy to discount Pirandello as any kind of 
a serious thinker. One idea does not a philosopher make, 
Perhaps the chief reasons, however, were and regain Piran-
dello's steadfast refusal to call himself a philosopher and his 
preference for the play, the novel and the short story over 
the essay. To understand the reasons for this refusal and 
this preference is integral to understanding Pirandello as a 
philosopher. For him, a philosopher was, above all, a logical and 
formally ordered thinker in the tradition of Aristotle, one who 
contemplated life, the world and its meaning almost as if he were 
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outside of it. Pirandello refused the feigned external stance 
presupposed by this world-view and rejected logic as its primary 
tool. 
(Logic) is an infernal little machine (...) a type of 
filter pump which puts the brain in communication 
with the heart. (...) The brain uses it to pump 
feelings from the heart, from which it forms 
ideas. A feeling leaves behind in the filter all 
that is warm and turbid: it is cooled, purified, 
idealised. Thus, some poor emotion roused by 
some particular case, some contingency, often 
painful, is pumped and filtered by the brain, 
by means of that little machine, and becomes 
a general abstract idea; and what follows from 
this? What follows is that we no longer have to 
upset ourselves about one particular case, one 
passing contingency; but we have to poison our 
whole life with the concentrated extract with 
the sublimated corrosive of logical deduction. 
Any many unfortunates think they can cure all 
the ills of the world with this, and they pump 
and filter, and pump and filter, until their 
heart is pumped dry as a cork and their brain 
is like a chemist's cupboard full of those little 
7 
bottles which bear on their labels a skull and 
4 
crossbones and the legend: POISON. 
Pirandello refuses to deal in this "poison" and hence he refuses the 
title of philosopher. It must be noted, of course, that Pirandello 
is not dealing with linguistic analysis and might very well have 
got on splendidly with Frege or Quine. This "rejection of logic" 
is not to be misconstrued as some facile espousal of illogic, which 
whatever else might be its consequences would necessarily remove 
one permanently from the realm of philosophy. Pirandello, like 
other existentialists, is merely stressing the value of individual 
human experience as opposed to rigid a priori systems. 
One of the most basic tenets of existentialism (if existentialism 
may be said to have tenets) is that which stresses the irreducible 
value of personal experience. Communication of the content of 
that uniquely personal phenomenon is held to be impossible. No 
one person can prescribe for another what life is or how the 
other should act. To do so on the basis of one's own personal 
experience would be, among other things, to attempt to communicate 
the incommunicable. For this reason, most existentialists have 
used essays only in conjunction with their other works: short 
stories, plays, and novels, in order to provide a more formal 
background or a frame of reference against which to interpret 
these. In a way reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein's distinction 
between "saying" and "showing", these latter are thought the 
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proper media for the existentialist writer because they have the 
power to evoke in the reader (or the audience) those responses, 
albeit vicariously, which cannot be "explained', "taught", or "said" 
in an essay. 
...existentialists see the right method of phil-
osophising as descriptive or revelatory. The 
philosopher is not so much concerned to explain 
or to systematise as to evoke, to show, to reveal. 
As Heidegger says: "I cannot prove anything 
in philosophy; but I think I can show some 
things." And novels, plays, poetry, biography 
and autobiography can be just as "revealing" 
as formal philosophical analysis. 
Of course, non-existentialist philosophers have also been tempted 
by this dichotomy between showing and saying or telling, but 
the existentialists have made this distinction central to their 
philosophy, and historically they have made more use of the novel 
and the play than have other philosophers. 
In her introduction to Being and Nothingness Mary Warnock 
describes Sartre's own use of example as not only an illustration 
but an essential element in Sartre's argumentation. She explains; 
(...)we are made to feel and, as it were, ex-
perience in our own persons, the shock which 
the eavesdropper experiences, the change that 
his internal feelings undergo at the moment when 
he is aware of being watched. It would have 
been possible to present an argument which would 
have led in the same direction, in a far more 
external, Aristotelian way; we might, that is, 
simply have been asked to agree to the fact 
that the emotion of shame entails the idea of 
another person, and therefore to agree that, if 
anyone experiences shame, that person at least 
must believe that other people exist. This would 
have been possible; but it would not have been 
an existentialist form of argument. As it is, 
we are asked not to agree to a proposition but 
to experience, in imagination a familiar emotion. 
And while we are under the impact of it, we 
are asked whether we do not therefore neces-
sarily believe that other people exist, and that 
they determine our own mode of existence. To 
understand the anecdote and reject the general 
conclusion would be to assert a contradiction. 
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There is, of course, a similar use of illustrative example in 
Pirandello. Whether it is indeed possible for a literary work 
to express a philosophic thesis is a question which need not 
concern us here. The point is that Pirandello has chosen the 
same set of literary forms as Sartre, and they have both tried 
to expound their theses by causing the reader or the audience 
to experience a certain realitS vScue, If this is not a valid 
philosophical methodology—as well it may not be—then Sartre 
too must be excluded from philosophy, in which case what is 
to be done with the term "existentialist philosopher"? Hence, 
the usefulness or legitimacy of an "illustrative" rather than a 
deductive methodology is not at issue. Rather, given that the 
recognised existentialist philosophers used such a methodology, 
Pirandello's choice of literacy form cannot of itself exclude him 
from the title "philosopher". 
C. Previous Works in the Area 
We have seen that Pirandello was not recognised as a 
philosopher during his own life-time. Is, then, the idea of 
classifying him as a philosopher, and in particular a pre-
exist entialist philosopher completely new? As far back as 1953 
Eric Bentley in his essay "Pirandello's Joy and Torment" suggested 
that Pirandello's vision had much in common with that of the then 
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contemporary existentialist novelists. In 1961 at the International 
Congress of Pirandellian Studies held in Venice, Vera Passeri Pignoni 
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presented a paper, entitled "Luigi Pirandello and Existentialist 
Philosophy", (published in the Congress Proceedings six years 
later in order to mark the hundredth anniversary of Pirandello's 
birth). In 1962 Sergio Pacific! included in A Guide to Contemporary 
Italian Literature a section on existentialism in which Pirandello 
figures quite prominently, and in which he specifically refers 
to Pirandello as an existentialist avant la Jet tre. In 1964, 
Franz Rauhut published a book entitled Per Junge Pirandello (The 
Young Pirandello) in which he discusses the existentialist themes 
found in Pirandello's youthful works, particularly his poetry. 
The concept of Pirandello as some sort of an existentialist "or 
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pre-existentialist or a forerunner of today's existentialists" 
therefore, is not new. 
What is the purpose then, of going beyond these articles and 
this book? What in fact is the aim of this thesis? Vera Passeri 
Pignoni's article, like all other previous works on Pirandello, 
is written from the point of view of a literary critic and, in 
the way of literary critics, certain hypotheses are taken as 
conclusion without sufficient substantiation. This may be due 
to the fact that it was written for an audience of Pirandello 
scholars who, the author may have assumed, were both sympathetic 
to her interpretation as well as being entirely familiar with the 
supporting examples which were evidently considered too obvious to 
mention. Nevertheless, construed as a contribution to philosophical 
12 
scholarship the article is not sufficiently thorough and rigorous 
to establish Pirandello as an existentialist. Sergio Pacifici's 
article is more substantial, and important existentialist themes 
are noted in Pirandello's works. However, it is a short article 
which once again has no pretentions at being an in-depth study 
of the subject. Rauhut's book Per Junge Pirandello is a much more 
exhaustive study, but it deals primarily with Pirandello's poetry 
in which are found many very trite themes which are then given an 
existentialist interpretation. The author defends this by stating 
that while these themes are platitudes, "platitudes are the most 
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important themes of human thought". As well, many of Rauhut's 
conclusions are interesting but mere assertions, as, for example, 
the claim that Pirandello should be classed with the Christian 
existentialist Gabriel Marcel based only on the "evidence" of two 
rather mysteriously pantheistic poems of his youth - 0 Notte. 0 
Sacra notte and 0 gloriosa pace. Finally, the book limits itself 
to an examination of Pirandello's youthful works rather than to 
an examination of the entire corpus of his writings. 
D. Purpose. Scope and Format 
This thesis, therefore, attempts to examine all of Pirandello's 
works in order to discover whether he can be justifiably termed 
an existentialist avant la lettre. Wo attempt is being made to 
justify existentialism itself, as this would be a quite different 
task and one better done by someone more sympathetic to that 
13 
philosophy. Nor is it asserted that Pirandello's ideas are wholly 
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original, any more than are those of Sartre, for example. The 
interesting question presents itself whether Sartre may have 
derived some of his philosophy from Pirandello, whose plays, after 
all, were translated into French and presented before enthusiastic 
Parisian audiences, M. Sartre, himself, before his death refused 
to enlighten us on this matter, either in print or by way of 
personal correspondence, and such a conclusion remains outside of 
the scope of this thesis. The research contained herein, however, 
will, it is hoped, be of use to some future historian of ideas who 
may perhaps be able to establish some causal relation between 
the similarities found in these two writers. 
It is assumed that the reader will have some general knowledge 
of French existentialism, but it is not assumed that he will be in 
any way familiar with the works of Pirandello. For this reason, 
extensive use has been made of quotations, and of any story to 
which reference has been made, the plot and themes have been at 
least briefly discussed. 
The principle of division of this thesis into chapters has 
been a thematic one. Thus each chapter will deal with a major 
existentialist theme and will be further divided into relevant 
minor themes. 
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Let us now proceed to an analysis of the works of Luigi 
Pirandello to see if we can establish an "obvious and vast 
similarity" to recognised existentialist works, a similarity which 
will be sufficient for us to term him an existentialist avant la 
lettre. 
The major themes which will be examined in this thesis include 
freedom; the "absurd" with its effect on a theory of values and 
the related notion of "bad faith"; the nature of reality; and the 
self and its relation to others. 
15 
CHAPTER II - FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Sartre and Pirandello; a General Comparison 
Individual freedom and responsibility are the fundamental 
concepts which lie at the basis of Sartre's existentialism. As he 
states in his popular essay L'Exi31entialisme est un humanisme: 
(...) there is no determinism, man is free, man is 
freedom. (...) Thus, we have neither behind us 
nor before us, in the luminous domain of values, 
either justifications or excuses. We are alone, 
without excuses. It is this which I will express 
by saying that man is condemned to be free. (...) 
he is responsible for all that he does. 
Comparing the ideas of Sartre and Pirandello yields some 
very interesting parallels. The following are several well-known 
views concerning individual freedom, as held by Jean-Paul Sartre, 
(at least in the earlier part of his career before he became 
Marxist and then Maoist). Let us examine how closely the ideas 
of Pirandello resemble these. 
1, According to Sartre, for men there is no such antecedently given 
thing as what Medieval philosophers called "essence". Existence 
precedes essence. First man exists. He then becomes aware of 
himself and begins to define himself. At first he is nothing. 
For Sartre freedom is identical with man's existence. 
(...) freedom in its foundation coincides with the 
nothingness which is at the heart of man. Human 
reality is free because it is not enough. It 
is free because it is perpetually wrenched away 
from itself and because it has been separated by 
a nothingness from what it is and from what it 
will be. It is free, finally, because its present 
being is itself a nothingness in the form of the 
"reflect ion-reflecting". Man is free because he 
is not himself but presence to himself. The being 
which is what it is can not be free. Freedom is 
precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be 
at the heart of man and which forces human 
reality to make itself instead of to be. As 
we have seen, for human reality, to be is to 
choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from 
the outside or from within which it can receive 
or accept. 
Freedom is the being of man. 
Thus freedom is not a being; it is the being of 
man - i,e. his nothingness of being. If we start 
by conceiving man as a plenum, it is absurd 
to try to find in him afterwards moments or 
psychic regions in which he would be free. As 
well look for emptiness in a container which one 
has filled beforehand up to the brim! Man can 
not be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he 
is wholly and forever free or he is not free at 
all. 
Pirandello was not worried about justifying his position, 
so he did not bother about the "technical" matter of whether 
existence precedes essence or not. However, Pirandello questions 
over and over what the "essence" of man is. Time and time again 
his characters (as Sartre would say) rise up in the world, meet 
themselves and find that they are nothing until and unless they 
will use their freedom to make themselves whatever it is they 
choose. In fact, the final line of Pirandello's play Trovarsi is 
precisely this conclusion; "One must create oneself, create! And 
then only one finds oneself." 
2. For Sartre, the decision as to what one would like to be 
is not a decision made by the will alone; that is, the decision 
cannot be said to have been made until whatever thoughts one 
may have are translated into acts, for it is acts which count. 
18 
not words or intentions. Intentions and motives cannot be looked 
at separately as if they were the "causes" of an act for we 
choose our intentions and our motives as well, 
(...) it is in fact impossible to find an act 
without a motive but this does not mean that 
we must conclude that the motive causes the 
act; the motive is an integral part of the 
act. For as the resolute project toward a 
change is not distinct from the act, the motive, 
the act, and the end are all constituted in a 
single upsurge. Each of these three structures 
claims the two others as its meaning. But the 
organised totality of the three is no longer 
explained by any particular structure, and its 
upsurge as the pure temporalizing nihilation of 
the in-itself is one with freedom. It is the act 
which decides its end and its motives, and the 
act is the expression of freedom. 
Feelings too are made up of acts, which we choose. Passions 
have no power of themselves because we choose our own passions. 
"There is no love except that which we show in acts and no genius 
but that which is expressed in works of art.' 
19 
Pirandello is in perfect accord with Sartre here. He stresses 
the existence of conflicting passions and how one must choose 
freely between them as does Sartre in his (Sartre's) famous example 
of the young man who cannot choose between patriotism and duty, 
and love toward his mother and so cannot decide if he should stay 
home by her side or go off to join the Resistance. Pirandello's 
play La Siqnora Morli. una e due is very much to the point here. 
Should the Signora remain true to her lover or leave him and 
return to her husband? What values should be chosen and on what 
basis? Pirandello stresses another difficulty, however. While it 
is true that words do not have the value that acts have and to 
simply "wish" to be something which one is not has no value at 
all, even acts are extremely subjective. For Pirandello, there is 
no "objective" value to a particular act. There is the act as 
I intend it to be. There is the completed act as I see it, the 
act as it is seen by another person and another and another, an 
infinite series of act3 which can therefore have no "objective" 
value. We do have, however, total responsibility for our acts and 
therefore our existence, as we shall see in more detail later on. 
Nor, insists Sartre, is a temperment an act, "There is always 
the possibility for the coward to cease being a coward or for 
the hero to cease being a hero." 
(...) for consciousness (there is) the permanent 
possibility of effecting a rupture with its own 
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past, of wrenching itself away from its past so 
as to be able to consider it in the light of 
a non-being and so as to be able to confer on 
it the meaning which it does not have. Under 
no circumstances can the past in any way by 
itself produce an act. 
Pirandello agrees but stresses the difficulty of such a 
change, Pirandello uses the image of a mask (or many masks) which 
each of us wears. After a shock or some kind of bizarre experience, 
or sometimes merely as the result of reflection, with a feeling 
of nausea and vertigo, we see ourselves as we are, unmasked, and 
this may be the turning point (as in Sartre's Nausee. which was 
written two years after Pirandello's death!) in our lives at which 
point we either sink into "nothingness" or affirm our liberty. 
3. Because of the great weight of responsibility placed upon 
us by this total freedom from any objective values, one lives 
continuously in a state of "metaphysical anguish". It would be 
so much easier to act according to some a priori code or because 
of some inner necessity. If we succumb to the temptation to deny 
our responsibility and make our human nature, society or some 
other so-called necessity the arbiter of our actions so as to 
escape this anguish, we are in what Sartre calls "bad faith". 
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We are not free not to be free. This would be to deny our 
own being which is freedom. It would be a form of "bad faith". 
We said that freedom is not free not to be free 
and that it is not free not to exist. This is 
because the fact of not being able not to be 
free is the facticity of freedom, and the fact of 
not being able not to exist is its contingency. 
Contingency and facticity are really one; there 
is a being which freedom has to be in the form 
of non-being (that is, of nihilation). To exist 
as the fact of freedom or to have to be a being 
in midst of the world are one and the same 
thing, and this means that freedom is originally 
g 
a relation to the given. 
Pirandello also illustrates this theme, especially in II fu 
Mattia Pascal, but he sees all around himself examples of people 
choosing not to be free and he shows an attitude toward them 
which is perhaps somewhat more compassionate than Sartre's. 
However Pirandello is in complete agreement with Sartre (see 
especially Hon si sa come and II Fu Mattia Pascal). Over and 
over again, while stressing the difficulties, he contrasts those 
characters who assume their responsibility and live their freedom 
with those who see themselves as prisoners of life, society or 
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whatever other excuse they have constructed for themselves. The 
difficulty of changing from being this latter type of person to 
one who accepts his freedom and his consequent responsibility 
is a major Pirandellian theme as will be seen in the following 
section concerning U, fu Mattia Pascal. 
4. Sartre insists that we must draw the full consequences of 
atheism. Not only is God a useless and costly hypothesis which 
we must give up, but Sartre believes that since He does not 
exist, there can be no a priori values. This is an obvious non 
sequitur, but in order to avoid what, for present purposes, would 
be an irrelevant discussion on this issue, let us take these as 
two separate postulates of Sartre's existentialism: there are no 
a priori values, and God does not exist. We choose the values 
which we want, and it is our choice alone which confers upon them 
their value. We are free to choose as we think best. 
Mary Warnock, in her introduction to Being and Nothingness 
puts quite succinctly Sartre's ideas concerning the origin of 
values: 
We can understand, moreover, how it is that 
human beings inevitably ascribe values to things. 
Without any contrivance, just by perceiving the 
world, they perceive values. Values 'spring up 
around them like partridges.' But the chief 
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lesson which we should learn is to avoid the 
'spirit of seriousness'. This is definedC.) as 
that which makes us pretend that values are 
absolute, given somehow independently of any 
human subjective judgment. This spirit makes us 
pretend that the quality of being desirable or 
undesirable is somehow a quality of the things 
themselves, like redness or roundness. Once this 
spirit has been dismissed, then it necessarily 
follows that a man will recognise himself as the 
source of all values, and when he has done this 
it will follow that he realizes that he can choose 
to value whatever he likes, and is free from the 
restraint of the conventional, the established 
or the apparently inescapable bonds of duty or 
taboo.10 
Pirandello came from a society where the notion of God 
permeated the entire social structure. Because of this, Pirandello 
treads rather lightly in this area. Certainly he rejects organised 
religion, and if he believed in God at all, it was plainly not in 
a traditional Christian concept of Him. How is one to interpret 
a statement like, "God is what is the best in each of us"? Was 
Pirandello espousing some type of pantheism? In my opinion, unable 
or unwilling because of social conditions in Italy at the time, to 
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make a clear statement of atheism, Pirandello used this ambiguous 
statement to express the same views as Sartre. This seems to me 
to be clearly indicated, although of course, not proven, in such 
works as La Sagra del Signore della nave. Lazzaro. and Non si sa 
come. God, namely the supreme value, is what is best in each of 
us, namely our freedom. Liberty is the supreme value. Sartre 
states that in choosing our own liberty we are choosing others' 
liberty as well. While Sartre wouldn't call this kindness, I think 
Pirandello would. The case for Pirandello's being a Christian 
existentialist a" la Gabriel Marcel has been made, (in my opinion 
very poorly) on the basis that kindness seems to be for him an 
a priori absolute value. Such an argument is a difficult one 
to sustain, because aside from the problem of connecting theism 
and absolute values, at no point does the author place kindness 
above the affirmation of one's personal liberty, in fact, quite 
the contrary. 
5. According to Sartre since there is no God, there is no 
determinism. Man is freedom, says Sartre. On the other hand, 
since God doesn't exist and there are no absolute values to which 
to refer, we have no justification, no excuses. We are condemned 
to be free, 
Pirandello's ideas coincide so much with Sartre's on the point 
of being condemned to freedom that he actually uses that precise 
term in Non si sa come, written in 1934, a number of years before 
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Sartre uses it. He explores the seeming need for law and its 
ultimate uselessness or destructiveness in La nuova colonia. and 
he deals time and time again with characters in their attempts, 
successful or not, to defy social convention. 
6. Although there is, according to Sartre, no human nature, there 
is a human condition, the historical and physical circumstances 
in which one finds himself. These have both a subjective and 
an objective value, objective because omnipresent, and subjective 
because they have no meaning except as we live them and exercise 
our freedom in relation to them. 
Thus I shall apprehend myself at any moment 
whatsoever as engaged in the world at my 
contingent place. But it is precisely this 
engagement which gives meaning to my contingent 
place and which is my freedom. To be sure, in 
being born I take a place, but I am responsible 
for the place which I take. We can see clearly 
here the inextricable connection of freedom and 
facticity in the situation. Without facticity 
freedom would not exist-as a power of nihilation 
and of choice- and without freedom facticity would 
12 
not be discovered and would have no meaning. 
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Nearly all of Pirandello's works deal with man trying to assert 
his freedom in the historical, social, and physical circumstances 
in which he finds himself. The problem of the extent of the power 
of these circumstances over the individual is a central theme 
of his writings. In fact, Gaetano Munaf6 in his recent work on 
Pirandello writes: 
(...) it seems to me that form all of the works o£ 
the great writer and dramatist one can really 
draw several conclusions which could, for example, 
be summarised like this: (...Affirmation of our 
absolute interior freedom from any tie which 
13 
would tend to limit it (...) 
As we have seen from the above six examples comparing 
Pirandello's ideas with those of Sartre, the Sicilian bears a close 
resemblance to the famous existentialist. Let us now turn to 
a closer examination of Pirandello's ideas concerning freedom as 
exemplified in his works. 
B. Freedom as Exemplified in U. Fu Mattia Pascal 
Although the question of the possibility of individual human 
freedom appears numerous times in Pirandello's works, it is nowhere 
treated as deeply as it is in II Fu Mattia Pascal (The Late Mattia 
Pascal). Most other allusions to this problem found in Pirandello's 
writings take on meaning only in reference to this work. It is 
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appropriate here to note that any philosophical interpretation of 
a literary work will be subject to the familiar general criticism 
suggesting that the evidence for any particular interpretation 
is inevitably less than conclusive. Moreover, it is notoriously 
difficult to separate the meaning of a philosophical thesis from 
the support provided for it, and it is especially difficult when we 
want to attribute a philosophical position based on evidence which 
is atypical. Assuming, of course, that a proposed interpretation 
is not simply vacuous, its consistent applicability to the whole 
of an author's works must be taken as sufficient evidence for 
giving the validity of that interpretation weighty consideration. 
Let us proceed then to an examination of the evidence. Mattia 
Pascal is a novel concerning a rather poorly educated young man 
whose family has been reduced from modest wealth to poverty by 
the thieving of Malagna, the manager of the Pascal estates since 
the death of Mattia's father. Pirandello paints the picture of 
a person who seems to lack any will of his own, prey to the 
events of the life which surrounds him but in which he doesn't 
seem to really participate. There are elements of Gide's hero of 
the acte gratuit, available for whatever adventure comes his way 
and at the same time Sartre's prototype of bad faith {mauvaise 
foi). Mattia falls into a job, the most boring and useless one 
imaginable. He allows himself to be pushed into an odious marriage 
and family situation. In a misguided attempt to save an old family 
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friend (Malagna's second wife) from the beatings and censure given 
to a sterile woman, he impregnates her, and thus his own child is 
abandoned to the care of his bitterest enemy. In short, through 
episode after episode, life becomes more and more unbearable for 
Mattia until he decides to run away to America. Physical freedom 
from all ties seems to him to be the only answer. 
Taking with him a small amount of money which his brother 
had sent for other purposes, he makes his escape. Frightened, 
however, of arriving in a new country with hardly any money, he 
gets off the train in Marseilles, and in his meandering about the 
town he sees a book on roulette in a shop window. On impulse he 
buys it, and in a twelve day stint at the Monte Carlo Casino, 
he wins a fortune. Returning home on the train, he reads in 
a newspaper the news of his own death. At first shocked and 
horrified, he realises that this combination of circumstances will, 
at last, give him the opportunity of experiencing the complete 
freedom he has been seeking. 
Taking a new identity, rich, with no ties, he sets about finding 
this much-prized liberty. In what does it consist? Freedom from 
family ties, geographical freedom, freedom from one's past? Mattia 
Pascal tries all of these and finds that they are but the illusions 
of true freedom. Feeling himself suffocated by nausea, anger, and 
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hatred of himself, he awakens to the realisation that true 
liberty consists in a free choice made within the confines of our 
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historical and social conditions. Mattia feels the great difficulty 
in accepting such liberty and therefore such responsibility, but 
he throws off his false identity, goes back to his village, and 
begins a truly new life as the "defunct Mattia Pascal", 
The major themes of this novel are therefore: bad faith, the 
illusion of complete materialistic liberty which little by little 
is changed into the realisation of the nature of true freedom, 
and the acceptance of this latter. 
1. Mattia's Bad faith 
Bad faith is defined by Sartre as the masking of one's anguish 
over his total responsibility, his absolute freedom of choice. This 
is usually accomplished either by making someone else responsible 
for a particular action or choice, or by asserting that we couldn't 
have chosen or acted other than we did. On the very first page 
of the book Mattia Pascal blames circumstances for his fate: 
(...) one must really become indignant (...) over 
the corruption of morals, and the vices and the 
sadness of the times which can be the cause of 
such harm to a poor innocent. 
As Mattia is becoming involved in the adventure which will lead 
to his wretched marriage, he questions his motives, 
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Why was I showing such anxiety to marry off 
Romilda? For nothing. I repeat: for the sole 
pleasure of impressing Pomino. 
There is no question of responsibility here. It is almost an acte 
gratuit, except that it is in no way in conformity with Mattia's 
"inner self". 
Another example of bad faith which has always been, as it 
happens, extremely common in Italy, is to take refuge in history, 
a continuous study of the past, not as a source of wisdom for 
choice of actions in the future, but only as a means of furthering 
humanism, the glorifying of all of the human race. Pirandello uses 
the occasion of Mattia Pascal's useless job as caretaker of a 
collection of books which someone had donated to the town but 
which no one ever reads, to express some views on the subject. 
(...) he hoped that his bequest would with time 
and with availability kindle in their souls the 
love of study. Until now, I can testify, it hasn't 
been kindled: and this I say in praise of my 
fellow citizens. 
Sig. Romitelli, Mattia's companion in the library, deaf, one foot 
in the grave, spends his time reading and memorising the minute 
details of the lives of musicians, artists, lovers. He is the 
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caricature of the great humanists. Little by little, Mattia also 
takes up this pastime, but; 
I read a little of everything, disorganisedly, 
but especially books on philosophy. They weigh 
so much and yet he who is fed on such food and 
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swallows it lives in the clouds. 
It is interesting to note here the similarity between Pirandello's 
rejection of such food and that of the famous pre-existentialist 
Gide, as found in Les Caves du Vatican. 
It depends on the stomach. It pleases you to 
give the name of paradox to what yours refuses. 
As for me, I would let myself die of hunger in 
front of such a hash of bare bones as the logic 
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which I see you feed your characters on. 
Mattia Pascal has one physical defect, his eye. This 
ungovernable organ of sight represents Mattia's search for true 
freedom, and it is fixed only when he finds it. Mattia put down 
his reading but then: 
(...) I took it up again: and ... yes sir, I also 
began to read (along with Sig. Romitelli) with 
one eye because the other one didn't want to 
20 
have anything to do with it. 
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Another refuge from our anguish is in the belief that if 
circumstances had been different, we would have been better. 
Pirandello gives an example which is very similar to Sartre's 
example of the woman who says: "I haven't had any children to whom 
I could devote myself because I didn't find a man with whom I could 
have made my life. There remains, therefore, in me, unused and 
entirely viable a host of dispositions, inclinations, possibilities 
which makes me worth more than the simple series of my acts 
. ,. „21 
implies, 
(Miss CaporaleX...) wanted to live, she did, poor 
thing, and she judged as ungenerous those men 
who only pay attention to exterior beauty. So, 
intimately, in her soul, did she feel beautiful? 
Oh, who knows how many or what sacrifices she 
would have been capable of, if she had found a 
'generous man'. Perhaps she wouldn't have drunk 
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even a drop of wine anymore. 
Little by little Mattia Pascal begins to realise what bad faith 
is. 
We always have to blame someone for our hurts 
and our misfortunes (...) But how could I listen 
to it, this blessed voice of reason, if it spoke 
to me precisely through Papiano's mouth, who 
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was for me wrong, obviously wrong, blatantly 
wrong (...) Oh, is it possible that the voice of 
reason had to choose just Papiano's mouth to 
make itself heard by me? Or perhaps it was I, 
who, in order to find myself an excuse, put it 




We fool ourselves so easily! The most when we 
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want to believe something (...) 
The way isn't easy. Even after these discoveries, Pascal is 
tempted to fall back into bad faith, 
'My fault? How?' I said. 'That good woman makes 
a mistake, first of all, recognising the body of 
some poor fellow who drowned himself, then she 
hurriedly marries again, and the fault is mine? 
25 
and I should take her back? 
Back in the library, by choice now rather than chance, at 
the insistence of his friend don Eligio, the new librarian, Mattia 
Pascal writes his memoires. From these don Eligio draws the lesson 
that: 
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(...) outside of the law and outside of those 
particulars, happy or sad as they may be, because 
of which we are who we are, dear Mr. Pascal, it 
26 
is not possible to live. 
But Pascal makes him note that in fact he was doing just that. 
He neither revised his civil status under the law nor re-entered 
into those particulars. Who is he? 
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'Eh, my friend ... I am the late Mattia Pascal.' 
2. Illusion of Complete Liberty 
We hide our anguish in some instances by pretending we aren't 
really free or to the other extreme, we feel chained, impotent 
and seek a kind of liberty which will free us from any and all 
ties or bounds. We feel that if we can change our circumstances, 
we will be free. It is this kind of freedom which first attracts 
Mattia. Returning home in the train, he sees the notice of his 
own death in the paper. 
(...) in a flash I saw ... but of course! ray 
liberation, freedom, a new life. 
Having begun this new life, Mattia reflects: 
Now I would have liked that not only exteriorly 
but also in the most intimate part of me that 
there not remain any further trace of him (the 
old Mattia Pascal). I was alone now, and more 
alone than I was, I could not ever be on the face 
of this earth, released from every tie and every 
obligation, free, new, and absolutely master of 
myself, without even the burden of my past and 
with the future before me that I could shape 
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as I liked. 
As much as to obey fortune as to satisfy my 
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own need, I began to make myself a new man. 
'And above all,' I said to myself, 'I will take care 
of my freedom: I will lead it over comfortable 
and always new roads: neither will I ever make 
it wear any heavy garment. I will close my eyes 
and pass by as soon as the spectacle of life 
at any point becomes unpleasant. I will take 
care to make my life rather with things which 
are called inanimate and I will go in search of 
beautiful views, of pleasant tranquil places. I 
will give myself little by little a new education: 
I will transform myself with loving and patient 
study, so that in the end, I will be able to say 
not only that I have lived two lives but that 
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I have been two men. 
(...) I wanted to live for myself too, in the 
present. From time to time I was assailed by 
the idea of my unbounded and unique liberty, 
and I would feel a sudden happiness so strong 
that I would nearly loose myself in a blessed 
stupor. 
I wanted to believe that (...) I, Adriano Meis, after 
having wandered for a while in that new unlimited 
freedom had finally gained my equilibrium, reached 
the ideal that I had set before me, to make of 
myself another man, to live another life that 
now, here, I felt full within me. 
These excerpts serve the same purpose as Sartre's description 
of M. Roquentin. Maurice Cranston writes: 
Roquentin is, we might fancy, a remarkably free 
man. He is thirty and has a modest private 
income; he has no family and no job, none of 
the so-called 'ties'. He has travelled widely; he 
can do what he wants and live where he chooses. 
'Free' we may want to call him: but Sartre is 
out to persuade us that Roquentin is not really 
free. He is degagS or uncommitted; and it is 
one of Sartre's central beliefs that dSgagement 
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is only a mockery of freedom, is, in fact, a form 
of running away from freedom, 
3. False liberty versus True Liberty 
At first, Mattia Pascal, convinced that he has found liberty, 
is merely annoyed at small inconveniences which life, nevertheless, 
imposes upon him. Even the fortune he has made will not last 
forever. 
I would have liked to go beyond Cologne, at least 
to Norway, but then I thought I had better impose 
a little restraint on my liberty. 
Walking along one day, Pascal sees a little puppy which he would 
like to buy, but he sees that this would involve the first 
compromise of his liberty, and he passes on. 
I went away, considering, however, for the first 
time that it was beautiful, yes, undoubtedly, 
this liberty of mine so boundless, but also just 
a bit of a tyrant. 
The cause of all our ills, (...) do you know what 
it is? Oemocracy, dear friend, democracy, that 
is government by the majority. Because when 
power is in the hands of one alone, this one 
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knows he is alone and must satisfy the many; 
but when the many govern, they only think of 
satisfying themselves, and so you have then the 
most stupid and hateful of tyrannies: tyranny 
masked as liberty. But surely! Oh, why do you 
think that X suffer? I suffer precisely for this 
tyranny masked as liberty. 
Mattia would like to settle down and have a home of his own, but 
this is impossible because he would then have to be registered 
on the tax role, etc. and eventually found out. He discovers the 
impossibility of even having a real friend. 
'Free', I kept on saying: but already I began 
to penetrate the meaning and to measure the 
confines of this my liberty. 
Little by little, Mattia realises that this unbounded freedom from 
all social ties is an illusion. Not that it couldn't be achieved 
- after all he could have solved all of his problems by obtaining 
false papers - but in the sense that even if it is achieved, it 
isn't true freedom because this kind of liberty means that one 
doesn't live. There is no life without some kind of commitment. 
You will always and everywhere be a stranger 
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... a stranger to life, Adriano Meis. 
The truth was perhaps this: that in my boundless 
liberty, it turned out to be difficult for me 
to begin to live in some way. On the point of 
making a decision, I felt myself held back. I 
seemed to see so many impediments and shadows 
40 
and obstacles. 
I could almost believe myself to be really drowned 
at the Stia and that in the meanwhile, I am 
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illuding myself that I am alive. 
I had seemed to me to be a streak of luck to 
be believed dead. Well, I am really dead. Dead? 
Worse than dead ... the dead don't ever have to 
die again, and I do. I am still alive for death 
and dead for life. What life, in fact, can mine 
v 42 
ever be. 
The life which I had seen in front of me free, 
free, free was nothing at bottom but an illusion 
which could not become reality except very 
superficially and more of a slave than ever, 
slave to pretending, to the lies which with such 
disgust I saw myself forced to use, slave to the 
fear of being discovered, even though I committed 
no crime. 
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Realising that he had chosen the wrong path to liberty or rather 
chosen an illusion of liberty instead of the real thing, Mattia 
Pascal decides to give up his life as Adriano Meis and return to 
his village. 
Crazy! How could I have deluded myself into 
believing that the trunk could live cut off from 
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its roots. 
That had seemed to me to be liberation! Yes, 
with the leaden weight of lies on my back. A 
leaden weight on the back of a shadow ... now I 
would have again my wife on my back and that 
mother-in-law ... but didn't I have them on my 
back even as a dead man? Now at least I was 
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alive, and on the war path. 
But of course, I'm going back! (...) I'm not the 
same person as before, you know. 
Thus Mattia Pascal rejects the illusion of complete liberty in 
the popular sense of being without ties or encumbrances. He 
realises that true freedom consists of a conscious choice within 
the personal and historical circumstances in which one finds 
oneself. 
It was a moment, but eternity. I felt inside 
myself all the confusion of blind necessities, 
of things which can't be changed: the prison of 
time; being born now, and not before or after; 
the name and the body which is given to us; the 
chain of causality; the seed thrown out by that 
man: my father without wanting to be; my coming 
into the world, from that seed; involuntary fruit 
of that man; tied to that branch (...) 
Another illustration of the necessity to choose within given 
circumstances in contrast with the illusory freedom found in the 
escape from those circumstances is found in the short story 
Lontano. The nausea, the anger, the suffocation, the strange 
sensations of his final awakening to the true nature of liberty 
are reminiscent of Sartre's M. Roquentin. He would have almost 
wished to reject this new-found liberty. 
I could have put out that eye with my own 
finger! What did it matter to me anymore its 
being fixed? 
And how could I go on living? No, no, enough! 1 
stopped. I saw everything waver before my eyes, 
I felt my legs begin to give way at the sudden 
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welling up of an obscure feeling which made me 
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shiver from head to foot. 
Two further examples of people choosing freedom despite the 
acknowledged difficulty of doing so are found in the short stories 
Fuga. in which the choice is represented somewhat symbolically and 
Volare. in which a young woman goes contrary to the expectations 
of society and chooses to leave her destitute family in order to 
find a life of her own. 
Pirandello describes the moment of Mattia's final complete 
rejection of his past (lives), his passage from bad faith to true 
freedom, 
I remained, I don't know for how long, there in 
that chair, thinking, now with my eyes wide open, 
now retreating into myself, angrily, as if to rid 
myself of a terrible inner spasm. I saw, finally; I 
saw in all its crudeness the fraud of my illusion; 
what it was at bottom that had seemed to me the 
greatest of fortunes in the first drunkenness of 
my liberation. I had already experienced how my 
liberty which had at first seemed limitless, in 
fact, was limited by the lack of money; then I had 
also realised that instead of liberty it could 
have been called solitude and boredom and that 
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it condemned me to a terrible punishment: that 
of my own company; I had then tried to get close 
to others; but the resolution to keep myself 
carefully from re-attaching even ever so loosely 
the cut cords, of what use had it been? See: they 
had re-attached themselves, those ties; and life, 
as much as I, already on guard, opposed it, life 
dragged me along, with its irresistible pull; life 
that wasn't for me any longer. Ah, now I really 
was aware, now that I could stand no longer the 
vain pretexts, the almost puerile pretendings, 
the pitiful, low excuses which prevented me from 
assuming consciousness of my feeling. 
Each person alone must make his own way. Mattia cannot 
follow in the footsteps of his brother, for example. When he is in 
Monte Carlo on his extraordinary winning streak, he must refuse 
to play with anyone else's money. No rule or law set by anyone 
else can govern his life if he is to find his freedom. The choice 
is between liberty and nothingness, 
Who was I? No one. 
Again the thought of my absolute impotence, of 
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my nothingness assailed me, crushed me. 
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And yet, free to do anything, he is not free not to choose, for 
that is death. 
Whoever understands, in fact, says: I mustn't do 
this, I mustn't do that, not to commit this or 
that folly. Wonderful! But at a certain point 
one realises that life is one large folly and so 
you tell me then, what does it mean never to 
have committed a folly? It signifies at least, 
(...) illuding myself that I could become another 
man, live another life. Another man, yes, but 
only provided that I didn't do anything. And 
so, then, what man? The shadow of a man! And 
what life? As long as I was content to remain 
closed within myself and to watch others live, 
yes, I could have to one extent or another held 
onto the illusion that I was living another life, 
but now (...) 
Life, considered that way, as an extraneous 




In this way, Pirandello has illustrated the major themes of JX 
fu Mattia Pascal: bad faith, the illusion of complete liberty which 
little by little is changed into the realisation of the nature of 
true freedom and the acceptance of this latter. 
Thus we can see emerging from this analysis of Jl fu Mattia 
Pascal an existentialist philosophy of freedom with its related 
notions of responsibility and bad faith, the necessary loneliness 
of each man's search for liberty, the necessity of choice and the 
condemnation of anything which tends to take away from man's 
freedom, 
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CHAPTER m - THE ABSURD 
A. Introduction 
While for Sartre, the affirmation of man's absolute freedom 
and his consequent responsibility is generally taken to be the 
i 
centre point of his entire philosophy, for Camus the focus is 
on man's realisation of the absurd, of the futility of all action 
in the face of the inevitable fact of death, and his reaction tc 
this realisation. Ordinary man, like Meursault in Camus' novel 
L'etranger. or Roquentin in Sartre's La Nausee continues in the 
daily familiar routine of his life, taking for granted society's usual 
values, accepting unaware whatever life, fate or God sends. At a 
certain point, man is confronted with the ultimate meaninglessness 
of all action, the irrelevance of all values, the absurdity of his 
existence, in short, the human condition. Sartre describes this 
moment of realisation in physical terms as a feeling of dizziness or 
nausea. Camus describes it in terms perhaps a bit more poetical, 
but it is the point at which this realisation is attained that 
the emphasis of Sartre's philosophy differs somewhat from that 
of Camus. While Sartre sees the absurd as being overcome by the 
affirmation of one's absolute personal liberty in choosing to give 
value to a particular course of action and thus giving meaning to 
one's life; Camus views the absurd as man's permanent condition, 
no matter what course of action he chooses or how freely he 
chooses it. What is important is to act in full knowledge that 
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life will nevertheless remain meaningless. The absurd cannot be 
overcome. It is born of this confrontation between man's desire 
for absolutes, for the rational, and his true condition in the 
midst of an irrational universe. It is in the affirmation of 
one's own existence by the rejection of suicide despite the awful 
knowledge of sure defeat that man finds his victory, 
Notoriously the quest is by no means unique historically; man, 
it appears, has always looked for some sort of ultimate values, 
some absolute around which to shape his life, to guide his choice 
of actions. What is the status of this absolute or these values 
in a philosophy which takes as its basic premiss, the contingency, 
the superfluity, the meaninglessness of all existence? 
According to Sartre, all men live in the state of what he 
2 
describes as a type of "anguish" because they are aware of their 
true condition. Camus, rather than make such a boldly general 
claim, may usefully be regarded as envisioning three states of man: 
1) the time when he is unaware of the absurd, 2) the actual moment 
of realisation and 3) the life of a man after this realisation. He 
thus leaves open at least the theoretical possibility that a mar 
might live his entire life unaware of his condition with regard to 
the absurd. Leaving aside for the moment this possibility, what 
other reactions can man have to his awareness of the absurd? He 
may overcome it by the affirmation of his own freedom, as Sartre 
recommends; he may simply continue to live with his awareness of 
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it, as Camus suggests; or he may try in various ways to hide 
his anguish even from himself and live in a state of what Sartre 
calls "bad faith". What forms can this "bad faith" take? Is it 
to some extent inevitable in all of us? 
In order to answer these questions and see the relationship 
between Pirandello's philosophy and those of Sartre and Camus 
concerning the question of the absurd, we must first of all examine 
the nature of the absurd as it is explained in the works of 
Sartre, Camus and Pirandello. Next we must compare the moment 
of realisation of the absurd as described by the recognised 
existentialists and by Pirandello. And lastly we must examine 
the treatment by Sartre, Camus and Pirandello of the various 
possible reactions to the absurd, distinguishing between those 
which involve "bad faith" and those which may be said to affirm 
existentialist "values". 
B. The Nature pf the Absurd 
In The Mvth of Sisyphus. Camus defines what he means by 
the notion of the absurd. He describes the continual search by 
man for some kind of absolute: truth, knowledge, understanding, 
reason, - and the failure of the world to give this. 
I want everything to be explained to me or 
nothing. And the reason is impotent when it 
hears this cry from the heart. The mind aroused 
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by this insistence seeks and finds nothing but 
contradictions and nonsense. What I fail to 
understand is nonsense. The world is peopled 
with such irrationals. The world itself, whose 
single meaning I do not understand, is but a 
vast irrational. If one could say just once: 
'this is clear', all would be saved. But these 
men vie with one another in proclaiming that 
nothing is clear, all is chaos, that all man has 
is his lucidity and his definite knowledge of 
3 
the walls surrounding him. 
But it is not in the world itself that the absurd is found, but 
in the confrontation between man in his continual search for an 
absolute and the irrational world, 
I said that the world is absurd but I was too 
hasty. This world in itself is not reasonable, 
that is all that can be said. But what is absurd 
is the confrontation of the irrational and the 
will longing for clarity whose call echoes in the 
human heart. The absurd depends as much on 
Camus explains that his choice of the word "absurd" is not 
an arbitrary one but rather it is based on the common usage 
of the word in circumstances where it draws attention to the 
glaring ludicrousness of a particular juxtaposition of phenomena 
or situations precisely as it does in this case between man's 
desire for lucidity and the world's inherent irrationality. 
In all these cases, from the simplest to the most 
complex, the magnitude of the absurdity will be 
in direct ratio to the distance between the 
two terms of my comparison. There are absurd 
marriages, challenges, rancours, silences, wars 
and even peace-treaties. For each of them the 
absurdity springs from a comparison. I am thus 
justified in saying that the feeling of absurdity 
does not spring from the mere scrutiny of a fact 
or an impression but that it bursts from the 
comparison between a bare fact and a certain 
reality, between an action and the world that 
transcends it. The absurd is essentially a 
divorce. It lies in neither of the elements 
compared; it is born of their confrontation, 
In this particular case and on the plane of 
intelligence, I can therefore say that the absurd 
is not in man (if such a metaphor could have a 
meaning) nor in the world, but in their presence 
together. 
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Thus Camus, in using the word "absurd", highlights what he sees 
as the ludicrousness of man's desire for some kind of absolute, 
some antecedently given "meaning", some eternal "plan" which would 
explain all; in contrast with the inherent "meaninglessness" of 
the world. For Sartre, instead, "absurd" is not a relative term. 
Rather it is to be found in the total superfluity of any existant, 
Every being is "in the way" {de trop, superfluous), 
All these objects ... how can I explain? They 
inconvenienced me; I would have liked them to exist 
less strongly, more dryly, in a more abstract way, 
with more reserve. The chestnut tree pressed 
itself up against my eyes. (...) I realised that 
there was no half-way house between existence 
and non-existence and this flaunting abundance. 
(...) We were a heap of living creatures, irritated, 
embarassed at ourselves, we hadn't the slightest 
reason to be there, none of us, each one, confused, 
vaguely alarmed, felt in the way in relation to 
the others. (...) In the way, the chestnut tree 
there, opposite me, a little to the left. In the 
way the Velleda. (...) 
And I - (...) I, too, was in the way. 
Pirandello, too, speaks of superfluity. It lies precisely in 
man's awareness of the meaninglessness of his own life which 
causes him to forever seek to create for himself a reality in 
which his life will take on a meaning despite the realisation of 
the impossibility of this task, 
(...) men have in them a superfluity which con-
stantly and vainly torments them, never making 
them satisfied with any conditions, and always 
leaving them uncertain of their destiny. An in-
explicable superfluity, which, to afford itself an 
outlet, creates in nature an artificial world, a 
world that has a meaning and value for them alone, 
and yet one with which they themselves cannot 
ever be content, so that without pause they 
keep on frantically arranging and rearranging 
it, like a thing which, having been fashioned by 
themselves from a need to extend and relieve 
an activity of which they can see neither the 
end nor the reason, increases and complicates 
ever more and more their torments carrying them 
farther from the simple conditions laid down by 
nature for life on this earth, conditions to which 
only dumb animals know how to remain faithful 
and obedient. (...) 
Those actions that are fundamental and indis-
pensable to life, he too is obliged to perform 
and to repeat, day after day, like animals, if he 
does not wish to die. All the rest, arranged and 
rearranged continually, frantically, can hardly 
fail to reveal themselves sooner or later as 
illusions or vanities, being as they are the 
fruit of that superfluity, of which we do not 
see on this earth either the end or the reason. 
Sartre's "superfluity" is a simple notion. It lies in the lack 
of any sort of justification for the existence of any being. 
All beings are, therefore, superfluous, meaningless, de trop. At 
first, Pirandello seems to be attributing this superfluity to 
man's awareness of the absurd, and that if man were to destroy 
this awareness and live like the animals in harmony with nature, 
he could escape his own superfluity. That this is not the case, 
that in fact he is trapped by his superfluity is clear from the 
following passage: 
And for my friend Simone Pau the beauty of 
it is this: that he believes that he has set 
himself free from all superfluity, reducing all 
his wants to a minimum, depriving himself of every 
comfort and living the naked life of the snail, 
And he does not see that, on the contrary, he 
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by reducing himself thus, has immersed himself 
altogether in the superfluity and lives now by 
nothing else. 
In fact, as has been seen, Pirandello's notion of superfluity 
coincides with Sartre's, 
It is the awareness of this superfluity which causes Ro-
quentin's famous feeling of nausea. He tries to put a label on 
it. 
The word absurdity is coming to life under my 
pen; a little while ago, in the garden, I couldn't 
find it, but neither was I looking for it, I didn't 
need it; I thought without words, on things, with 
things. Absurdity was not an idea in my head, 
or the sound of a voice, only this long serpent 
dead at my feet, this wooden serpent. (...) I 
understood that I had found the key to Existence, 
the key to my own Nauseas, to my own life. In 
fact, all that I could grasp beyond that returns 
9 
to this fundamental absurdity. 
On the other hand, Sartre seems to differ from Camus in attributing 
the absurdity of things to their gratuitousness, rather than to 
the contrast between their gratuitousness and man's expectations 
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of some sort of meaningfulness in the world; but he does say that 
absurdity is relative to the "accompanying circumstances", 
Absurdity: another word; I struggle against 
words; down there 1 touched the thing. But I 
wanted to fix the absolute character of this 
absurdity here. A movement, an event in the tiny 
coloured world of men is only relatively absurd: 
by relation to the accompanying circumstances. 
(...) the world of explanations and reasons is 
not the world of existence. A circle is not 
absurd, it is clearly explained ... But neither 
does a circle exist. 
Sartre and Camus are in agreement, 
This discomfort in the face of man's own in-
humanity, this incalculable tumble before the 
image of what we are, this 'nausea', as a writer 
of today calls it, it is also the absurd. 
Time and time again, Sartre and Camus see man as searching for 
an externally given absolute, a certainty not within the realm of 
logical certainties or mathematical truths but in the sphere of 
the existant, the contingent. He is frustrated in his attempts 
and can find peace only through illusion. 
A stranger to myself and to the world, armed 
solely with a thought that negates itself as 
soon as it asserts, what is this condition in 
which I can have peace only by refusing to know 
and to live, in which the appetite for conquest 
bumps into walls that defy its assaults? To 
will is to stir up paradoxes. Everything is 
ordered in such a way as to bring into being 
that poisoned peace produced by thoughtlessness, 
lack of heart or fatal renunciations. Hence the 
intelligence, too, tells me in its way that this 
12 
world is absurd. 
Those who exist let themselves be encountered, 
but you can never deduce anything from them. 
I believe there are people who have understood 
this. Only they have tried to overcome this con-
tingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. 
But no necessary being can explain existence: 
contingency is not a delusion, a probability 
which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, 
consequently, the perfect free gift. (...) they 
cannot succeed in not feeling superfluous. And 
in themselves, secretly, they are superfluous. 
C...)13 
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In JX Signore della nave Pirandello illustrates the theme of 
a continual but fruitless search for the absolute. The pig lives 
happily while he lives. Man cannot because of his continual thirst 
for an absolute, in the instance of this short story - and its 
corresponding play - religion. Who, therefore, is more of a beast, 
the pig or man? What could be sadder, Pirandello asks, than men 
who, having debased themselves to the level of pigs, cannot even 
enjoy the earthly pleasure which this has brought but must run 
weeping after the statue of the absolute which they seek. 
No, no, you see? They're crying, they're crying! 
They got drunk, they brutified themselves, but 
no, here they are now crying after their bloody 
Christ! And you want more of a tragedy than 
this?14 
The Sicilian discusses this thirst for the absolute in 
L'umorismo. his major philosophical essay. 
(...) life, not having, fatally for human reason, 
a clear and determined end, it is necessary, in 
order not to grope in the abyss, that it have 
an individual, fictitious, illusory one for each 
man, either low or exalted, it matters little; 
since it isn't nor can it be, the real end, that 
everyone is anxiously seeking, perhaps because 
it doesn't exist. What is important is that 
one give importance to something, even if it is 
vain: it will be worth any other value which is 
taken seriously, because at bottom neither one 
nor the other will satisfy: since the burning 
thirst to know will always remain, the faculty of 
desiring will never be extinguished, and nothing 
says, unfortunately, that man's happiness will 
be found in progress. 
He, like Sartre and Camus, affirms the emptiness of objective 
reality. 
Pirandello, then (...) tends to sustain the the 
absolute unreality of all things and at the same 
time would like to demonstrate the reality of 
relativism in all things (...) he would affirm 
the absolute vanity, he would impune, that 
is, the dualism of Good and Evil, of Truth 
and Error, of Wisdom and Folly, of Life and 
Death, reconciling the opposites and reorganising 
them in the original unity of the absolute 
and undifferentiated Ego, and he would show as 
illusory the apparent differences, reducing them 
to the common denominator of their essential 
nothingness. 
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And yet this continual search for something absolute, some truth, 
some meaning in the midst of the emptiness of objective reality 
remains the human condition, 
If the unease of the times is seen in the 
contrast between an unsuppressible demand of 
man and the discovery of the constitutional 
impossibility of his satisfying it, Pirandello, 
while he defines the crisis of this historical 
moment, already he theorises about it as an 
absolute condition. The indisposition of the 
moment, in fact, is not made up of exclusively 
temporal circumstances like the passage between 
two systems of beliefs, as it is of the con-
sciousness of a perennial tearing apart of the 
human condition held between self-deception and 
dissatisfaction. The critical characteristics -
incommunicability, meaninglessness of action and 
oppressiveness of every rule and condition -
defined in the analysis of the historical moment 
they will constitute themselves as characteris-
tics of the absolute and perennial crisis which 
only now are appearing to consciousness. 
As Roquentin contemplates his discovery of the contingency 
of all existants, their superfluity, the very first word which 
60 
comes to his mind to describe these beings was "comic". He then 
rejects this word in favour of the "absurd".18 Pirandello, instead, 
chooses the word "humour". In his long essay on this topic, 
while attempting first of all to define the word and then discuss 
its relation with rhetoric and irony, its various characteristics 
in different cultures, the distinction between mere comedy and 
humour, its presence or absence in Italian literature and finally 
coming to conclusions regarding the essence, characteristics and 
subject matter of humour; it is clear that rather than analysing 
the concept of humour as commonly understood, Pirandello was 
speaking of a different concept, one which had up until that point 
barely been acknowledged and had never, until then, been clearly 
defined: the absurd. 
Every feeling, every thought, every movement 
which arises in the humourist is immediately 
doubled into its opposite; every yes into a no, 
that comes at last to assume the same value as 
the yes. The humourist might perhaps pretend 
sometimes to hold to one side: inside meanwhile 
the other feeling is talking to him, the one 
which seems not to have had the courage to be 
the first to reveal itself; it speaks to him and 
begins to put forth now a timid excuse, now some 
attenuating circumstance, which cools the ardour 
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of the first sentiment, sometimes a pointed 
reflection which takes apart the seriousness 
19 
and causes laughter. ' 
This very special laughter is but one reaction man can have 
to his sudden awareness of the absurd. Nothing can be taken 
too seriously once the artificiality of its value is seen. For 
Pirandello, the essence of humour is a sense of the contrary, an 
awareness of life as a parody, a continuous illusion to mask from 
ourselves the abyss which surrounds us. 
All phenomena are either illusory or the reason 
for them escapes us, inexplicable. Our knowledge 
of the world and ourselves lacks completely that 
objective value which we commonly presume to 
attribute to them. It is a continuous illusory 
construction. (...) the humourist (...) through 
the ridiculousness of this discovery, will see 
the serious and painful side; he will take apart 
this construction, but not merely to laugh at 
it; and instead of scorning it, while laughing, 
20 
he will perhaps even feel compassion. 
Thus we can see that what Pirandello calls humour is far from 
comedy. It could more properly be called a sense of the absurd, 
and our reactions to it as described by Pirandello are the same 
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feelings of dizziness or nausea or fear - quite literally - that 
are so aptly described by Camus and Sartre. 
In certain moments of interior silence, in which 
our soul divests itself of all its habitual 
frauds, and our eyes become more acute and more 
penetrating, we see ourselves in life and life in 
itself, almost in a disquieting, arid nudity; we 
feel ourselves assaulted by a strange impression, 
as if, in a flash, a reality was revealed to us 
different from the one we normally perceive, a 
reality living outside human sight, outside of 
the forms of human reason. Then, most lucidly 
the structure of everyday existence, almost 
suspended in the emptiness of that interior 
silence of ours, appears horrid to us in its 
impassible and mysterious crudeness, since all of 
our customary fictitious relations of sentiment 
and images are separated and disjointed in it. 
The internal emptiness becomes larger, crosses 
the limits of our body, becomes a void around us, 
a strange emptiness like a stopping of time and 
of life, as if our interior silence sank in the 
abysses of the mystery. (...) It was a moment; but 
there remains in us long after the impression of 
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it, as of a vertigo, with which is contrasted the 
stability though vain, of things, ambitious or 
mean appearances. Life, then, small, commonplace, 
which pivots between these appearances seems 
to us almost as if it is no longer for real, 
as if it were like a mechanical fantasmagoria. 
And how can we give it importance? How can we 
respect it/ 
Life, seen in this light, can no longer be taken seriously and 
hence the laugh, albeit tearful, of the humourist. 
Even the power of blind, senseless nature defeats the 
grandness of human designs, the ideals of his fictions. And 
so the humourist, or the absurd man, reflects: 
'What if Cleopatra's nose had been longer, who 
knows what other vicissitudes the world would 
have had/ And this if, this miniscule participle 
which one can note, insert like a wedge in all 
events, how many and what disjunctions can it 
produce, of what disorder can it be the cause, 
22 
in the hands of a humourist. 
Pirandello illustrates the power of nature over man's designs 
in a short story entitled JX buon cuore. in which by superb 
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planning everything is arranged to procure the greatest good for 
the greatest number, but due to nature or man's good intentions 
themselves, or the absurd, all of the good is turned into evil 
and the author reflects: 
How true it is that it always happens that way, 
that the force of nature is worth more than 
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any artifice. 
Despite our intuition of the absurd, we still search for 
absolutes, although at every attempt we are frustrated. As 
Camus writes: 
Faced with this inexctricable contradiction of the 
mind, we shall fully grasp the divorce separating 
us from our own creations. So long as the mind 
keeps silent in the motionless world of its 
hopes, everything is reflected and arranged in 
the unity of its nostalgia. But with its first 
move this world cracks and tumbles (...) Of whom 
and of what can I say 'I know that!' (•••) This 
very heart which is mine will forever remain 
indefinable to me. Between the certainty I have 
of my existence and the content I try to give 
to that assurance, the gap will never be filled, 
24 
(...) there are truths but no truth. 
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Pirandello is in complete agreement. 
(...) the pretension of the part of the individual 
and of society to determine a definitive and 
immutable truth is absurd. 
This absurdity is dramatised in the short story JX tabernacolo. 
A usurer who is known as an atheist and a socialist has a 
shrine built. Upon its completion he dies, before having paid the 
labourer. No one will believe that it was he who ordered the 
work and so the worker isn't paid. Still believing in the ideal of 
justice, the labourer goes to court and loses. His faith in divine 
justice destroyed, he realises that he himself creates justice (or 
any other value). He dresses up like Christ and goes to live 
in the shrine. Despite this revelation, this knowledge, he still 
prays, although he is aware all the while of some doubt, or some 
recurring but vague thought that gnaws him from the inside, 
Another illustration of the ridiculousness of a search for 
ready-made values is found in Fuoco alia paglia. Simone, having 
been very wealthy but having lost nearly everything, has had a 
glimpse of the absurd. He is a miser and part mad, a reaction 
which Pirandello sees as a possible consequence of trying to face 
the void which is within us and live the absurd. As he writes 
in L'umorismo: 
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In this normal state of consciousness, in these 
re-connected ideas, in this usual feeling of life, 
we can no longer have faith, because at length 
we know that they are a fraud of our own 
construction in order for us to live and that 
underneath there is something else, which man 
cannot face without dying or going mad. 
Simone, half mad, is trying to live with this knowledge. Nazzaro 
is a poor man but happy in his own self-deception. He represents 
a certain set of values and because of his name, it is difficult 
to resist the thought that he is perhaps the symbol of Christ, 
Simone becomes Nazzaro's friend and tries to buy his salvation 
(like his namesake in the Bible) from Nazzaro. The conditions are, 
however, strict. He must release the thousands of birds he has 
been keeping as a possible source of food and burn the field of 
grain, his last possession. The results, of course, are disastrous, 
Salvation cannot be bought with someone else's values. 
In II bottone della palandrana. Pirandello depicts one of those 
perfectly honest, neat, exemplary people who think there is order 
in the world. Discovering that there is in fact none, he realises 
that he might as well throw away the button of his over-coat 
which has come off in his hand, he might as well walk down the 
street with his coat undone, with his sleeves inside-out, or even 
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with his hat upside down on his head. In a world with no order, 
no values, everything is permitted. 
Camus sees a longing for death as man's first reaction to 
his awareness of the absurd. As soon as man finds himself in an 
alien world with no illusions, he must contemplate his own suicide, 
A world that can be explained even with bad 
reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other 
hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions 
and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. (...) 
This divorce between man and his life, the actor 
and his setting, is properly the feeling of 
absurdity. All healthy men having thought of 
their own suicide, it can be seen, without further 
explanation, that there is a direct connection 
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between this feeling and the longing for death. 
Sartre's M. Roquentin, contemplating the discovery of his own 
superfluity thinks first of all of suicide, but realises that even 
his death would be superfluous, 
I dreamed vaguely of killing myself to wipe out 
at least one of these superfluous lives. But 
even my death would have been in the way. In the 
way, my corpse, my blood on these stones, between 
these plants, at the back of this smiling garden. 
And the decomposed flesh would have been in the 
way in the earth which would receive my bones, 
at last, cleaned, stripped, peeled, proper and 
clean as teeth, it would have been in the way: 
28 
I was in the way for eternity, 
Pirandello notes this reaction to the absurd and discussing it 
in his essay Arte e coscienza d'oggi he quotes The Confessions 
of Tolstoy: 
Science told me only: life is an evil deprived of 
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any sense. I wanted to kill myself. 
In fact, the theme of suicide in the works of Pirandello is so 
frequent that it must be dealt with in a separate section, in 
which all of the instances of suicide appearing in these works 
must be noted and an attempt made to derive a cohesive account 
of Pirandello's attitude toward it. 
The universality of man's condition in an absurd world is 
stressed by both Sartre and Camus. Pirandello, too, speaks of 
the ubiquitousness of this "life-malady", 
Useless, almost a non-entity; but he existed, 
and was walking beside me, and was suffering. 
It was true that he was suffering, like all the 
rest of us, from life which is the true malady 
, n30 
of us all, 
C. Realisation of the Absurd 
We have already examined Sartre's primary example of the 
realisation of the absurd in his novel La Nausee. In Being and 
Nothingness. Sartre states that man as a "being-for-itself" is 
consciousness. He further states that: 
Consciousness is a being, the nature of which 
is to be conscious of the nothingness of its 
being. 
thus denying the possibility that man could exist in the world 
without being aware of his condition with regard to the absurd, 
Camus and Pirandello do not see this awareness as something 
intrinsic within man, but emphasize rather the effect which the 
moment of realisation of the absurd has on a person. Camus 
writes in The Myth of Sisyphus: 
It happens that the stage-sets collapse. Rising, 
tram, four hours in the office or the factory, 
meal, tram, four hours of work, meal, sleep and 
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and 
Saturday, according to the same rhythm - this 
path is easily followed most of the time. But one 
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day the 'why' arises and everything begins in 
that weariness tinged with amazement. (...) What 
follows is the gradual return into the chain or 
it is the definitive awakening. At the end of 
the awakening comes, in time, the consequence: 
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suicide or recovery. 
While Camus in this passage mentions only two responses: suicide or 
recovery, it must be noted that the term "recovery" is ambiguous 
here because as is evident from other passages, it may indicate 
a suppression of the newly-acquired awareness with a return to 
normal daily existence, a refuge in some type of hope of salvation 
from the absurd, or it may indicate the "heroic" decision to live 
with the absurd. Pirandello, too, sees various stages in a man's 
life. According to Gaetano Munafd these consist of a life of 
ordinary daily routines, a first moment of real contact with the 
world, with the contrast between the emptiness of the interior 
content and the ostentatious exterior appearances of people, a 
search for the reason for this discrepancy, the discovery of the 
absurdity of trying to force reality into forms, of trying to give 
it meaning, and a final moment of an attempt at reconstruction. 
For Camus, it is the acceptance of this consciousness which is 
important. 
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A sub-clerk in the post-office is the equal of 
a conqueror if consciousness is common to them. 
All experiences are indifferent in this regard. 
There are some that do either a service or 
a disservice to man. They do him a service 
if he is conscious. Otherwise, that has no 
importance; a man's failures imply judgment, not 
of circumstances, but of himself. 
The various alternatives to the acceptance of this consciousness 
will be dealt with in a later section. For the moment let us 
be concerned with how this consciousness of the absurd can come 
about, 
Pirandello, like Camus, sees this awareness as a possible 
result of almost any untowarded event. 
Man acquires an awareness of his condition 
through some unexpected circumstance ... Mos-
carda's nose in Uno. nessuno e centomila: the 
news of Mattia Pascal's suicide learned of by 
chance; the drunks in the Gala's house in JX 
giuoco delle parti: the elections for Cirincid in 
Maschera dimenticata: the fall from the horse for 
Henry IV; the meeting with his step-daughter at 
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Madame Pace's in Sei personaggi in cerca d'autore 
C...)36 
This awareness, however, is also a sign of the times as Pirandello 
writes in Arte e coscienza d'oggi: 
We have set aside or lost traditional values. 
What can take their place? (...) we feel bewildered, 
even lost, in an immense blind labyrinth, sur-
rounded on all sides by an impenetrable mystery. 
Paths, there are so many. Which will be the 
right one?37 
According to Pirandello, finding nothing in heaven or on earth 
to satisfy his longing for a system of values, for truth, for 
something absolute, man is nevertheless unwilling to accept a 
world which exists for itself, peopled by little beings intent upon 
procuring for themselves what possible happiness they can find. 
Instead he beats his breast and desperately demands that nature 
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give him some reason for all that it has done. 
Pirandello reasons that with the coming of science, faith 
must die, but ironically it does not bring with it man's longed 
for certitude, but rather an even greater awareness of the void. 
In the past, man had faith in a certain truth. This was the star 
which illuminated his whole way. Science, to demonstrate that 
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there was in fact no such star but only a tiny lamp which fed 
on oil not always pure, blew on the lamp and put it out. Since 
man could then no longer see, science gave him an electric light. 
But no matter how many at lit, man's way is still in darkness. 
Science is insufficient to light the path. In Segni dei tempi 
Pirandello writes: 
There is then no way out. Science is impotent to 
work out the problem. It succeeds in annihilating 
the explanations which fantasy and sentiment 
had created and vested with the forms of the 
positive religions; but of substituting for these 
destroyed explanations a new and sufficient one, 
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it is incapable. 
Whatever the immediate cause of a man's moments of confrontation 
with the absurd, it is clear that Pirandello, like Camus, is 
preoccupied with their nature. The description of special, 
privileged moments is a repeated theme in Pirandello's works. 
They may be moments of a kind of pantheistic participation in 
life, or moments of alienation and a feeling of the strangeness 
of familiar things. They may be moments of a heightened joyful 
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awareness in which everything seems new and alive. Whatever 
their nature, they provoke an immediate confrontation between 
this awareness, these ideals, this sense of the infinite and our 
74 
ordinary perception of things, of life's daily realities, of death. 
In this confrontation is born the absurd. 
Camus states that the theatre is the perfect medium for 
eliciting an awareness of the absurd. 
The actor has three hours to be Iago or Alceste, 
Phedre or Gloucester. In that short space of 
time he makes them come to life and die on fifty 
square yards of boards. Never has the absurd 
been so well illustrated or at such length. What 
more revelatory epitome can be imagined than 
those marvellous lives, those exceptional and 
total destinies unfolding for a few hours within 
a stage set? Off the stage, Sigismundo ceases 
to count. Two hours later he is seen dining 
out. Then it is, perhaps, that life is a dream. 
According to Camus, art cannot be a refuge for the absurd man, 
as Sartre had tentatively concluded at the end of La Nausee. 
It is, itself, an absurd phenomenon and cannot afford an escape 
from the confrontation. Rather it is but one symptom of man's 
awareness of the absurd. Thus it serves two functions: 1) it 
reflects the quandry of the artist, as an absurd man himself, 
and 2) it can precipitate this awareness in the spectators. 
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Pirandello, according to Gino Cucchetti in his article "Assoluto 
e relativo nei tre miti di Luigi Pirandello" in the Proceedings of. 
the International Congress of Pirandellian Studies, wanted to try 
something which had not been fully attempted since the pomp of the 
ancient Greek theatre. He wanted to reveal the great darkness 
which "determines and accompanies the life of human souls, in 
the vast tragicity of the events which accompany it". A prime 
example, himself, of the humorist of which he writes, Pirandello 
fulfils the description of the absurd man. 
The humorist knows that ordinary events, common 
details, the materialness of life in sum, so 
varied and complex, bitterly contradict those 
ideal simplifications, compel to actions, inspire 
thoughts and feelings which are contrary to 
all of that harmonious logic of facts and of 
characters conceived by ordinary writers (.. J 
that search for contrasts, contradictions on 
which the work is based, in opposition to the 
unity sought by the others; it is from this that 
comes that certain disorder, that unboundedness, 
that capriciousness - all of those digressions 
that are found in the humorous work, as opposed 
to ordinary contrivance, to the composition of 
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the work of art in general. 
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A great number of Pirandello's fictional works - plays, short 
stories and novels - are in this sense "humorous" or as the later 
existentialists would call it "absurd". These works seem to fall 
into two main categories: 1) those works in which a character or 
characters either philosophise on the subject of the absurd or 
In which their moment of awareness of the absurd is described 
and 2) those works which manifest to the reader or the audience, 
though not necessarily to the characters within the work, certain 
situations or anomalies in life which tend to bring about a 
consciousness of the absurd. To the first category belong such 
short stories as Tu ridi, Dal naso al cielo. C'fe aualcuno che ride. 
La mano del malato povero. Un'idea. II guardaroba dell'eloguenza. 
La carriola. Rimedio la geografia. Canta l'epistola, Una giornata 
and La cattura and portions of such novels as Si gira. U. fu 
Mattia Pascal and Suo mar it o. 
In Tu ridi. Pirandello continues his theme of "humour" and 
the absurd. A man in the most difficult of situations, leading 
a most serious life, is heard to laugh every night in his sleep. 
He doesn't know why himself. Eventually it is discovered that 
the laughter is the result of a recurring and absurd dream 
concerning very "serious" people behaving ludicrously and in a 
manner very unbecoming to their dignified positions. If we are 
to make anything of this story at all, the only interpretation 
which appears reasonable is that the author is suggesting that 
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life itself is nothing but an absurd dream and our situation is 
as ludicrous as that of the professor in his friend's world of 
sleep, 
In C^ qualcuno che ride, a "serious" meeting is called. 
Everyone in the whole town is there, but no one knows why. When 
two young people dare to be themselves and laugh, a scandal 
is caused. They themselves must, as punishment, be derided and 
ostracised. The mask (see Chapter V) cannot be dropped for a 
moment or the absurdity of the world is too evident. 
In Dal naso al cielo. after a discussion of moral idealism 
versus life experience, the idealist sees the absurdity of his 
position in the discovery of the body of his opponent, dead under 
mysterious circumstances. Death is indeed the end of everything; 
all that remains of the link which the idealist thought he saw 
between man's life and some sort of absolute is a spider web 
which goes up, it seems, into heaven, from the nose of the dead 
man. 
In La mano del malato povero it is the protagonist himself 
who speaks to the reader of his understanding of man's condition. 
The real difficulty is another. - Which? Eh, 
you, dear friends, want to know too much! The 
opposite of me who doesn't ever want to know 
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anything. If X have to tell you what the real 
difficulty is, that indicates that you aren't 
aware of it. And then why should X tell you. 
This passage is, of course, similar to several others, particularly 
the previously cited one from Si gira ... in which it is clear 
that Pirandello sees life, or the human condition, as the true 
malady of us all, 
Un'idea is the story of the gradual formation of an obscure 
thought, an idea which comes as the result of the awareness 
of that life malady and which cannot be identified, Unable to 
understand the reason for anything, feeling a terrible disgust 
for his own "good" actions in a meaningless world the protagonist 
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would almost rather be a beast, so as to escape this condition. 
He tries to define his feeling: 
- Weariness! Too many times has he exclaimed 
this. In the end it has come to seem someone 
else's exclamation; for some comforts, though 
useless, we still try to give ourselves. If it 
is really tiredness, moreover, being no longer a 
temporary thing, and neither sleep nor anything 
else being enough to make it pass, what relief, 
what comfort can there be any longer in his 
calling the idea that? And it isn't even disgust 
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with his life. No, it's that he just doesn't know 
what that idea is precisely, or where it comes 
from, now so often, like a sudden stopping which 
holds him suspended and absorbed in an opaque 
waiting. 
At last the idea takes form and he realises that he is contemplating 
suicide, 
Man's relationship with the objects which surround him is a 
recurring theme in Pirandello's works. In many of these passages 
one is reminded of Sartre's distinction of Being-in-itself and 
Being-for-itself. In II guardaroba dell'eloauenza Tudina alternates 
between a vicious dislike for these objects and a gentle and 
solicitous care for them. They represent a reality which she 
cannot understand. 
(...) apparently moved by a savage impulse, but 
in reality by an unconscious instinctive need 
to rid herself of and destroy certain things 
the sense or the value of which she couldn't 
succeed in grasping. 
La carriola is devoted precisely to this theme of the 
consciousness of the absurd and a man's reaction to it. 
I saw, suddenly, in front of that dark, bronze 
coloured door, with the oval brass plate on which 
was engraved my name preceded by my titles 
and followed by my scientific and professional 
qualifications, I saw suddenly as if outside of 
me, myself and my life but without recognising 
In this remarkable story of the absurd, the protagonist now 
realises that he must live with this awareness of the unreality 
of things. He goes back to his "ordinary" life, to his work, to 
his family, but he has a remedy for this feeling of alienation 
or rather a unique way of forcing himself to remain always in 
confrontation with the absurd, the meaninglessness of his position 
with all its titles and privileges. Every so often, when no one 
is about, he performs the ludicrous act of holding onto the hind 
legs of his dog and walking him around like a wheelbarrow. 
There are other remedies. In Rimedio la geografia. a man seeks 
to remove himself from all distress by remembering the smallness 
of earth in comparison to the universe. Taken by itself, this 
story might be interpreted as a recommendation to suppress all 
personal feelings and live in a state of sublime indifference which 
can be achieved by keeping always before one the immensity of 
the universe and the smallness of earth. In fact, there is some 
justification in this interpretation since it corresponds with the 
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commonly accepted interpretation of the novel Si gira ... However, 
it can also be argued that such indifference is impossible. We 
cannot really isolate ourselves from reality except through a 
supreme act of what Sartre would take to be "bad faith". This type 
of indifference is the result of acceptance of the meaninglessness 
of life rather than a confrontation with it. In the short story 
Quando si comnrende for example, Pirandello clearly illustrates 
the impossibility or the fraudulence of such indifference, and 
over and over again he, like Camus, stresses the importance of 
living life, being one with its "flow" rather than discussing it or 
trying to capture it in "form" or categories. Also, the novel Si 
gira ... can be even better interpreted as an illustration not of a 
much sought indifference, but rather as a perfect example of that 
"quietism" which Sartre so forcefully rejects as a form of "bad 
faith". Therefore, although this particular short story does not 
present a clear idea of Pirandello's beliefs on indifference in 
the face of the absurd, considering it together with Pirandello's 
other works in this area it must be interpreted as a type of 
"remedy" which tries to annihilate the absurd or avoid it rather 
than confront it, 
In Canta l'epistola a young man, becoming aware of the absurd, 
rejects his former life as a seminarian and begins to develop a 
very special relationship with nature. For him, a blade of grass 
takes on monumental importance. After all, if nothing has any 
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meaning, why should any one thing have less meaning than another? 
No one understands his unique perceptions, and as he dies trying 
to make them understand, they think he was delirious to the end, 
Una giornata uses a stream-of-consciousness technique to 
illustrate the feeling of alienation experienced as a common 
reaction to an intuition of the absurd. In it, a man feels as 
if he had amnesia, a3 if there were a meaning to his everyday 
activities which he had somehow lost. Of course, there has never 
been one and at one point time, the enemy of us all (as Camus calls 
it in The Myth of Sisyphus catches up with the protagonist as 
he realises finally that he is old, his whole life has passed in 
the meaninglessness of daily tasks without his being aware of it. 
In La cattura. a man bereaved by the death of his son becomes 
aware of the vanity of everything. 
Alone, among the trees and with the boundless 
expanse of the sea in sight, as if from an 
infinite distance, in the long and light rustling 
of those trees, in the dark and slow murmuring 
of that sea, he became used to feeling the vanity 
of everything and the anguished tedium of life. 
In the following passage from the novel Si gira ..., the protagonist, 
who later will close himself up in passivity and indifference, 
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describes another character, and thus reveals indirectly his own 
experience with the absurd: 
(Cavalina) has acquired a clear perception of the 
futility of everything and has seen himself thus 
lost, alone, surrounded by shadows and crushed 
by the mystery of himself and of everything. (...) 
Illusions? Hopes? Of what use are they? Vanity 
... And his own personality, prostrated, annulled 
in itself, has gradually re-arisen as a pitiful 
consciousness of other people, who are ignorant 
and deceive themselves, who are ignorant and 
labour and love and suffer. 
Mattia Pascal, whom we have seen in his search for the true 
nature of freedom, has glimpsed the absurd as well. Commenting on 
a passage from 11 fu Mattia Pascal. Claudio Vicentini in his recent 
book L'estetica di Pirandello states that ; "Heaven, understood as 
a system of beliefs and values is a recurrent image in Pirandello, 
(...) The humorist (emphasis mine), aware of the illusion, destroys 
the conventional wholeness by means of 'the hole in the paper 
sky' and introduces criticism into the work of art". 
Mattia Pascal, alias Adriano Meis, feels a great 
envy for marionettes above which the fake sky 
remains unbroken. They can love, and hold 
themselves in consideration as valuable, without 
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ever suffering vertigo or dizziness. 
In the novel Suo marito is found another description of the 
experience of the absurd. 
She had a horror of that mirror where the 
image of her own soul denuded of all necessary 
fictions, necessarily had to also appear to her 
as deprived of' any light of reason. 
How many times, in insomnia, while her husband 
and master slept placidly next to her, did she see 
herself assaulted in that silence by a strange 
and sudden terror, that snuffed out her breath 
and made her heart beat tumultuously! So lucidly 
then the structure of daily existence, suspended 
in the night and in the emptiness of her soul, 
without sense, without reason, tore her apart 
allowing her to glimpse in a moment a very 
different reality, horrid in its impassible and 
mysterious crudeness, in which all the usual 
false relationships of sentiments and images 
would divide and fall apart. 
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Having now gathered together representative examples of the 
first category of Pirandello's "humorous" works, those in which a 
character or characters either philosophise on the subject of the 
absurd or in which their moment of awareness of the absurd is 
described, let us turn now to the second category, that is, those 
works which manifest to the reader although not necessarily to 
the characters within the work, certain situations or anomalies 
in life which tend to bring about a consciousness of the absurd, 
To this category belong such short stories as La levata del sole. 
Al valor civile. Richiamo aH'obbligo. L'illustre estinto. Marsina 
stretta. Se ..., Un'idea. Pi sera un geranio. La rallegrata. JX 
marito di mia mogiie. Distrazione. Notizie del mondo. Soffio. Lumie 
di Sicilia, Un cavallo nella luna. II vitalizio. II buon cuore. and 
Nell'albergo £ morto un tale. While these two categories do to 
a certain degree overlap, the distinction is useful to see how 
Pirandello has illustrated the theme of the absurd. In accord 
with the general existentialist contention that there are many 
paths to an awareness of the absurd, Pirandello has illustrated 
a number of these. The realisation of the lack of seriousness 
of life, the "games" that fortune plays or reflection upon the 
weighty effect of even the most trifling of circumstances may 
lead to an awareness of the absurd. In La levata del sole we see 
how even the most serious of human intentions can be frustrated. 
A man burdened by gambling debts as well as a host of other 
difficulties sees no other solution but suicide. He stays up the 
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entire night in order to watch his last sunrise, but he fails 
even at this, his last desperate act. Instead of watching the 
sunrise and then putting an end to his life, he falls asleep. 
In Al valor civile the laughter of fate is evident. A woman 
has left her husband to go and live with another man and have 
children by this second relationship, thus setting herself up in 
a respectable position in society. Her former husband is alone. 
He never risked much in life, and when he did he always lost. 
Now he is poor and very cynical. One night a man is seen to be 
drowning in the sea. It is a moment for heroism. Who will go 
to rescue him in the midst of the storm? A number of decorated 
and be-medalled heroes stand about. Instead, in order to attain 
a place for himself in society, in order to risk all, for once, 
the deserted husband swims to the rescue. Amid the praise and 
applause of the crowd he sees that the man he has saved is his 
wife's lover, 
Richiamo all'obbligo is a comical short story concerning a 
"love potion" and its effects on a straying husband, to the 
benefit of the wife's lover. Neither marriage, nor love, nor faith 
in science, nor even fatherhood, nothing can be taken too seriously, 
Another game of fate occurs with its victim the protagonist 
of L'illustre est into. A very famous, powerful man lies dying. He 
imagines the enormous pomp and ceremony which will attend his 
87 
funeral. Instead, he is buried in a pauper's grave, and all the 
ceremony is attendant upon the body of an unknown corpse because 
of an inadvertent switch of the bodies by the train personnel. 
Reflection on the results of such "tricks" of nature, (tricks 
which, however, it must be noted, are not ascribed to any intentional 
action on the part of a somehow rational "nature" or "fate") 
leads to consciousness of the power of the "if" and hence to 
an awareness of the absurd. In Marsina strettar a suit of 
clothes which is too tight is the tiny catalyst needed to change 
the disposition of the wearer, which in turn cause him to act 
differently from the way he normally would and hence to alter the 
whole course of certain serious events which change the lives of 
several people, 
In the short story Se ..., this theme is developed more fully. 
If a soldier had not been given his discharge in one particular town 
rather than another, his entire life would have been different, 
At first, one is tempted to interpret this as a short story of 
"bad faith". However, the protagonist rejects the idea of fate 
(which would place the responsibility on some other knowing being 
or force). He simply reflects on the disparity of the unimportance 
of random circumstances and what may be their final result. 
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All that happens, had to fatally happen? False! 
I could have not happened, if ... And here I lose 
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myself: in this ifj 
If it is not clear that the protagonist goes beyond the realisation 
Df the power of the "if" to an awareness of the absurd, there is 
certainly portrayed in this short story one of the paths which 
may lead to this awareness. 
While Sartre sees the absurd as he contemplates the fullness 
and superfluity of being, Camus often finds it in the contemplation 
of death. The relationship between death and the absurd is an 
interesting one in that a contemplation of the finality of death 
may lead to an awareness of the absurd, and this latter may 
lead to a contemplation of suicide. For the moment, let us 
confine ourselves to the consciousness of death as it leads to an 
intuition of the absurd. With the exception of a certain interest 
in spiritism, Pirandello sees death as in a profound sense, final, 
and hence "useless" and "without meaning", that is, a man's death 
is the end of his personal existence. It fulfils no "eternal plan" 
and (contrary to man's desire) has no more "meaning" than any 
other natural event. In Notizie del mondo, the theme of life's 
continuation after the death of a person is illustrated; however, 
it is life for the others and illustrates the absurdity of his 
own life, now that it is past. The best friend of the deceased 
"corresponds" with him and through this correspondence little by 
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little we see what little difference it would have made if he had 
never lived. 
In Jl marito di mia moglie. Pirandello states clearly that 
an awareness of death is at the basis of all philosophy. The 
protagonist, quoting a book whose title and whose author he 
cannot remember, states: 
The horse, - then - , who doesn't know that he 
has to die, doesn't have any metaphysics. But if 
the horse knew that he had to die, the problem 
of death would, in the end, become, also for him, 
much more serious than that of life. 
Finding hay and grass is, certainly, a most 
serious problem. But behind this problem the 
other one arises: 'Why ever, after having toiled 
for twenty, thirty years to find the hay and 
grass, must one have to die, without knowing 
why one has lived?' 
The horse doesn't know he has to die, and 
he doesn't ask himself these questions. To 
man, however, who - according to Schopenhauer's 
definition - is a metaphysical animal (which means 
90 
precisely, an animal which knows he has to die). 
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that question is always before him. 
The protagonist of this story not only knows that he will 
eventually die, but that he is, in fact, dying and so must face 
the "philosophical question". His first reaction is to wish to 
be the non-metaphysical horse, but of course he cannot, and he 
has a clear picture of the absurdity of his own position and how 
life will be after he is gone, 
While comical in nature, Distrazione illustrates man's in-
stinctive flight from death and anything connected with it. It 
is the story of a former taxi driver who loses his present job 
as the driver of a hearse because of a brawl which is brought 
about by a moment of distraction. Forgetting his new position, he 
beckons a by-stander and offers him a ride. In La rallegrata, the 
distinction between man and beast and their respective attitudes 
toward death is shown. Horses in the stall of a funeral director 
are conversing with each other and trying to understand what 
it is that they do. 
Man's confrontation with death and the consequent meaning-
lessness of life are illustrated in PX sera, un geranio, 
He saw now those things; no longer as they used 
to be, when they had some meaning for him; those 
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things which for themselves have no meaning 
at all and which now, therefore, are no longer 
anything for him. 
And this is dying. 
Perhaps the most striking illustration of death and the absurd 
in Pirandello is Soffio. In this short story, a man discovers 
quite by accident that he has a strange and unique power. Just 
by blowing on his fingers to illustrate the transcience of life, 
he can kill anyone. On the one hand, life is nothing, on the other 
is depicted all its sweetness and joy, 
Another path to the absurd is the realisation of the relativity 
of values (see Chapter III Section D). A good example of this, 
contrasting in this case, city values and country values, is Lumie 
di Si cilia. In D_X sera, un geranio. while we have already seen the 
"death confrontation", we can also see illustrated the theme of 
the relativity of values. A man lies dying. What is life? It 
has no meaning except what we give it, like a flower in the night 
- who knows why it has sprung up? The "why" is all-important 
because it leads to the realisation that there is no answer. It 
is seen as well in Notizie del mondo. Science can invent machines 
and aparata to make us do more or do it better, but: 
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What is important isn't to fly faster or slower, 
higher or lower, but to know why one flies. 
The power of an uncaring nature over man's most serious 
undertakings is illustrated once again in Un cavallo nella luna. 
JX vitalizio. IX buon cuore and NeH'alberqo A rnorto un tale. There 
is no "seriousness" in nature. It has complete power over the 
affairs of men, but unlike the reasoning "fate" of the Greeks, 
this modern "force" is uncaring, and repeatedly manifests the 
gratuitousness, the meaninglessness of human life. 
If then, life is meaningless, is suicide the answer, or is it, 
as Camus suggests, precisely in the refusal of suicide that man 
finds some type of happiness? Is it in the affirmation of personal 
freedom that man finds himself, or is it in some sort of agape 
that must be lived. Indeed, what values if any can "exist" in an 
absurd world? In other words, upon becoming aware of the absurd, 
a man will according to existentialist theory, react in one of 
many possible ways. Some of these reactions are "authentic", that 
is, consistant with the person's newly acquired consciousness of 
the absurd; and some are "inauthentic", that is, seeking to reject 
or hide from this consciousness. In the following section, we will 
examine these various possible reactions and, categorising each 
as "authentic" or "inauthentic", we will compare Pirandello's views 
with recognised existentialist ones. 
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D. Reactions to the Absurd and Values in an Absurd World 
As has been noted, for the atheistic existentialist, life has 
no special a priori "meaning". From this, along what some would 
regard as a logically dubious chain, they pass to the assertion 
that everything is therefore meaningless and that value judgments 
are totally arbitrary, thence to the discussion of what reactions 
to the absurd are "authentic" and which values are to be choson 
in an absurd and meaningless world. 
In the conclusion of The Myth of Sisyphus. Camus identifies 
man's happiness with the acceptance of his condition in an absurd 
world. He likens all men to Sisyphus, that ceaseless and "futile 
labourer of the underworld" who was condemned by the gods to 
roll a rock to the top of a mountain where it would forever fall 
back into the valley and from which he would forever have to 
roll it up the mountain. Human life, for Camus, is as futile and 
meaningless as Sisyphus' labour, but: 
The absurd man (...) knows himself to be the 
master of his days. At that subtle moment when 
man glances backward over his life, Sisyphus 
returning toward his rock, he contemplates that 
series of unrelated actions which becomes his 
fate, created by him, combined under his memory's 
eye and soon sealed by his death. Thus, convinced 
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of the wholly human origin of all that is human, 
a blind man eager to see who knows that the 
night has no end, he is still on the go. (...) This 
universe henceforth without a master seems to 
him neither sterile nor futile. (...) The struggle 
itself towards the heights is enough to fill a 
man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy. 
Thus for Camus, the acceptance of the futile struggle, the 
affirmation of life in the face of inevitable and meaningless 
death is seen to be, paradoxically, the only meaningful value in 
a meaningless world. 
Sartre's view diverges only slightly from Camus' here, and the 
difference is much more in emphasis than in substance. He does 
not speak at all of "happiness", in the face of the absurd, but 
rather of the acceptance of man's complete freedom to affirm what 
value he chooses, since in an absurd world, according to Sartre, 
no values are given. In the affirmation of this liberty and in 
the commitment of oneself to a self-chosen value, no happiness 
or victory is found, but only the avoidance of what Sartre calls 
"bad faith" or "self-deception". 
For Camus, to react in any way other than that which accepts 
the absurd condition and determines to live in the full knowledge 
of it, means to be defeated and overwhelmed by the absurd and 
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be, in effect, less than a man. Hence, suicide is to be rejected 
as is the search for that which those in this tradition call 
an "absolute"—meaning in this context something possessing an 
externally generated value, something capable of giving an a 
priori "meaning" to life and thus taking away the despair. The 
only solace which may be allowed is that agape, fraternal love, 
or charity, which reaches out to all other men since they too 
must live the absurd, (see for example The Plague). 
For Sartre, it is only through the acceptance of our complete 
liberty to choose, the realisation of which is brought about by 
an awareness of the absurd, that we may live as men. Any device 
which would seek to mask this feeling of anguish or take away 
one jot of our responsibility for our choices or deceive us into 
believing that we are not, in fact, free is a form of "bad faith". 
There is no solace for our anguish. No value or system of values 
is held to be more worthy than any other except in that it either 
affirms each man's liberty or restricts it. 
What is Pirandello's position regarding the various reactions 
to the absurd? How does he deal with the "existentialist" values 
such as freedom or the affirmation of life as compared to the way 
in which he deals with traditional moral values? With a view to 
forming a coherent interpretation of the place of value sytems 
in Pirandello's works let us examine all the various reactions 
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to the absurd found therein and see the extent to which this 
author may be termed a "pre-existentialist". 
1. Relativity (Subjectivity) of Values 
For Camus one of the direst consequences of the realisation 
of the absurd and the decision to live with it is the awareness 
of a paradoxical type of freedom. 
(...) hitherto he was bound to that postulate of 
freedom on the illusion of which he was living, 
(...) To the extent to which he imagined a purpose 
to his life, he adapted himself to the demands 
of a purpose to be achieved and became the 
slave of his liberty. (...) Thus the absurd man 
realises that he was not really free. (...) To the 
extent to which (...) I arrange my life and prove 
thereby that I accept its having a meaning, 
I create for myself barriers between which I 
confine my life. (...) The absurd enlightens me 
on this point: there is no future. Henceforth 
this is the reason for my inner freedom. (...) He 
enjoys a freedom with regard to common rules. 
Hence within the existentialist framework commonly accepted moral 
values lose their force, 
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There is a widely-held although fallacious line of reasoning 
among atheistic existentialists that by denying the existence 
of God they, thereby, take away the force of moral imperatives. 
They are fond of that famous line by Dostoievski "If God does 
not exist, then everything is permitted." They also spend great 
amounts of energy and endless pages fighting what to many is the 
straw man of absolute values, values which always and everywhere 
override any possible circumstances. Pirandello's short story La 
morta e la viva is a perfect example of these lines of reasoning. 
A man who all his life had had faith in the infinite power of 
God, who had respected Him in all circumstances finally comes 
upon a situation which cannot be neatly arranged according to 
any previously constructed value system, and the man realises 
that he must construct his own since no values are absolute in 
this sense, Pirandello's ideas concerning the relativity of all 
reality are well-known, (see Chapter IV). Based on a rejection 
of God's existence (see below), the realisation of the absurd, and 
this notion of relativity, Pirandello also concludes that values 
are relative; and the only absolute that will be found is within 
ourselves, our freedom to choose within the limits of our historical 
context and in the face of our ultimate death. The phrase 
"relativity of reality" is typically Pirandellian and in order not 
to substitute some other locution for this already well-accepted 
- within Pirandellian studies - phrase, I have continued to use 
it, but it must be noted that Pirandello's "relativism" could 
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more properly be termed "subjectivism" since he is an ontological 
absolutist but an epistemological relativist. 
Interestingly, in a recent article within the field of Piran-
dellian studies (June 1982) Ludovico steidl in fact refers to 
Pirandello's philosophy as "soggrestivistica", thus going against 
the already established usage and perhaps happily starting a 
trend toward more philosophically correct terminology.68 
In the short story Zuccarello distinto melodista this search 
for the absolute is illustrated. At first the reader is led to 
believe that the protagonist is searching for an "absolute" in a 
name or a title which would exhaust all the possibilities of being 
of an individual or an object. In fact, it is upon the discovery 
of a sign advertising the performance in an unkown and tawdry 
cafe of a certain "Zuccarello, distinguished melodist" that the 
protagonist thinks that he has found the "absolute", the title 
which would exhaust all the possibilities of being of its owner. 
I was (...) in one of those moments, unfortunately 
not rare, in which reason (I still have, unhappily, 
a little of that), sure of having reached at last 
that absolute which everyone, without knowing 
it, anxiously seeks in life (...) Reason, moreover, 
realises all of a sudden that it holds in its 
hand, victoriously, a little tail, understand? 
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instead of the absolute; the little tail of a 
wig, the kind of a wig tail to which Baron von 
Munchhausen held onto to pull himself out of the 
pond into which he had fallen. (...) sooner or 
later, the good which we have set for ourselves, 
toward which we aim all of our affections, all of 
our thoughts, and which has, therefore, acquired 
for us the intrinsic value of our own life, an 
absolute value, understand?; as soon as it is 
reached, or even before, it reveals itself to us 
as vain. (...) Because the absolute, dear friends, 
that absolute in which alone, our spirit could 
find rest, can never be reached. 
The protagonist, in desperate need of finding the 'absolute' is sure 
that Zuccarello must have reached this "absolute" and therefore 
be a god. The confusion between the protagonist's search for 
the "absolute" and his own statement that it cannot be found is 
finally resolved in the conclusion that the "absolute" is nothing 
more than the place inside each one of us from which can grow 
an entire world. Zuccarello had found the only "absolute" that 
there is in this world: the understanding of himself and his life 
condition, the understanding that is, of the subjectivity or, as 
Pirandello would have it, the relativity of all reality. 
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It must be noted here again, that neither those existentialist 
claims concerning the relativity (subjectivity) of values, nor those 
concerning the possible existence of an "absolute" and the alleged 
consequences of these claims is at issue here. What is relevant 
is only the finding of identical claims in the works of Pirandello, 
In the philosophy of Pirandellian drama is the 
immoral affirmation that 'It is for each that 
which it appears to each.' Sceptical affirmation 
which is equivalent to 'Truth does not exist.' 
In L'uomo la bestia e la virtu, the questions are raised; What 
is man? What is beast? What is virtue? Conventional notions 
of these are not accepted. 
The relativity (subjectivity) of all reality according to the 
perceiver is affirmed again in La mano del malato povero: 
I really have never understood what pleasure 
there is in posing questions to others in order 
to know how things are. They tell you the way 
they know them. Are you happy with that? Thank 
you very much! I want to know them for myself, 
and I want them to enter into me as they appear 
to me/1 
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In fact, according to Pirandello, it is impossible to see things the 
way others do no matter how much one tries. This is illustrated 
in Quand'ero matto, A man who finds total peace in a contemplation 
of nature, feeling as if he himself could become the world with the 
trees as his members, the earth as his body, the rivers as his 
veins and the air his soul, awakes from this revery to realise 
that he has really been raving. 
Let us come back into our own consciousness ... 
- But I re-entered into it, not to see me, but 
to see the others in me as they see themselves, 
to feel them in me as they in themselves feel 
and to want them as they wanted themselves. 
The entire segment of his life during which time he tried to be 
one with nature and one with other people is refuted as the time 
"when I was crazy". In fact, these desires, this way of life has 
made him incapable of taking care of himself or functioning in 
the world. It is only when he accepts the necessity of being an 
egotist that he learns to be "wise". The ironic ending of the 
story is his marriage to the wealthy widow of the man who robbed 
him of everything. Thus he judges that he has been saved by 
the great virtue of foresight on the part of his "good" thief. 
Although it is undoubtedly true that it was for merely pragmatic 
reasons that the protagonist of the story "could" not succeed 
in seeing the world as others saw it, it is also true that he 
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could only see through the eyes of other people and feel as 
they did in his own idealised manner. In other words, he only 
imagines himself to be thinking the way they were and feeling 
the way they did. It was not, as it first appears, because of 
his extreme goodness that he was robbed and ruined, but because 
of the goodness which he thought was in others. Thus, studying 
this story along with La sign or a Frola e JX signor Ponza suo 
genero (and its dramatic equivalent Cos!- £ (se vi pare) which is 
the classic example of Pirandello's illustration of the relativity 
(subjectivity) of reality, and which will be discussed at more 
length in Chapter IV on reality, we can see that it is not merely 
a pragmatic impossibility of seeing the world as others see it; 
such an objective world-view is impossible in principle as well. 
In the face of this discovery Pirandello affirms in L'uomo in frak 
that: 
Loyalty, loyalty is a debt, and the most sacred 
toward ourselves even before that toward others. 
To betray is horrible. 
In Niente we see the full force of Pirandello's treatment of 
"common" values. They are niente, nothing. What is love once we 
have attained it? What is glory once we have achieved it? What 
is learning, or even life itself? Niente. (It must be noted that 
Pirandello is not asserting that this experience is or should be 
universal but only that it is one way of coming to an awareness of 
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the relativity (subjectivity) of values to the importance which the 
individual places upon them,) In the face of death, in the case of 
this particular story - suicide, it is realised that nothing has 
value and death is, in fact, the easiest way out. (For a further 
discussion of life as the only value, however, see subsection 6 
of this chapter.) 
In the stories: Ritorno. Tutt'e tre. La prova. and X fortunati. 
the "common" values of marriage and religion are questioned. In 
fact, in La prova we find a situation almost identical with Sartre's 
classic example of the choice of values as illustrated in the 
Biblical story of Abraham and his willingness to sacrifice his 
son, Isaac. For Sartre, even Abraham being tested by God, was 
entirely free and entirely responsible for his actions. He could 
not blame it on God because it was he who had to first of all 
decide whether in fact it was God who was calling, and whether 
he was indeed calling Abraham, and whether he was in fact that 
Abraham. The relativity of time itself that is, the subjectivity 
of its perception, is illustrated in X due giganti. 
The ambivalent traditional Christian values of poverty and 
humility even within the Church itself are shown in La Messa di 
quest'anno. If one examines logically and follows to their final 
strict conclusion the teachings of Christ, the Church should not 
be rich. It should give all it has to the poor. Christmas should 
not be celebrated with feasts and decorations and pomp, but with 
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stark simplicity in its wholly spiritual value. The new priest in 
a small village wishes to do this, to the great disappointment 
of everyone. The narrator tells us: 
'I am sure that the bishop will remedy everything,' 
(...) This priest Don Grotti is too logical and 
cannot succeed, he follows too much to the letter 
the teachings of Christ. (...) No capons, no yellow 
bread ... no nothing. (...) even more logical 
was Catholicism which was well aware that men 
couldn't for an unsure good over there, beyond 
life, last for very long in the bitter and hard 
resignation and in the despising of the goods of 
the earth here below, it wanted pomp, it wanted 
feasts ... and so many other things it wanted 
and permitted. Go on, won't Monsignore want to 
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be a good Catholic? 
On what basis then can values be chosen if even those which have 
supposedly been sent down from Heaven can be and are interpreted 
in contradictory ways? 
The highest value, if there is one, must be the keeping of 
faith with one's self-chosen values, whatever they may be, (This 
is illustrated in Alia zappa. however the difficulty of doing this, 
is also illustrated in Sopra e sotto and in La balia.) 
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The existentialists insist upon the absurdity of life, its 
ultimate meaninglessness. This leads them to a claim that there is 
no such thing as an a priori value. At the same time, Sartre treats 
the acceptance of man's utter freedom and total responsibility 
as the highest value while Camus extols the acceptance of the 
absurdity of man's condition as the only fully human mode of 
behaviour. It is true that Sartre makes use of sophisticated 
philosophical reasoning (or plain sophistry—depending on one's 
point of view) in order to explain that he isn't really treating 
freedom as a "value" but as man's "mode of being": 
I am indeed an existent who learns his freedom 
through his acts, but I am also an existent 
whose individual and unique existence temporal-
izes itself as freedom. As such I am necessarily 
a consciousness (of) freedom since nothing ex-
ists in consciousness except as the non-thetic 
consciousness of existing. Thus my freedom is 
perpetually in question in my being; it is not 
a quality added on or a property of my nature. 
It is very exactly the stuff of my being; and 
as in my being, my being is in question, I must 
necessarily possess a certain comprehension of 
freedom. 
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Camus seems to find it obvious that if man's condition is meaningless 
and absurd, then the only manly thing to do about it is too 
accept this absurdity. This great act of courage perhaps brings 
happiness and a sort of victory and is hence to be valued. 
One cannot help but observe here a certain contradiction. 
One intuits an uncomfortable inconsistency. Either it is the case 
that there are no a priori values and one cannot recommend 
any particular mode of action, or this is not the case. One 
cannot have it both ways. It is a tempting opportunity for 
philosophical refutation of existentialist theses. However, even 
more interesting is the observation of the same contradiction in 
Pirandello. 
On the one hand Pirandello illustrates the typically existen-
tialist notion of freedom from "common" moral strictures because 
of their "relativity" in the face of the absurd. On the other 
hand, he, like Camus, takes certain conclusions as obvious, e.g. 
we are alive, there is this continual "flux" of life within us. 
Being that this is all we have and the opposite of this, anything 
which stops this flow is a form of death, choose life. Being 
that life lived to its fullest, life aware of the masks, the forms 
which try to stifle it, life aware of its own absurd condition 
in which it is forced on the one hand to construct itself and 
accept certain masks while on the other it struggles to be free 
from such killing forms —being that such a life seems more human, 
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more truly alive, Pirandello sees this kind of life as a sort 
of ultimate value. Keeping faith with whatever values one has 
chosen is also accepted intuitively as a positive value. 
Thus we can see within the works of Pirandello a great 
concern for the relativity—or subjectivity—of values as part of 
the awareness of the absurdity of man's condition, a typically 
existentialist theme. We can also see the same sort of inconsistency 
of claims in regard to ultimate values in Pirandello as in the 
recognised existentialists. 
2. God 
What is Pirandello's position regarding the existence of 
God? Religion, the Church, believers, miracles, and other themes 
concerning God are numerous in the works of Pirandello. What are 
their functions? Can Pirandello be classed with the atheistic 
existentialists or does he affirm God's existence? Among the 
literary critics we find many discussions in this area. Most 
common is the opinion that Pirandello is a pantheist, but some 
critics such as Pietro Mignosi have even maintained that Pirandello 
is a perfectly orthodox Catholic. Pirandello's own claim that 
one aspect of his work is "perfect orthodoxy in regard to the 
position of religious problems. And such problems only allow of a 
Christian solution," is, I would argue, misinterpreted and used 
to support this dubious claim. Gino Cucchetti in his article 
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Assoluto e relativo nei tre miti pU Luigi Pirandello states that 
Pirandello does not in fact resolve these problems, then states 
quite irrelevantly that Dante didn't either and asks the further 
irrelevant question as to whether any of us has. This critic 
further contradicts himself in stating that far from Pirandello's 
thoughts is; 
(...) the procedure of a certain deism which, 
establishing with rational critical processes 
the inconsistancy of all the positive religions, 
believes to be able to abolish them, leaving each 
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individual to his own devices. 
Either Pirandello does, in fact, leave each individual to his 
own devices, or he resolves these religious problems. Cucchetti 
further states: 
(...) Pirandellian doubt is put in the service of 
truth; irony and sarcasm punish perfidy, even 
if it is overshadowed by the pretences of social 
living, and even while negating it, he affirms 
this life and the nobility of its struggles. And 
not the 'absolute' in each man's actions, which 
could represent the implacable march of destiny, 
marked with the birth of the existence of each 
one of us, but the 'relative' created by our will. 
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by our sentiments, by our 'ego' conscious and 
operating, is the most serene and comforting 
significance that life is not that little breath 
which is imposed upon us by a materialistic 
force, based on a biological formula, but it is a 
magnificent gift liberally given to us by a spirit 
incalculably larger and more powerful than we, 
a gift which we ^an use as we wish, according 
to our desires, our tendencies, our aspirations, 
a free will, in short, which makes us, according 
to our thought, and each in a different way, 
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masters of the world. 
In this section I will argue that: a) Pirandello's attitude 
towards organised religion is a negative one, b) that his position 
concerning God, in a Christian sense is that He is an invention 
of man brought about by fear of the unknown or the inability to 
face the absurdity of life, c) that the true nature of God - if 
such a term can be applied to such a nature - is nothing more 
than life itself which is envisioned as a force, a continual flow 
or flux which has no meaning in itself, of which we are only a part 
and to which it is we ourselves who must give a meaning, d) that 
the acceptance of this concept is in some sense impossible for 
men so they need their faith in God and e) that the recognition 
of this need is the only true sense in which it may be said 
no 
that Pirandello's approach to religion only admits of "Christian 
conclusions", 
a. In La lega disciolta. Bombolo, a Mohammedan living in 
Sicily, acting on "Christian" principles of justice and charity, 
is contrasted with the Christians who, while outwardly preaching 
the same principles, are actually less "Christian" than he, in 
that they do not practise what they preach. In La Madonnina 
we see the faith of a small boy coming from an atheist family 
contrasted with the scheming of the priest and other "faithful" 
which deceipt destroys the boy's faith and drives him from the 
Church. In Uno nessuno e centomila the narrator-protagonist of 
the novel describes all nuns as at least partly crazy, In the 
play All'uscita the Philosopher describes how he had to explain 
to his dog why he couldn't go into church. 
'There stands the most respectable of human 
sentiments, dear, which not content, not even 
he, to live in men's breast, wanted to make 
a house for himself on the outside, and what 
a house! Domes, naves, columns, gold, marble, 
precious canvasses,' Now you, good man, perhaps 
you can understand. As a house of God, the world 
is undoubtedly infinitely grander and richer than 
a church; incomparably more noble and precious 
than any altar, the spirit of man in adoration 
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of the divine mystery. But this is the fate 
of all sentiments which want to construct a 
house for themselves: of necessity they become 
smaller, and even become a little puerile, because 
of their vanity. It is the same fate of that 
infinite which is in us (...) 
And again in Uno nessuno e centomila. we see the image of churches 
as houses built by men to enshrine their own sentiments. 
Men, you see? had to construct a house even 
for their sentiments. It's not sufficient for 
them to have them inside, in their heart, these 
sentiments: they want to see them on the outside 
also, to touch them, and they built for them a 
house. 
b. In L'Avemaria di Bobbio we see the torment of a man 
wishing to live without faith. Bobbio, a sceptic and an atheist, 
has continually recurring toothaches, but hates the dentist. It 
is clear from the story that the pain represents man's anguish 
over his condition, his recurring fear of the absurd. Can science 
"cure" man of this fear, or is faith in God the answer? In 
pain, almost as a childhood conditioned response, Bobbio says an 
Avemaria. The pain goes away. This is repeated a number of 
times. Should he believe or not? Finally, in order to solve the 
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problem and not have these "games" anymore, he turns to science 
and has all his teeth pulled out. Of course this cannot solve 
the original problem of whether or not the Avemaria cured his 
pain. In the novel Suo marito the authoress reflects upon her 
own faith in God and begins to see this belief as a necessary 
fiction in the face of the absurd. 
(...) but wasn't God perhaps a supreme fiction 
created by this dark and profound feeling in 
order to calm herself. Everything, everything 
was an illusion machine which one mustn't squelch, 
which one had to believe, not through hypocrisy, 
but out of necessity if one didn't want to die 
or go crazy. But how to believe if one knew 
them to be illusions? Alas, without a goal, what 
sense did life have? Beasts live for living and 
men couldn't and didn't know how; of necessity 
men had to live, not for living but for something 
fictitious, illusory which would give a sense and 
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a value to their lives. 
In the face of the absurd, man's invention of God comforts him. 
In ii vecchio Dio we read: 
Hopes, illusions, riches and so many other beauti-
ful things had Mr. Aurelio lost along the path 
of life: faith in God was the only thing he had 
left, faith which was, in the midst of the an-
guished darkness of his ruined existence, like a 
little lantern; a little lantern which he, walking 
hunched over, sheltered as best he could, with 
timorous care, from the frigid breath of the 
latest disillusionment s. He wandered as if lost 
through life's disorder and no one was concerned 
about him anymore. 
- It is not important: God sees me! - he exorted 
himself in his heart. And he was really sure of 
this, Mr. Aurelio was, that God saw him because 
of his little lantern. So sure, that the thought 
of his proximate end, rather than dismaying him, 
comforted him. 
In Bereche e. la guerra we see man as the creator of God, the 
Creator. 
If only it were known in the heavens that 
in the strip of tenuous half-light there are 
millions and millions of restless beings, that from 
that little grain of sand there they seriously 
believe that they can dictate laws to the whole 
universe, impose upon it their own reason, their 
own sentiment, their own God, the little God 
born in their little souls that they believe to 
be the creator of those heavens, of all those 
stars: and here, they take him, this God who has 
created the heavens and all the stars, and they 
adore him and they dress him up after their own 
fashion and they demand that he account for 
their little worries and provide protection also 
in their most sordid affairs, in their stupid 
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wars. 
In Pallottoline we see again, how man has created his own God out 
of his fear, 
- Are you afraid? - her husband shouted at her, 
- Are you afraid that God, because I curse, as 
you say, will send you a thunderbolt? There's 
the lightening rod, fool. Do you see what your 
God is born from? From that fear of yours. But 
can you seriously believe, pretend that an idea 
or a sentiment born in this nothing full of fear 
which is called man should be God, should be the 
one who formed the infinite universe. 
In fact, it is the husband who is made to look foolish, not because 
his lightening rod couldn't protect them from a thunderbolt from 
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On High, but because he is naive enough to believe that by exposing 
the origin of man's belief in God, he could rid man of his faith. 
In fact, for most men this faith is a necessary illusion, as is 
well illustrated in Lazzaro. In this play, it is precisely the 
realisation of this necessity which allows a man who has rejected 
the priesthood to accept it once more. 
- Now I understand and really feel the word 
of Christ: CHARITY! Because men cannot remain 
all and always standing, God himself wants his 
house on earth which promises true life beyond; 
his Holy House, where the tired and the poor 
and the weak can kneel down and all sorrow and 
all pride bend its knee. (...) now I feel myself 
worthy again of putting on the habit for the 
divine sacrifice of Christ and for the faith of 
others.86 
Man needs the comfort he seeks from faith in God. In Si gira ... 
we read: 
A man has died ... Myself, yourself, ... no matter: 
a man ... And five people, in there, have gone 
on their knees round him to pray to someone, 
to something, which they believe to be outside 
and over everything and everyone, and not in 
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themselves, a sentiment of theirs which rises 
independent of their judgment and invokes that 
same pity which they hope to receive themselves, 
and it brings them comfort and peace. Well, 
people must act like that. 
c. The "God" which Pirandello envisages is, therefore, not the 
personal Judeo-Christian God who gives a meaning to the universe, 
who planned and executed the redemption of man, and who will 
judge and reward or punish each man according to his merits. It 
is a "God" only in the sense that it is a force somehow beyond 
man and yet is found in each man. It is the only "absolute"; 
life, a continuous flux, a force which is in each man and which 
will continue after the death of each man. If it is any form of 
theism at all, then it must be regarded as a pantheistic doctrine, 
the equivalent of affirming that life is the ultimate value, an 
affirmation which is hardly foreign to Camus. What is called 
"God" by man in his necessity for faith is in reality, according 
to Pirandello "pitch darkness". Man denies death in God, but 
this does not render us immortal nor does it give meaning to our 
lives. True resurrection consists in: 
believing in only this Immortality, not ours, not 
for us, hope of reward or fear of punishment: 
believing in life's eternal present, which is God, 
and that is enough. 
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God is our own life within us and no need to search anywhere 
else. 
Our spirit is God within us. 
(...) God (...) see you with your own eyes, 
(...) What should I do? 
Live.90 
In Uno nessuno e centomila the narrator-protagonist contrasts 
Pirandello's conception of God which is within oneself with that 
which is a construction of man. 
d. According to Pirandello, to accept that God is life within 
each one of us means that we must accept each person's reality as 
being as valid as our own; there is no God who has a priveleged 
view. It is not possible for us to do this as we can only see 
from our own point of view, and hence men reject this pantheistic 
God and hold to their ancient faith. In Quand'ero matto a man 
who had tried to accept this pantheistic world-view, realises the 
impossibility of this. 
(...) I agree now that this would be a difficult God 
for wise people and even down-right impractical 
because whoever would want to recognise him 
would have to act towards others the way I used 
to act, that is, like a crazy person: with equal 
consciousness of oneself and of others, because 
they are consciousness as we are. Whoever would 
really do this and would attribute to others 
the identical reality which he attributes to 
his own, would of necessity have the idea of a 
reality common to all, of a truth and also of 
So we see that in one sense, because of man's weakness and fear 
it is very pragmatically impossible, according to Pirandello, to 
accept as the absolute what he proposes is, in fact, the only 
absolute. It is impossible also in principle, as we have seen 
in the above section concerning the relativity of values. (More 
will be said concerning the affirmation of life as well as the 
inevitability of what Sartre calls "bad faith" later on in this 
chapter.) 
e. What attitude can then be taken in regard to the 
need for an absolute, the need for faith? More will be said 
later on concerning Pirandello and fraternal love, agape', but 
the above examinations of his attitudes toward the traditional 
Judeo-Christian concept of God along with his espousal of what 
may be regarded as a form of pantheism show that Pirandello's 
so-called "Christian conclusions", if such they may be termed, 
are Christian only to the extent that they take into account 
the frailty of man and propose a loving, charitable, tolerant 
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attitude towards these weaknesses. In no further respect can 
he be termed an "orthodox Catholic". His pantheism is thus more 
profitably classed with the atheistic existentialists rather than 
the theistic or Catholic existentialists. 
3. Suicide 
Camus, considers the question of suicide the most vital one 
in all of philosophy. 
My reasoning wants to be faithful to the evidence 
that aroused it. That evidence is the ab-
surd. It is that divorce between the mind 
that desires and the world that disappoints, my 
nostalgia for unity, this fragmented universe 
and the contradiction that binds them together. 
Kierkegaard suppresses my nostalgia and Husserl 
gathers together that universe. That is not 
what I was expecting. It was a matter of living 
and thinking with those dislocations, of knowing 
whether one had to accept or refuse. There 
can be no question of masking the evidence, of 
suppressing the absurd by denying one of the 
terms of its equation. It is essential to know 
whether one can live with it or whether, on the 
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other hand, logic commands one to die of it. 
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And he concludes, as we have seen above, that in order to 
overcome the absurd we must live with it, in full knowledge of 
the meaninglessness of our lives. Sartre too condemns suicide 
because paradoxically, although it is a free act, it becomes the 
final act which takes away our freedom, man's mode of being doing 
away with his mode of being. For Sartre, death can only "remove 
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all meaning from life". 
If we must die, then our life has no meaning 
because its problems receive no solution and 
because the very meaning of the problems remains 
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undetermined. 
Suicide is as meaningless as any other kind of death. 
It would be in vain for us to resort to suicide 
in order to escape this necessity. Suicide can 
not be considered as an end of life for which 
I should be the unique foundation. Since it is 
an act of my life, indeed, it itself requires 
a meaning which only the future can give to 
it; but as it is the last act of my life, it 
is denied this future. Thus it remains totally 
undeterminedC..) Suicide is an absurdity which 
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causes my life to be submerged in the absurd. 
121 
In the works of Pirandello we find one fictitious suicide (U 
fu Mattia Pascal), three attempts or (near attempts) at suicide 
and twenty-one examples of successful suicide. What function (or 
functions) do these examples have in Pirandello's exposition of 
his position concerning suicide? 
There are only two clear examples of suicide as a reaction to 
the absurd in all of Pirandello's works. In L'idea it is presented 
to us as a vague idea which haunts, omnipresent in front of the 
absurdity of life. In Candelora a woman faced with the relativity 
of all reality cannot live with this awareness and kills herself. 
Another short story, PubertA. may be interpreted as an example 
of suicide in the face of the absurd, but it may just as well be 
read as a reaction to the normal but in this case exaggerated 
psychological difficulties of puberty. 
In Spunta un giorno. we see the only example of the deliberate 
rejection of suicide after it has been seriously considered as a 
means of escape from an impossible or extremely difficult situation. 
The two other examples of attempts (or near attempts) concern one 
man who simply lacks the "courage" to commit the act of self-
destruction, L'idea. and another who simply falls asleep instead 
of making the attempt, (La levata del sole). 
Of the twenty-two examples of successful suicide, twelve are 
committed because of the protagonist's inability to live with a 
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difficult situation. In E due! a young man cannot live with 
his past. In Nel segno, L'uoroo solo. Si gira ..., La veste lung a. 
and Scialle nero the motive concerns unrequited love, betrayal 
by the beloved or the impossibility of living without love. In 
Zia Michelina the suicide is the result of the conflict between 
society's values and the woman's own. In Niente and in La veglia 
(this latter really an attempted suicide, but I have classed it 
with the successful ones since the woman was saved only at the 
last moment and not by her own acts.) the motives are less 
clear but have to do with the difficulty of living with certain 
situations. In Jn silenzio a young boy who has "adopted" his 
illegitimate half-brother after the death of their mother and 
made the love between them the focus of his life, kills himself 
and the little brother as well when the mother's former lover 
comes to claim the child. In Vestire gl'ignudi and JX guardaroba 
dell'eloauenza suicide in conjunction with false stories are used 
as means of saving the reputation of two people. In the latter 
case, the suicide is committed by one person for the sake of two 
other people's reputations, and in the former it is committed by 
the person whose reputation is at stake. 
While in some cases it is the awareness of the absurd which 
results in suicide, in two short stories. Sole e ombra and L'imbecille 
suicide is used by the author to lead us, if not the protagonist, 
to a further awareness of the absurd. In the first case, a 
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man commits suicide because he cannot bear the idea of being 
caught for his stealing and going to prison. But a greater part 
of the story concerns the contrast between his last glorious 
day in the country and his designs, and between his death and 
the continuing, uncaring beauty of nature. In the second story 
suicide is used to illustrate the uselessness of death. No one, 
no political motive, no other circumstances can make it "worth 
something" to the individual. Its very finality makes the life 
which preceeded it futile, 
In six instances suicide happens to appear in a short story 
or novel, but it is used primarily to illustrate another theme, 
In JX fu Mattia Pascal the suicide of a gambler is the technical 
means by which Pirandello develops his plot and causes Mattia 
to leave the casino and start for home, during which journey he 
hears the news of his own presumed suicide and begins his new 
life as Adriano Meis. In Mentre il cuore soffriva the suicide of 
an old man paralysed by a stroke is described. It is used to 
illustrate the contrast between his body as looked at from the 
outside by others and what was, at the same time, going on inside 
him. In La levata del sole, a man who has gambling debts sees 
no other solution but to kill himself. He stays up to see his 
last sunrise but instead of killing himself he falls asleep. In 
this story, as was shown in Section II of this chapter on the 
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realisation of the absurd, Pirandello illustrates the absurdity 
found in conjunction with even our most serious intentions. 
In Ii viaggio. Da si, L'uccello impaqliato and Jl dovere del 
medico, suicide is the perhaps exaggerated reaction of four people 
in circumstances which take away their freedom and make their 
life nothing more than a living death. The suicides are not a 
solution. They are used by the author to provide a contrast 
which ironically, highlights the value of life. In Da si, a man 
decides to kill himself after discovering that he has fallen so 
low that in fact his old self has already been dead for three 
years. In II dovere del medico an accused murderer kills himself 
rather than have his life - or even his freedom - taken away 
from him. In Ii viaggio a young widow caught in the strictures 
of traditional Sicilian society finally chooses life by rejecting 
the living death of the customs of her little village. When she 
must return to the village, she chooses death instead. Rather 
than being an example of true suicide, she is symbolically shown 
to have chosen only between two forms of death. In L'uccello 
impaqliato a man who has "not lived" so he wouldn't die finally 
realises his circumstances and ends the "living death" that was 
his existence. 
Thus, in none of these cases does Pirandello state clearly 
his position regarding suicide. He does not preach against it 
as does Camus or Sartre, but neither does he propose it as a 
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solution or an escape. In fact, far from admiration, the reader is 
led to feel pity and a great compassion for all of these suicides. 
Considering this evidence alone, it must be admitted that the 
claim that Pirandello, like Camus, rejects and condemns suicide, 
is simply under-determined by the textual evidence. However, 
considered within the framework of all of the works of Pirandello 
and especially in the light of the large number of works which 
affirm the value of life as an antidote to the absurd (see 
sub-section 6 below) it must be concluded that while Pirandello 
did not consider the question of suicide as the basic one of all 
philosophy as did Camus, neither did he leave out the question 
altogether. And the answer to this question was, for Pirandello, 
that while one must feel compassion for those who do choose this 
form of action, for there are many who do; suicide is not an 
acceptable means of dealing with the absurd. 
4. Denial of Responsibility and/or of the Absurd 
Sartre's notorious equation of man with freedom leads him 
to conclude that he is totally and utterly responsible for his 
choices, his actions. To attempt to behave as if one were not 
responsible is to commit an act of what Sartre calls "bad faith", 
mauvaise foi. It is an act by which a man tries to hide from or 
mask the discomfort which this responsibility causes him. Even 
madness is, for Sartre, a kind of "bad faith" because insanity 
is a way of trying to create a false, illusory world in which 
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a man can live without responsibility. Max Charlesworth in The 
Existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre, quotes an interview with 
Sartre in which the French philosopher speaks of his influence on 
and position concerning R.D. Laing and the anti-psychiatry school 
of psychiatrists. 
I think that Professor Laing was looking for a 
theory which would put freedom first, so that 
mental illness, or what is known as mental illness, 
might appear as an aspect of freedom, and not as 
a disease resulting from a malfunctioning of the 
brain or from some physical complaint. I think 
what he meant is that within society, such as I 
conceived it, one could understand the nature of 
an aberrant but persistent attitude which at 
present is known as madness, an attitude that 
prevents a real contact with others and which 
is nevertheless a consequence of freedom. (...) a 
new conception of mental illness seen as a mode 
of life as valid as our own, but which, however, 
is likely to lead to total inertia, for instance, 
or to unbearable pain. He takes men as they are, 
not as mad versus sane men, but as men; some 
reaching a certain stage of distress, others 
avoiding that stage. That is, I presume, what 
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Laing seemed to want to take from my writings, 
As a matter of fact, I am completely in favour 
of anti-psychiatry, such as it is practised by 
Laing and by others in Italy and France.96 
For Sartre, Freud's theory of the unconscious act is a contradiction 
in terms, and "bad faith" or "self-deception" is the true cause of 
"mental illnesses" which are seen to be the result of "repression". 
According to Sartre, repression at an unconscious level is not 
possible because the mechanism of repression must in fact be 
conscious of what it is repressing in order to do so. Even under 
such extraordinary circumstances as torture, it is not licit to 
say that one couldn't have done otherwise. One must admit that 
rather than endure the pain, he chose to do as he did. Thus any 
attempted escape from our responsibility for our choices as free 
men is an example of "bad faith". 
In Arte e coscienza d'oggi Pirandello describes the times and 
one origin of this desire to escape. Modern science has taken 
away the place in the universe which man thought to hold. The 
world is no longer anthropocentric. Man can no longer believe 
in the greatness of his position. As the "ancient faith" in God 
disappears and man sees that there is no "meaning" or eternal 
"plan" to be found in nature, he becomes aware of the absurd, 
of I'umorismo of his situation and may seek to escape this 
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realisation. One aspect of this "modern insanity" is a refuge in 
a deterministic view of the world. 
While on the one hand describing the condition of man as 
part of an absurd world and emphasising his freedom; on the 
other, Pirandello does not condemn universally the inauthenticity 
with which some people approach this condition, this freedom, and 
their resultant responsibility. The over-analysis of life, the 
dissecting and marking of it with neat little labels rather than 
living it is seen as inauthentic and unacceptable, but to a certain 
extent "bad faith" (or as Pirandello might prefer "self-deception") 
is unavoidable because not only do we often see ourselves as 
very different from what we really are (see Chapter V on Self 
& Others), but society itself often demands of its members a 
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certain reciprocal deception which makes life more tolerable. 
This apparent divergence of opinion between Pirandello and Sartre 
is not the result of any radically different view of man's freedom or 
responsibility. It is brought about only by a certain pessimism on 
the part of the Sicilian as to individual man's actually accepting 
his position in the absurd world. As has been shown in Chapter II 
on freedom, Pirandello clearly believes not only in the desirability 
of accepting this freedom and responsibility but in the very real 
possibility of doing so. He does stress the difficulty of this, 
however, and a great part of his work is devoted to illustrating 
the conflict between authenticity and self-deception. 
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This same conflict between authenticity and self-deception 
or bad faith shows up in Sartre. It is not only a question 
of perpetual temptation toward bad faith as toward an easier 
alternative but a conflict or a tension at an even deeper level. 
Sartre states; 
That which affects itself with bad faith must 
be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being 
of consciousness is consciousness of being. It 
appears then that I must be in good faith, at 
least to the extent that I am conscious of my 
bad faith, (...) There is in fact an 'evanescence' 
of bad faith, which, it is evident, vacillates 
qg 
continually between good faith and cynicism. 
And again even more forcefully: 
Thus the essential structure of sincerity does 
not differ from that of bad faith since the 
sincere man constitutes himself as what he is 
in order not to be it. This explains the truth 
recognized by all that one can fall into bad 
faith through being sincere (...) Thus we find 
at the base of sincerity a continual game of 
mirror and reflection, a perpetual passage from 
the being which is what it is, to the being which 
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is not what it is and inversely from the being 
which is not what it is to the being which is 
what it is. And what is the goal of bad faith? 
To cause me to be what I am in the mode of 'not 
being what one is', or not to be what I am in 
the mode of 'being what one is'. We find here 
the same game of mirrors. In fact, in order for 
me to have an intention of sincerity, I must at 
the outset simultaneously be and not be what I 
am. 
Thus we see in both writers the illustration of the conflict 
between authenticity and self-deception or bad faith, with a 
slightly greater tendency on the part of the Sicilian toward a 
certain pragmatic pessimism in regard to the outcome as well as 
an appreciation on the part of both writers of the ontological 
difficulties involved, 
Pirandello, like Sartre, sees that the "unconscious" can be 
no more than an excuse. He acknowledges its power, but sees 
that its existence does not take away responsibility. In the 
short story Nel gorgo and in the play taken from it Non si sa 
come we see a man who, having committed adultery with his wife's 
best friend in an "irrational" moment, and finding himself as well 
as his partner, perfectly capable of pushing the memory of this 
betrayal so deeply into their unconscious as to feel guiltless, 
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goes "mad" as he realises that his wife might have done the same 
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thing. The unconscious is likened to an abyss (.il gorgo) into 
which the entire episode falls and which closes over immediately, 
leaving no trace of the event. It is clear, however, that the 
responsibility remains, as it does in the short story Nel sogno 
from which comes the following passage: 
(...) she had been another's in the unconsciousness 
of her dream. The betrayal didn't exist in fact, 
for the other; but it was and remained here, here 
for her, in her body that had taken pleasure, 
a reality.102 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of the unconscious as an excuse is 
also illustrated, 
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Where was the guilt? What could he do to her. 
In IX treno ha fischiato. the usefulness of insanity as a 
refuge from reality appears again. A man living an "impossible" 
life, supporting a huge number of ill relatives, working literally 
day and night becomes aware of his own freedom and sees his life 
as his own choice. He is overcome with a sense of exhilaration 
at this discovery, and other people think he is crazy. Of course, 
he isn't, but being well aware of the situation he sees that it 
would be much easier if he were, 
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Yes, he was still a little elated, but very 
naturally so because of what had happened to 
him. He laughed at the doctors and the nurses 
and at all his colleagues who thought him crazy. 
- if only! - he said. - if only! 
Of course, the most famous example of Pirandello's treatment 
of insanity is the play Enrico IV in which a man, injured in a fall, 
awakes believing himself to be Henry IV. His friends and servants, 
etc. second his delusions. After a time, he realises who he really 
is, but aware also of the treachery of his "friends",—who had 
engineered the fall—he pretends to continue to believe in his 
fictitious identity, waiting for the moment when he will be able to 
exact his revenge. He finally murders the man who had betrayed 
him and retreats behind his "insanity" to evade responsibility 
for his action. This play raises the question of what insanity 
is, but it must be noted that Pirandello deals throughout his 
works with two different concepts of insanity. One refers to the 
type which we have been discussing through which a person tries 
to evade his responsibility. The other concept, as we saw very 
briefly in IL. treno ha fischiato is the labelling as "insane" by 
society of any person who does not conform to its standards, 
accept its particular values or share its deceptions. This is 
the theme of the play JX berretto a sonagli. 
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It's so easy to pretend to be crazy, believe 
me! I'll teach you how. You just have to begin 
shouting the truth in everyone's face. No one 
believes it, and everyone will take you to be 
insane. 
Thus insanity can be a type of "bad faith" or "self-deception", 
an attempt to evade one's freedom. 
For Camus, "bad faith" is any flight from the absurd. In 
discussing the various reactions to the absurd, in his essay 
The Myth of Sisyphus Camus distinguishes between the absurd 
hero, Sisyphus, who lives with and faces the meainglessness of 
his existence and the futility of his endeavours, and others who, 
through various means try to escape an awareness of the absurd. 
In Pirandello, too, we find self-deception as a remedy for the 
distress caused by the awareness of the absurd. In Si gira ... 
the actress Nesteroff tries to escape the meaninglessness of her 
existence. The protagonist of the novel, Serafino Gubbio, reflects: 
'But what good will it do you' - I would like 
to shout at her - 'what good will it do you if 
Aldo Nuti does not come to bring it back before 
you, your malady, when you have it still inside 
you, stifled by an effort but not conquered? 
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You do not wish to see your own soul? Is that 
possible? If follows you, it follows you always, 
it pursues you like a mad thing! (..-) Is it 
better to be killed than to fall back into that 
torment, to feel a soul within you, a soul that 
suffers and does not know why?' 
Serafino is aware of the senselessness of everything. He wonders 
if this can be an awareness peculiar to him or if others also 
are aware. 
I study people in their most ordinary occupations, 
to see if I can succeed in discovering in others 
what I feel that I lack in everything I do: the 
certainty that they understand what they are 
doing.107 
He sees that others, too, are conscious of the absurd, but try 
to reject it. 
This is enough for me: to know, gentlemen, that 
there is nothing clear or certain to you either, 
not even a little, that is determined for you 
from time to time by the absolutely familiar 
conditions in which you are living. There is 
something more in everything. You do not wish 
or do not know how to see it. But the moment 
this something more gleams in the eyes of an 
idle person like myself, who has set himself to 
observe you, why, you become puzzled, disturbed 
It is as if people, at times, would like to step outside of their 
own beings so as to relieve their suffering, aware that it is 
their own being which is the cause of their pain. 
Enemies, to her, (Nesteroff) all the men become 
to whom she attaches herself, in order that 
they may help her to arrest the secret thing 
in her that escapes her: she herself, yes, but 
a thing that lives and suffers, so to speak 
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outside herself. 
In fact, it is precisely the desire to be aware of one's own being, 
to give it a value, a meaning, in contrast with the impossibility 
of achieving this which gives rise to the absurd. If one could 
get outside of his own being and live without this awareness, the 
anguish which this confrontation produces would cease. In Canta 
l'epistola. a man who has already rejected religion as a solution 
to the eternal problem is very well aware of the absurd. If man 
could cease searching for a meaning, the absurd would no longer 
exist. 
To be no longer conscious of being, like a stone, 
like a plant; not to remember any longer even 
one's own name; to live just to live, without 
knowing that one lives, like animals, like plants; 
with no more affections, nor desires, nor memories, 
nor thoughts; without anything any longer which 
would give a sense, a value to one's own life. 
The desire not to die but to live, as Sartre describes it, in the 
manner of a thing, that is, without the terrible consciousness of 
the absurd, is overwhelming. In the short story La trappola it 
is illustrated again: 
I was in the dark. You know I like to see the 
day die through the panes of a window and let 
myself be taken and enveloped little by little 
by the shadows, and think: - 'I'm not here any 
more!' - think: - 'If there were someone in this 
room, he would get up and light a lamp. I don't 
light the lamp because I'm not here anymore. I 
am like the chairs of this room, like the table, 
the curtains, the arm chair, the sofa, which 
don't need a lamp and don't know and don't see 
that I am here. I want to be like them, and not 
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see me and forget that I am here. 
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Sometimes people seek refuge from the absurd in frenetic and 
continuous activity, hoping thereby to lose consciousness of it, 
From his ridicule of such behaviour we may conclude that this is, 
for Pirandello, an inauthentic mode of action. Claudio Vicentini 
states; 
Action, as absolute functionality without any aim, 
becomes mechanical action (...) In this prospec-
tive, devouring activism represents the typical 
attitude of the man who 'has renounced' and 
tries to suffocate the existence of superior 
truths, (...) It isn't, however, the overcoming of 
the crisis, it is only the loss of awareness 
of it, and entails the progressive alienation 
of man who in exasperated activism suppresses 
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authentic feelings. 
Vicentini in his work on Pirandello's aesthetics also notes that 
the theme of the insignificance of human action which loses all 
value and all real aims is a recurrent motif in Pirandello's works. 
He quotes, in this context, Pirandello's short story Notizie del 
mondo (Novelle I p 708) "What is important is not to fly faster 
or slower, higher or lower, but to know why one flies." Without 
this reason, action is folly. Again Vicentini quotes Pirandello (I 
vecchi e X qiovani. in Romanzi. cit„ p. 817): 
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I don't know, at certain times, who is crazier, 
I who don't understand anything or those who 
seriously believe that they do and speak and 
move as if they really had some goal in front 
of them.113 
In Si gira ..., Serafino, keeping his own being in parentheses, 
as it were, retreats from life and observes very keenly the others 
around him. He sees everyone rushing around, trying to hide their 
distress in continuous amusements and activities, 
I don't deny it, the outward appearance is light 
and vivid. We move, we fly. And the breeze 
stirred by our flight produces an alert, joyous, 
keen agitation, and sweeps away every thought. 
On! On, that we may not have time nor power 
to heed the burden of sorrow, the degradation 
of shame which remain within us, in our hearts, 
Outside, there is a continuous glare, an incessant 
giddiness: everything flickers and disappears. 
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'What was that?' Nothing, it has passed! 
Such flight is fruitless. Even those amusements and those 
activities cannot take from us the realisation of our condition. 
139 
Yes. More wearying and complicated than our 
work do we find the amusements that are offered 
us; since from our rest we derive nothing but 
115 
an increase of weariness. 
The short story of Pirandello's which best illustrates the 
theme of activity as a flight from the absurd is Leviamoci questo 
pensiero. The protagonist is convinced that beyond all the little 
tasks, the minute, everyday activities and obligations of life, 
there must be some scope, some grand design by which he was 
meant to accomplish something important. Living means doing this 
"important something" so he must rid himself of the worry of 
doing this or that in order to get on with the business of living. 
(...) it palpitated in him like an indefinable 
anxiousness, the anxiousness of an unknown wait, 
a vague presentiment, that in life there was 
something to be done, which was never one of those 
many of which he ran round trying to rid himself 
immediately of the worry. But unfortunately, 
always, when he had rid himself of the worry, 
he remained as if suspended and panting in a 
frenetic emptiness. That anxiousness remained 




He couldn't 3eem to realise that life consists precisely of those 
little tasks, those minute, everyday activities and obligations of 
which he tried to rid himself of the worry. On his death bed he 
is still convinced that there must be something important that 
he was to do. 
He regained consciousness a few moments before 
dying; he re-opened his glazed eyes, looked 
sullenly at the doctor and the nurses around 
his bed: then reclining his head on the pillow 
he repeated with his last breath: - There was 
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something I was supposed to do ... 
Another, and most common, form of "bad faith" illustrated by 
Pirandello is the avoidance of responsibility for one's own life by 
attitudes which place the responsibility instead on circumstances, 
other people, or fate. 
In Si gira ... Serafino defines this type of "bad faith". 
We all of us readily admit our own unhappiness; 
no one admits his own wickedness; and the former 
we insist upon regarding as due to no reason 
or fault of our own; whereas we labour to find 
a hundred excuses and justifications for every 
trifling act of wickedness that we have committed, 
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whether against other people or against our own 
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conscience. 
In order to avoid responsibility for his own actions, a man may do 
almost anything, as Serafino continues to reflect in the following 
passage: 
Among all the phenomena of human nature one 
of the commonest, and at the same time one 
of the strangest when we study it closely, is 
this of the desperate frenzied struggle which 
every man, however ruined by his own misdeeds, 
conquered and crushed in his affliction, persists 
in keeping up with his own conscience, in order 
not to acknowledge those misdeeds and not to 
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make them a matter for remorse. 
The following are fully twenty examples from Pirandello's 
novels, short stories and plays of the theme of blaming other 
people, fate, God or circumstances for one's own difficulties, (1) 
In Vexilla Regis a woman blames her mother's objection to her 
marriage for her own abandonment of her lover and their child, 
(2) In Zafferanetta a man blames his natural child for his retreat 
from life and abandonment of his wife and the child of their 
marriage. (3) In L'ombrello. a young widow blames the "difficult 
nature" of one of her children for her own not remarrying. (4) 
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In In corpore vili a priest uses the cook or anyone else around 
as a scapegoat for his own gluttony and even uses the sacristan 
to take the medicine for his own resultant illnesses. (5) In Tra 
due ombre a man, upon seeing his former fiancee and realising 
how changed he is, blames his stupid wife and ugly children for 
the changes. (6) In Superior stabat lupus a woman refuses to 
acknowledge her own complicity in a murder. 
Did the suspicion of her father's cruel decision 
flash across her mind, upon seeing him the next 
morning all intent and attentive in the care 
of the sick one, after all that had been said 
between them the previous evening? Perhaps, but 
she refused to assume consciousness of it. 
In the novel (7) JX turno, a husband refuses any responsibility in 
his wife's illness, of which he is actually the cause. The doctor 
himself wishes to avoid responsibility for his choice of treatment. 
And if the doctor said something to him: - I 
don't know anything. - he answered invariably. 
It's up to you. You're responsible. I'm here. I 
don't complain about anything. 
But in the end the doctor asked for a consul-
tation, and having obtained from his colleagues 
the assurance that he had done all that was 
possible for the sick woman, he wanted to decline 
all responsibility. 
(8) In the play Come tu mi vuoi. a man refuses to acknowledge his 
responsibility for his own choices, 
Salter: I destroyed for you my life! 
The unknown woman: For your own passion - not for me. 
Salter: But who made me lose my head? 
The unknown woman: I? You, yourself wanted to lose it 
122 
by coming near me. 
(9) In Uno di pifl a man uses his own child as an excuse not to 
admit that he can't leave his wife because he is afraid of her 
and needs her. 
(...) while it was he who put her forward that 
way, his little girl, in order to shelter his 
shame behind her, the shame of his inconfessable 
shyness of his wife. He wanted to hide his shame 
from himself and from his mother, and he put 
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forward the little girl, saying that he didn't 
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leave his wife on account of her. 
(10) In Vittoria delle formiche a rich man who has lost everything 
through his over-indulgence in wine, women and gambling, is now 
reduced to poverty. At the time he had refused all responsibility, 
pretending not to be aware that ruin was imminent, although now 
he lives in endless remorse over what he should have done and 
didn't do. But still he hasn't learned his lesson. In order to 
rid his shack of ants he tries to burn the ant hill nearby. His 
hovel catches fire and he is burned trying to save it. He dies 
calling it "an alliance between the ants and the wind", 
(11) In Sedile sotto un vecchio cipresso a strangely emotional man, 
always angry with one person or another has to call in a colleague 
from his office as mediator every time he has a fight with his 
wife. The colleague becomes like one of the family. He and the 
wife have an affair, and the husband, thoughtless of consequences, 
as usual, imprisons the wife in her own home, after having sent 
her away and recalled her on account of the children. He shoots 
the lover in the arm and is absolved. The lover goes away and 
is reduced to begging in the streets. The husband, who has had 
all kinds of prostitutes in the house as a vendetta on his wife, 
by some sort of venereal infection has an enormous growth on 
his neck on account of which he can't even lift his head. One 
day, after many years, the husband and the lover meet and try 
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to console one another. They are still trying to blame fate for 
their present circumstances. (12) In Va bene, a man has blamed 
"the blows of fate" for his entire life. Time after time he makes 
the wrong decision and then, to avoid responsibility, blames fate 
for all the dire consequences. (13) In La casa dell'anonia. the 
theme of blaming fate is given a humorous twist. A man waiting 
for an appointment in the livingroom of an acquaintance notices 
a cat which is going after a nest of swallows under the window 
ledge. The cat is bound to knock over a vase of geraniums that 
is in the way. The observer can't take the agony of suspense. He 
feels that it is useless for him to move the vase since the next 
day it would be put back in its place. An accident is therefore 
"inevitable". He rushes out of the house; if he is indeed hit by 
the falling vase, whose fault is it? (14) In U. ventaglino a poor 
woman begging in a cafe is finally given money. She spends it on 
a little fan, saying "God will provide". (15) In La morta e _la viva 
a man who has taken the responsibility of a choice under very 
unusual circumstances continues to put the responsibility for the 
consequences of his choice on God. (16) In Un'altra allodola. two 
men who haven't seen each other for years meet. In discussing 
their present circumstances, the one who is poor, whose wife has 
run off to become a prostitute, blames all of his difficulties on 
his being poor. (17) In L'uomo solo a man whose wife has left him, 
obviously through his own fault, continues to blame fate for his 
unhappy circumstances. 
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What could he do about it if around his child-
like, tender and simple heart had grown that 
ugly body of a pig? Born for hearth and home, 
to love one woman in life, who would love him 
- not a lot! not a lot! - just a little, what 
recompense would he have known how to give her 
for that little bit of love!124 
(18) In JX turno. a young man with a little musical talent blames 
the place of his birth for his not having developed his talent 
and thus opened up the future for himself. Because he lives in a 
small town and hasn't developed his talent, he does nothing and 
lives off of his relatives. (19) In JX piacere dell'onesta Maurizio 
speaks of: 
The bad actions which one sees himself forced 
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to commit. 
(20) In Vittoria delle formiche the man who has been reduced to 
poverty muses: 
It was destiny that he should wind up in the 
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country. 
Thus we have seen twenty examples of the avoidance of responsibility 
through a transfer of blame to another person, fate, God or 
circumstances. 
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Another way of avoiding responsibility is that of trying not 
to act. As Sartre states, this, too, is a choice. Pirandello, too, 
sees this sort of avoidance of responsibility as impossible. As 
he states in E due! 
(...) because men, in the presence of a fact, 
couldn't remain impassive like things, even though 
they, like he, might try with all their strength, 
not only not to participate in it but even to 
hold themselves as almost absent from it. 
We see three examples in Pirandello, of people attempting to 
avoid responsibility by trying to live through another person, 
In La balia Pirandello describes a woman who expects that others 
will give her life, without understanding that each person must 
make his own. 
She felt, and was perhaps really unhappy; but she 
blamed others for this unhappiness, instead of 
her own contrary nature, her bitter character, 
her lack of any good graces. She was convinced 
that had she come across a different man who 
would have loved and understood her, she wouldn't 
have felt all that emptiness inside and around 
her. (...) Her husband (...) avoided as much as 
possible speaking with her at length, certain 
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that, whatever he might say or do he wouldn't 
succeed in inspiring in her, in communicating to 
her that affection for life, of which she felt 
the furious desire, but of which at the same 
time he judged her incapable. She expected life 
from others, without understanding that each 
person must make it for himself.128 
A major theme of the novel Sup marito is precisely this refusal to 
make one's own life. It concerns the husband of a famous writer 
who tries to take refuge in and derive his own personal worth 
from his wife's fame. The short story Ho tante cose da dirvi also 
deals with a person who tries to take her identity from another. 
A woman who as a young country girl married a famous musician, is 
stupid and knows nothing of music or art, but she thinks that for 
the past twenty-eight years she has shared her husband's life. 
Now that he is dead, she cannot seem to understand why no one is 
interested in seeing her. She has "borrowed" her husband's life 
all these years and now, by rejecting a suitor from her village, 
she refuses to live her own, again. 
Another way of rejecting one's own responsibility is by 
adopting certain illusions which may be easier to live with than 
reality. In Concorso per riferendario al consiqlio di state a 
man is in a resort "trying" to study for an examination through 
which he could obtain a civil service position in order to be able 
149 
to marry. He uses every possible excuse to keep from studying, 
except the real one: that he truly doesn't want the position and 
doesn't really want to marry the girl. The truth is discovered 
when his fiancee breaks off the engagement and rather than feel 
unhappy or disappointed he is relieved, 
In L'esclusa. the protagonist, a heroine of the anti-establishment 
whose role in the novel is to contrast with the "bad faith" 
of society is herself, upon occasion "guilty" of the same behaviour. 
When evening came, however, she realised that not 
so much for others did she need to pretend as 
for herself. Immediately, not to pay attention 
to her own disquietude, not to remain alone with 
herself, she took out from the drawer the school 
assignments to be corrected, as she was in the 
habit of doing every evening, she took in hand 
the correction pencil and she began to read, 
concentrating on the first composition all her 
attention.129 
In La maestrina Boccarme we see a country school teacher who has 
retired from life to live with her illusions. In Mondo di carta a 
man who has never lived, but only read about life, goes blind. At 
first he hires someone to read to him, but this is unsatisfactory 
since every inflection, every tone of voice other than his own 
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seems wrong. Then he hires a girl merely read silently and thus 
share his world. When she takes exception to a particular book, 
saying that the place described isn't really the way it is in the 
book, the man is distraught. It must be the same! It must be 
the same! Otherwise, his entire conception of the world, based 
on his books, is no longer secure, 
The following are four examples of Pirandello's illustration 
of the theme of man's coming to the realisation of his deliberate 
avoidance of responsibility, (1) In II treno ha fischiato a man 
who lives an impossibly difficult life, working literally night and 
day to support a host of ill or aged relatives, is awakened to 
all the possibilities of life outside of his own tormented and 
difficult situation. A train whistle in the middle of the night is 
the catalyst which brings about this awareness. The situation 
will remain. He continues to work to support his relatives. In 
fact, very little will change, but the awareness of all the other 
possibilities and hence his responsibility for having in fact 
chosen this particular life are enough to bring his happiness, 
(2) In Marsina stretta. a man realises how he usually abandons 
himself to whatever situation arises, rarely if ever having the 
courage to rebel. (3) In II coppo a man who has blamed his failures 
as an artist on anyone except himself and his own choices, finally 
realises his own responsibility. In this very symbolic short 
story, a type of fishing net represents self-deception and the 
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river water which flows through it, life. He realises that it 
is (was) his decision to jump into the net and after jumping, he 
climbs out. He realises that he has chosen those "duties" which 
inhibit other choices and chosen to pretend that he couldn't have 
done otherwise. (4) In Paura d'esser felice. the theme of the 
realisation of one's own responsibility is symbolically portrayed. 
In this story is discussed the question of whether it is fate 
or ourselves which are responsible for our own happiness. A 
man whose every plan seems to be foiled at the last moment is 
convinced that it isn't through his own actions that he comes 
to grief but rather through some sort of demon or evil eye or 
malevolent force. He becomes afraid to be happy and thus tempt 
the evil eye. He always asks for the opposite of what he wants, 
complains about what pleases him, etc. in order not to lose his 
happiness. In the end he "catches" the demon responsible. He 
realises that it is within himself. 
Thus, along with those examples of "the denail of the absurd", 
we have seen numerous examples of man becoming aware of his 
condition, accepting his responsibility and living in "good faith" 
with the absurd. However, it is clear that Pirandello wishes 
to stress the difficulty of this. Sartre states in Being and 
Nothingness that: 
(...) consciousness conceals in its being a per-
manent risk o£ bad faith. The origin of this risk 
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is the fact that the nature of consciousness 
simultaneously is to be what it is not and not 
to be what it is.130 
In other words, if a man calls himself, for example, honest, in the 
same manner that he calls a stone, a stone, he is in "bad faith" 
inasmuch as he is not honest, he has merely committed certain 
acts which may be termed "honest" and there always remains for 
him the possibility that he will one day commit a dishonest one, 
Thus, man, or as Sartre terms him, consciousness, is not what he 
is. On the other hand, the man who has always acted the coward, 
may term himself courageous in that for each one of his future 
acts, there is as much possibility for him to act courageously 
as for him to continue to act cowardly. Thus, he is what he is 
not. 
There is a nearly perfect parallel here between Pirandello 
and Sartre. While the affirmation of freedom is, in one sense, 
the avoidance of "bad faith"; self-deception is, in another sense, 
nearly unavoidable since as soon as one tries to affirm one 
mode of being as opposed to another, as soon as he tries in a 
certain sense, to define his "self" he is deceiving himself. The 
continuous flux which is life, or consciousness cannot be limited 
or defined. Hence Sartre's "permanent risk of bad faith". Hence, 
also, Pirandello's ideas concerning life as a continuous flux and 
form (definition of any part of that flux) as death. Despite 
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this, man cannot live in society without imposing upon himself a 
form, a mask behind which lives his vastly multi-faceted self. As 
Pirandello states in L'umorismo: 
And nothing is true! True the sea, yes, true 
the mountain; true the stone; true the blade 
of grass; but man? Always masked. Without 
wanting it, without knowing it, in that thing 
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which he in good faith believes himself to be. 
And yet this mask, too, is a kind of self-deception, 
Thus emerges from both Pirandello and Sartre a philosophy of 
freedom in the face of the absurd, freedom, however, in constant 
danger of being subverted by the desire to flee one's responsibility 
or to deny the absurd. These desires to flee or to deny are 
Sartre's classic examples of "bad faith". At the end of this 
chapter we will examine the other reactions to the absurd to see 
which are in Sartre's terms "authentic" or "inauthentic". 
5. Fraternal Love 
It has been stated in defense of Pirandello's philosophy 
against the charge of utter despair and pessimism that, in fact, 
the one value which this writer affirms, despite all his pessimism 
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is that of love, mutual - if not understanding - then, tolerance, 
agape. Indeed, Vera Passeri Pignoni in her previously cited 
article on Pirandello and existentialist philosophy writes: 
And this (suffering) is accompanied, as a medicine 
and a relief, by love which has the function, 
in the great iciness of existence, to bring 
humanity back to its primordial ardour, to warm 
for a moment that substance which form has 
irrevocably fixed. How can one find here the 
most agonised themes of Jaspers or of Marcel, 
the need to resolve in love, in communion, in 
compassion that weight of the absurd and of 
the irrational which would otherwise crush man. 
Thought doesn't include everything but it itself 
is included. To its limitedness it is necessary 
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to respond with the consoling mystery of love. 
Using as a prime example of this "doctrine" the play Cosi &. (se 
vi pare) and speaking of Pirandello's characters which "do not 
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ask to be understood but to be loved". Prof. Pignoni states: 
(...) he gathered together the voices of many 
philosophical theories, elaborating them with 
originality, thus from the budding existentialism 
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of his thought, he deduced a most human, most 
original theory of love and of compassion. " 
In an article on the moral philosophy of Pirandello, Lina 
Passarella Sartorelli, defending the writer against charges of 
complete moral relativity, finds that Pirandello's morality - as 
she puts it - consists in his pity and compassion! 
But against this drama (0 dX uno p_ dX nessuno) 
stands Tutto per bene where Pirandello becomes 
the tragedy of the most pointed morality, crying 
along with scorned virtue. And there stand 
also Pensaci, Giacomino and II piacere dell'onesta 
where man becomes the protector of another's 
error.135 
The conclusions of both Prof. Pignoni and Prof. Sartorelli, while 
appealing are, in fact, unwarranted because 1) The compassion, 
the fraternal love of which these two writers speak is indeed 
present in Pirandello's works. However, it appears most frequently 
as an emotional response in the reader or the audience to the 
various situations and characters depicted. This consumate author, 
this winner of the Nobel Prize for literature has undoubtedly 
accomplished this deliberately but can this assumption be used as 
"hard" evidence for the conclusion that his philosophy includes a 
"doctrine" of fraternal love similar to Marcel or Camus? And more 
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importantly, 2) the themes of pity and compassion, while they do 
appear, seem to be counterbalanced or even outweighed by opposing 
ones such as the inability to see others as they see themselves, 
the impossibility of any deep communication between people, the 
violence done to the self by the other's "look". 
To cite the same examples as Passarella Sartorelli, it is at 
least debatable whether Tutto per bene becomes the "tragedy of 
the most pointed morality, crying along with scorned virtue" or 
whether instead the author isn't in fact pointing again to ono 
of his favourite themes, i.e. you make your own reality. That the 
reality is, in this particular instance, a bit more compassionate 
than in others is, I think, quite irrelevant. In Pensaci. Giacomino 
and II piacere dell'onestA the fact that man becomes "the protector 
of another's error" is simply the cause of further mishap. Hence 
the compassionate nature of this protection is overshadowed by 
its consequences, 
There are indeed three short stories in which love, or 
compassion is the major theme, and it may be on this evidence that 
Professors Pignoni and Sartorelli base their conclusions. These 
are; Natale sui Reno, in which we find a great nostalgia—possibly 
autobiographical—for a time when the author was surrounded by 
love. Prima notte and La fede. Already in the latter two, however, 
we see evidence of the difficulty of attaining such love. In fact, 
it is precisely this difficulty—one might even say impossibility-
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-which is illustrated in two very striking short stories: Sogno 
dX Natale and Un goj, In Sogno di Natale a man dreams on 
Christmas that he meets Jesus roaming the world looking for a 
soul into which he, the incarnation of love, may be reborn. He 
can find none since everyone is too busy looking after his own 
affairs. The hypocrisy of the world which professes itself to 
be guided by Christian principles of charity, which supposedly 
lives by the agape of the Gospel is shown in Un goj. In fact, 
this agape is at best difficult to encounter. A Jew who has 
given up his whole identity, changed his name and married into 
an ultra-Catholic family is persecuted for his religion by his 
hypocritical and over-zealous father-in-law. He feels a "goj", a 
stranger, in his own home. Actually, he is more "Christian", and 
understands and bears things more "Christianly" than any of his 
family. During the Great War, the father-in-law has prepared a 
magnificent manger scene, making use of all sorts of black market 
items. While everyone else is out at Midnight Mass, the "goj" 
replaces all of the shepherds. Magi, peasants, and other figures 
in the scene with tin soldiers of all nationalities, all with their 
guns facing Bethlehem. 
Thus, while it may appear at times that Pirandello would find 
in compassion, fraternal love, or agape a kind of temporary refuge 
from the absurd, it is clear that Pirandello sees such a refuge as 
impossible—or nearly so—because man is depicted as a basically 
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self-centred being who, because of the inescapable relativity of 
his perception of reality, can never truly communicate with others 
let alone attain to such love, 
6. Nature and the Affirmation of Life 
Pirandello's attitude toward nature is somewhat complex and 
quite unique. He has been called a mystical-pantheist and his 
pantheism has been discussed in sub-section 2 of this Section, but 
to call his attitude toward nature "mystical" is merely an evasion, 
a means of avoiding a rigorous examination of this attitude. It 
is neither mystical nor mysterious. Indeed, it is "pantheistic" 
only if one insists on terming the "highest value", God. In this 
sub-section I will argue that Pirandello's attitude towards nature 
leads him first of all to a historical outlook concerning man's 
awareness of his place in the universe, thence to the various 
attitudes which an individual may take towards nature and his 
place in it, and finally to the view of life, or nature, as a 
continuous flux of which we are a part and which is killed by 
the various "forms" which we try to impose upon it. 
Mankind could never be "glorified". His behaviour is often 
more bestial than that of the beasts. This is well-illustrated in 
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the play Sagra del Siqnore della nave in which a young pedagogue 
tries to defend: 
'human dignity' despite the spectacle that it 
makes of itself right in front of his eyes. In 
the end his faith wavers terrified, and he falls 
prostrate in front of this obscene and frighten-
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ing spectacle of bestiality triumphant. 
It is not just humanity in general being judged, but individuals 
as well. 
Sig. Lavaccara; That one there, I assure you, he is 
a lawyer, yes, but much more of a 
pig than my pig which we are about 
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to eat. 
In the past, however, despite man's faults he was regarded 
as the centre of the universe, the centre of the history of 
the Redemption, God's likeness and His child. The beginning of 
the disintegration of this illusion came with Copernicus. From 
L'umorismo: 
One of the greatest humorists, without knowing 
it, was Copernicus, who took apart not really 
the workings of the universe, but the proud 
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image which he had made for ourselves of it. 
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The coup de grSce was given by the telescope which, by making the 
heavens and the stars so grand, in turn made us see the world 
and all of our own grandness and glory as infinitely small. Thus 
man, his old faith lost, turned to science to provide 'him with a 
way to deal with the absurd. It must be noted here, of course, 
that Pirandello was writing at the time of public awareness of the 
rise of science, a time in which science of one sort or another was 
thought to be the panacea. It must be noted also, that Pirandello 
was not saying that people turned from faith to science as a 
necessarily conscious choice. He is speaking, rather, as a social 
psychologist, analysing the "popular mind", much the way Sartre 
does when he connects atheism with the absence of moral values. 
Of course, science fails to live up to man's expectations of it. 
Vicentini, discussing Pirandello's essay Arte e. coscienza d'oggi. 
writes: 
Thus, rationalism, after having destroyed faith in 
God, the concept of truth and the anthropocentric 
conception of nature, can no longer satisfactorily 
answer the man who asks what is the aim of 
life, how to govern the instincts, and how to 




In Lg stormo e l'angelo centunor Pirandello illustrates the 
theme of faith or science used as a refuge from the absurd. Faith 
is for the common people what science is for the educated. 
In the two short stories Donna Mimma and Le sorprese della 
scienza. Pirandello ridicules man's faith in science. In the former, 
an old mid-wife is forced to go to school to get a licence for 
her "profession". All the "science" she learns takes away her 
instincts and the benefit of all her years of experience. She is 
useless. Her rival, a young fully-trained woman, instead, takes up 
all of the old woman's folklore and traditional behaviour and so is 
very successful. In Le sorprese della scienza Pirandello paints the 
picture of Milocca, a town with no electricity, no running water, 
nothing that smacks of progress. The inhabitants of this town, 
far from being "backward", think of themselves as ultra-modern. 
They are simply waiting for the ultimate technological advancement 
which will make electricity, running water, etc. obsolete. 
Machines or other modern inventions which are the result of 
science are also derided since all they can do is make life, a 
dull and meaningless business, easier and more monotonous. In Si 
gira ... there are many examples of Pirandello's dislike for "the 
machine". The following are six: 
(1) This was bound to happen and it has happened 
at last! 
Man who first of all, as a poet, deified his 
own feelings and worshipped them, now having 
flung aside every feeling, as an encumbrance not 
only useless but positively harmful, and having 
become clever and industrious, has set to work 
to fashion out of iron and steel his new deities, 
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and has become a servant and a slave to them. 
(2) (...) the motor-car, the machinery intoxicates 
them and excites this uncontrollable vivacity in 
them. They have it at their disposal; free of 
charge; the Kosmograph pays. In the carriage 
there is myself. They have seen me disappear in 
an instant, dropping ludicrously behind, down the 
receding vista of the avenue; they have laughed 
at me; by this time they have already arrived. 
But here am I creeping forward again, my dear 
ladies. Ever so slowly, yes; but what have you 
seen? A carriage drop behind, as though pulled 
by a string, and the whole avenue past you in a 
long, confused, violent, dizzy streak. I, on the 
other hand, am still here; I can console myself 
for my slow progress by admiring one by one, 
at my leisure, these great green plane trees by 
the roadside, not uprooted by the hurricane of 
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your passage, but firmly planted in the ground, 
which turn towards me at every breath of wind 
in the gold of the sunlight (...) 
(3) A violin, in the hands of a man, accompany 
a roll of perforated paper running through the 
belly of this other machine! The soul, which 
moves and guides the hands of the man, which 
now passes into the touch of the bow, now 
trembles in the fingers that press the strings, 
obliged to follow the register of this automatic 
instrument. 
(4) All the life that the machines have devoured 
with the voracity of animals gnawed by a tapeworm, 
is turned out here, in the large underground 
rooms, their darkness barely broken by dim 
red lamps, which strike a sinister blood-red 
gleam from the enormous dishes prepared for the 
developing bath. 
The life swallowed by the machines is there, in 
those tapeworms, I mean in the films, now coiled 
on their reels. 
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We have to fix this life, which has ceased to 
be life, so that another machine may restore to 
it the movement here suspended in a series of 
instantaneous sections. We are as it were in a 
womb, in which is developing and taking shape a 
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monstrous mechanical birth. 
(5) (...) that (opportunity) of meeting the man who 
has remained for me ever since the symbol of 
the wretched fate to which continuous progress 
condemns the human race. 
(6) I have no doubt, however, that in'time. Sir, 
they will succeed in eliminating me. The machine 
- this machine too, like all the other machines 
- will go by itself. But what mankind will do 
then, after all the machines have been taught 
to go by themselves, that, my dear sir, still 
remains to be seen. 
Of course, man can do many things with the aid of science and its 
machines, but the one important task of man - to find a meaning 
for his existence - neither science nor inventions can accomplish, 
We read in Canta l'epistola: 
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Oh ambitions of man! What cries of victory 
because man has begun to fly like a bird! But 
look here how a little bird flies: it is with the 
purest and lightest ease which is accompanied 
spontaneously by a trill of joy. Think now of 
the mortal anguish of man who wants to be a 
little bird! Here a flutter and a trill, there 
a noisy and stinking motor and death ahead. 
The motor breaks, the engine stops; good-bye 
little bird! - Man - Tommasino Unzio would say, 
stretched out there on the grass - leave flying 
alone. Why do you want to fly? And when you 
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have flown? 
While some look for an answer to the eternal question in faith 
or science, some take refuge from their terror of the absurd 
in their acceptance of scientific theories and the consequent 
"smallness" of man. If man is so small, then his pains must be 
small too. In the short story Fallottoline! we find such a man. 
He is an astronomer who lives a miserable life with his wife 
and daughter, but he doesn't let any of this worry him because 
the earth is nothing but a little ball. He takes refuge in his 
telescope. Pirandello describes the complaints of his family over 
how far away they lived from everything. 
Distance? But on earth for him there was no 
distance. He would make a ring joining his thumb 
and finger of one hand and would say to his 
wife, laughing derisively: But if the Earth is 
so big ...m 
All pain and discomfort he would try to remove with reflections 
on the smallness of man, 
- You feel cold because you don't reason! Not 
only by words did he demonstrate contempt in 
which he held the world and all the things of life, 
He suffered from toothaches, and sometimes his 
cheek, in the violence of his pain would swell up 
under his huge beard like the hip of a father-
abbot: well then, immediately he would push back 
into space the planetary system: the sun would 
disappear, the earth would disappear, everything 
became nothing, and with his eyes closed, unmoving 
in the consideration of this nothing, little by 
little his torment would subside. - A decayed 
tooth which hurts in some astronomer's mouth ... 
it's enough to laugh. 
The contemplation of nature and man's place within it is, for some, 
an ideal means of escape. This is illustrated in Si gira ...: 
Escape, Signor Fabrizio, escape; fly from the 
drama! It is a fine thing, and it is the fashion, 
too, I tell you. Let yourself e-va-po-rate in 
(shall we say?) lyrical expansion, above the 
brutal necessities of life, so ill-timed and out 
of place and illogical; up, a step above every 
reality that threatens to plant itself, in its 
petty crudity, before your eyes. Imitate, in 
short, the songbirds in cages, Signor Fabrizio, 
which do indeed, as they hop from perch to 
perch, cast their droppings here and there, but 
afterwards spread their wings and fly: there, 
you see, prose and poetry; it is the fashion. 
Whenever things go amiss, whenever two people, 
let us say, come to blows or draw their knives, 
up, look above you, study the weather, watch 
the swallows dart by, or the bats if you like, 
count the passing clouds; note in what phase 
the moon is, and if the stars are of gold or 
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silver. 
Not everyone can find comfort in this manner. 
As we gaze at them (the stars), our own feeble 
pettiness is engulfed, vanishes in the emptiness 
of space, and every reason for our torment must 
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seem to us meagre and vain. But we must have in 
ourselves, in the moment of passion, the capacity 
to think of the stars. This may be found in 
a man like myself, who for some time past has 
looked at everything, himself included, from a 
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distance. 
In the short story Rimed io la geografia. we find another version 
of this type of escape from anguish. A man has found the way 
to forget his troubles by thinking how insignificant they are in 
relation to all the troubles in the world. By thinking of the 
reality of other places he somehow takes away the reality of this 
place or this situation. The paradox is, of course, that man is 
never so small as when he considers himself as grand, (science 
will immediately dispute his claim and show him to be a tiny speck 
in an immense universe), and conversely, he is never so grand as 
when he considers himself to be small. That is to say, realising 
his own place in the universe and being able to live with the 
knowledge that the only spark of greatness, the only bit, as it 
were, of infinity which is within him is his life, which is only a 
tiniest part of the eternal flux of nature but which for him will 
be limited by his death - accepting this knowledge means that 
a man is living, as Camus would phrase it, in defiance of the 
absurd. 
I know; there is also the melancholy of those 
philosophers who do admit the smallness of the 
earth but not, for that, the smallness of our 
soul if it can conceive of the infinite greatness 
of the universe. Yes. Who said it? Blaise 
Pascal. Nevertheless, one would need to think 
that this greatness of man, then, if ever, exists 
only provided that he understand, in front of 
that infinite greatness of the universe, his own 
infinite smallness, and that for this reason, 
man is only great when he feels very small, and 
never so small as when he feels himself to be 
great.152 
Another means of escape from the absurd is a desire to be 
one with nature, not as a man, a consciousness, but as a thing, 
a "being-in-itself" as Sartre would call it. Camus also is aware 
of this type of an attempt at escape. In The Myth of Sisyphus. 
we read: 
If I were a tree among trees, a cat among animals, 
this life would have a meaning or rather this 
problem would not arise, for I should belong to 
this world. I should be this world to which I 
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am now opposed by my whole consciousness (...) 
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Two examples of this type of "escape" have already been given in 
sub-section 4 of this chapter, since it is essentially an attempt 
at hiding from or masking man's situation rather than accepting 
it. 
Another attitude toward nature which is a form of bad faith, 
an attempt to refuse the responsibility of one's position in an 
absurd world, is taken by people who try to give a "meaning" 
to nature and hence to their own existence as part of nature, 
Pirandello describes this attitude in several places. In La patente 
ue find: 
D'Andrea: (...) I speak to him (the little cardinal) 
imitating, thus, with a whistle, his song, and he 
answers me. I don't know what I tell him; but 
if he answers me it means that he gathers some 
sense from the sounds that I make to him. Just 
like us, my friends, when we believe that nature 
speaks to us with the poetry of its flowers, or 
with the stars in the sky, while nature, perhaps, 
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doesn't even know that we exist. 
In the short story JX oatto. un cardellino e le stelle we find: 
A stone. Another stone. Man passes and sees 
them next to each other. But what does this 
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stone know of the stone nearby? And the water 
of the canal which it flows through? Man sees 
the water and the canal; he hears the water 
flowing there and goes as far as to imagine 
that water confides, in passing, who knows what 
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secrets to the canal. 
II gatto. un cardellino e le stelle is the story of an old couple 
who are keeping as a remembrance of their orphaned granddaughter 
who died at age fifteen, a little cardinal. They attribute all 
sorts of human thoughts to it. The little bird is eaten by a cat 
and the stars continue to shine. Nature is perfectly indifferent. 
The short story JX corvo di Mizzaro is another illustration of 
man's attempt to ascribe a meaning to nature and natural events. 
In Suo marito. again, we find as a minor theme, the idea of nature 
having a meaning and having been created for man, 
Ah, man who takes the whole earth and thinks 
that everything has been made for him. 
Thus Pirandello first describes the historical progression 
of man's awareness of his place in nature from an anthropocentric 
conception to a "rationalistic" one. Then we see four attitudes 
which Pirandello derides as impossible or based on falsehood: 1) a 
refuge in science as the provider of the "meaning" of nature and 
hence of human life, 2) the seeking of solace in the contemplation 
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of the "greatness" of nature and the "smallness" of man, 3) the 
desire to be "one" with nature in the manner of a thing as 
opposed to a consciousness and 4) the ascription of a "meaning" 
to nature. These are all derided by Pirandello and are illustrated 
as examples of various types of useless self-deception. 
What, then, is Pirandello's own attitudes toward nature? 
Among all of the possible reactions to the absurd (insistance 
upon the existence of an absolute, rejection of responsibility, 
the affirmation of "common moral values" or of the existence of 
God, suicide, fraternal love), what value, if any, does Pirandello 
choose? In all of his works, the only value which is unequivocally 
affirmed and never contradicted is life itself. It is here that 
Pirandello's and Camus' ideas coincide perfectly. In La. trappola 
we find what may be Pirandello's clearest exposition of his ideas 
concerning nature, life, death and forms. 
(...) life is a continual flux, incandescent and 
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indistinct. 
We are all beings caught in a trap, detached 
from the flux which never stops, and fixed for 
death. The movement of that flux in us lasts 
for a brief space of time, in our separated 
detached and fixed form; but then, little by 
little it slows down; the fire cools; the form 
173 
dries out; until the movement stops entirely in 
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rigid form. 
Thus we are a part of nature. Our life is only a part of a 
life force which continues, but our life in and of itself has 
no meaning. The continuous flux of this life-force will continue 
unaltered after our death. Beyond the realisation of this, any 
reflection, any thought, any attempt to organise or contain our 
being in some "form" is only a hastening of death, since the 
movement of life's flux is the antithesis of the immobility of form. 
Oh to lose oneself, there, to stretch out and 
abandon oneself, thus, on the grass, to the 
silence of the skies; to fill one's soul with 
all that vane blue-ness, making all thought, all 
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memory fail. 
Thought can be the enemy of life, as we read in La nuova colonia: 
But don't think of anything! Try to do! Listen 
to me, to have never thought. - There is the 
ground to the tilled? till; to sow? sow; to 
throw out and bring in the nets? throw out 
and bring in! Do, do. To do just to do, without 
even seeing what you are doing, why you are 
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doing it. 
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There is no use asking the eternal "why". There is no answer, 
There is only life. In All'uscita we read: 
(...) so much life which, in the meanwhile, entered 
into me through my open senses, of which I wasn't 
aware. And then I would complain. About what? 
About that miserable little thought, about an 
unsatisfied desire, an adverse event already 
passed. And in the meanwhile all the good of 
my life escaped me. 
Life in man is his only good. We read in Sopra e sotto: 
(...) man has here, here in his breast, in himself 
the greatness of the stars, this infinity, this 
eternity of the heavens, the spirit of the 
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immortal universe. 
Because of Pirandello's derision of blind faith in science 
and his identification of man with nature since the flux of the 
life-force flows through all nature and man as well, we find in 
Pirandello's works very often an exaltation of the country over 
the city. He often likes to contrast the unnatural constructions 
of man (machines, inventions, city life) with nature or life in 
harmony with nature, as he does in Ciaula scopre la luna. in which 
a boy who has been a miner all his life finally discovers the 
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moon or in Alberi cittadini in which he describes the trees which 
try to grow in cities. In La favola del figlio cambiato we find 
the same contrast. 
I shall go to bathe my hands in that fountain! 
I want life to make itself new in me like spring 
grass] 
Away with the bitter fog, and that smoke 
that smoke pierced by lamps, 
architecture of iron, 
ovens, coal, city 
bustling with blind 
and miserly worries. 
In the play La nuova colonia. we find a group of people who 
are trying to escape from the city and begin life anew. In the 
play Lazzaro we see the contrast between the "real" life of the 
country and the "cursed" life of the city. And in X giganti 
della montagna we find: 
And only when you no longer have a house, does 
the whole world become yours. You go and you 
go, then you abandon yourself on the grass to 
the silence of the heavens; and you are all and 
you are nothing ... and you are nothing and you 
In SX gXra ... Serafino muses and wonders if it wouldn't be 
better to destroy everything and start again. 
I look at the women in the street, note how 
they are dressed, how they walk, the hats they 
wear on their heads; at the men, and the airs 
they have or give themselves; I listen to their 
talk, their plans; and at times it seems to me 
so impossible to believe in the reality of all 
that I see and hear, that being incapable, on 
the other hand, of believing that they are all 
doing it as a joke, I ask myself whether really 
all this clamorous and dizzy machinery of life, 
which from day to day seems to become more 
complicated and to move with greater speed, has 
not reduced the human race to such a condition 
of insanity that presently we must break out 
in fury and overthrow and destroy everything, 
It would perhaps, all things considered, be so 
much to the good. In one respect only, though: 
to make a clean sweep and start afresh. 
Mixed with pity, as is his custom, we find Pirandello's greatest 
derision reserved for those who refuse to live: the country primary 
school teacher in La maestrina Boccarme who lives only her world 
of illusions, the cataleptic wife of the puppet maker in La. paura 
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del sonno. the abandoned wife in Pena di vivere cosa, In La 
distruzione deH'uomo we see the hideous crime of the murder of 
a pregnant woman and we are led to question whether the title 
refers to the destruction of the child in the womb or of the 
murderer himself. An excellent example of Pirandello's condemnation 
of mere existence as opposed to life is found in the short story 
L'uccello impagliato. Coming from an entire family which has died 
young of T.B., two brothers decide "not to live so they won't die". 
One finally decides to marry and the other remains, just like the 
old stuffed bird in his house. The married brother lives happily, 
eats and drinks normally. The other brother tries to follow 
his example once, but worries about it so much that he becomes 
ill. Three years after his marriage, the one brother dies. The 
other lives more sombrely than ever. Having reached age sixty, 
he realises that he is "made of straw", lifeless. He pulls out the 
stuffing of the old bird and commits suicide. In the development 
of this theme, it is clear that Pirandello is affirming the value 
of life lived to the fullest. As Camus writes: 
(...) if I admit that my freedom has no meaning 
except in relation to its limited fate, then I 
must say that what counts is not the best living 
but the most living. It is not up to me to 
wonder if this is vulgar or revolting, elegant 
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or deplorable. Once and for all, value judgments 
are discarded here. (...) 
Pirandello's affirmation of life is found throughout his work 
- in the triumph of the continuation of life after the death of 
a loved one, in an especial reverence for the family (although 
not always the socially accepted one), in a mistrust of imposed 
chastity as opposed to a love for all life especially young, 
new life, in an awareness of the irreversibility of life and the 
impossibility of capturing any part of life in "form" or trying 
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to perpetuate any experience beyond its moment of life. In the 
3tories Vis it are gl'infer mi and Filo d'aria Pirandello affirms life 
in its violent contrast with death. In the play L'uomo dal fiore 
in bocca and its twin short story La morte addosso. as well as 
in the short story La toccatina and JX marito di, mia moglie we 
see the reactions of a man who knows he is dying. There can be 
no greater affirmation of life. 
Of what use is this affirmation of life? Can man find in 
it an answer to his eternal "why", a refuge from the absurd? 
No. Pirandello affirms the existence of a life force but not any 
meaning to it. It simply is, and we are part of it, like Sartre's 
"being". It is a positive value in that it is the contrary of 
"nothingness". Our awareness of this life force only enhances 
our consciousness of the absurd as we contrast our ideals or 
aspirations with an eternal but blind and meaningless flux which 
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is our life within us. This flux is the only reality, eternally 
mutable, all else is only illusion. (See chapter on the nature of 
reality.) 
Let us examine, then, the final possible reaction to the 
absurd, the last possible value to be chosen: silence. 
7. Silence 
In Arte e coscienza d'oggi Pirandello notes that the natural 
consequence of irresolution in thought is irresolution of action. 
Wo ideal today arrives at concretising itself in 
front of us into a really intense desire or into 
a strong need. As soon as one believes in the 
vanity of life, one believes in the uselessness 
of the struggle. We neither reach the ideal nor 
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does the need disappear. 
A desire for silence, for passivity is felt. Vicentini, in L'estetica 
di Pirandello, sees this as a positive solution, 
(...) it is not a repression of every interest, 
but only of the egoistic interest, it isn't a 
closing but an opening, it isn't a distance but 
a presence m the world. 
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Realising the vanity of all ideals, the relativity of all reality 
(see chapter on reality) one can find any decision, any attitude, 
any action intolerable because it is unjustifiable. The theme of 
Quando s& capito XI giuoco is precisely this necessary stoicism 
brought on by an understanding of the world's meaninglessness. 
(...) nor could he be shaken from that kind of 
perpetual philosophic lethargy which stood in 
his large greenish eyes and panted through his 
large nose among the hairs of his dishevelled 
moustache and those which grew in clumps from 
his nostrils. 
Because Memmo Viola would say that he had un-
derstood the game. And when one has understood 
4-k 171 
the game ... 
Is such "disinterest", such passivity possible? Serafino Gubbio 
in SX gira ... finds himself in perpetual danger of being caught 
in that reality from which he tries to divorce himself completely. 
(...) I endeavour to feel them in myself as they 
feel themselves, to wish for them as they wish 
for themselves: a reality, therefore, that is 
entirely disinterested. But I see at the same 
time that, without meaning it, I am letting myself 
be caught by that reality which, being what it 
is, ought to remain outside me; matter, to which 
I give a form, not for my sake, but for its own; 
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something to contemplate. 
Serafino's job as a camera operator is one of complete passivity, 
Knowing that all the action is but illusion meant for the cinema 
he must remain before it and simply turn the handle of his machine 
so that it may record it. 
(...) Now she was beginning to be aware that 
for these other people and also for herself (in 
a vague way) I was not, properly speaking, a 
person. She began to feel that my person was 
not necessary; but that my presence there had 
the necessity of a thing, which she as yet did 
not understand; and that I remained silent for 
that reason. They might speak, yes, all four of 
them - because they were people, each of them 
represented a person, his or her own; but I, no: 
I was a thing: why, perhaps the thing that was 
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resting on my knees, wrapped in black cloth. 
It is Serafino's job to be a silent, impassive spectator. Speaking 
to a tiger which is to be used in a film, he says: 
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And I, who love and admire you, when they kill 
you, shall be impassively turning the handle of 
this pretty machine here, do you see? They have 
invented it. It has to act; it has to eat. It 
eats everything, whatever stupidity they may 
set before it. It will eat you too; it eats 
everything, I tell you! And I am its servant,174 
Entering his studio he stops being a person and assumes his 
impassive role as the servant of the machine, 
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I ceased to be Gubbio and became a hand. 
I at once assume, with it in my hand, my mask 
of impassivity. Or rather I cease to exist. Jt 
walks, now, upon my legs. From head to foot, I 
belong to it: I form part of its equipment. 
Little by little, the impassivity of Serafino Gubbio's job spills 
over into his life and we are aware that Pirandello is no longer 
speaking of one individual with a unique profession but of the 
condition of men in general, 
I am neither hungry nor thirsty! I can do 
without everything. 
I have wasted upon you a little of what is of 
no use to me; 
you know it; a little of that heart which is of 
no use to me; 
because to me only my hand is of use (...) 
Confronted by life itself, he tries to use his work-a-day passivity 
as an escape. 
I felt myself, all of a sudden, alienated by this 
disgust from everyone and everything, including 
myself, liberated and so to speak emptied of 
all interest in anything or anyone, restored 
to my function as the impassive manipulator of 
a photographic machine, recaptured only by my 
original feeling, namely that all this clamorous 
and dizzy mechanism of life can produce nothing 
now but stupidities. 
But as yet the withdrawal is not complete. There is always the 
danger that Serafino will not be able to remain passive. 
Never before have I turned the handle of my 
machine with such delicacy. This great black 
spider on its tripod has had her twice, now for 
its dinner. But the first time, out in the Bosco 
Sacro, my hand, in turning the handle to give 
her to the machine to eat, did not yet feel. 
Whereas, on this occasion ... Ah, I am ruined; if 
Suddenly there occurred a thing which (...) rebuked 
me for having chosen to remain indifferent. My 
mask of indifference I was obliged to throw aside 
in a moment, at the threat of a danger which did 
really seem to all of us imminent and terrible. . 180 
Despite my resolution to place and keep all these 
people in front of my machine as food for its 
hunger while I stood impassively turning the 
handle, I saw myself too obliged to continue to 
take an interest in them, to occupy myself with 
their affairs.181 
We begin to see the reason for Serafino's attempts at perfect 
passivity. It is not so much a "professional" need as it is a 
need to escape from his "superfluity". 
I have only to enter here, in this darkness, 
foul with the breath of the machines, with the 
exhalations of chemical substances, for all my 
superfluity to evaporate. 
Hands, I see nothing but hands, in these dark 
rooms; hands busily hovering over the dishes; 
hands to which the murky light of the red lamps 
gives a spectral appearance. 1 reflect that 
these hands belong to men who are men no longer; 
who are condemned here to be hands only: these 
hands, instruments. Have they a heart? Of what 
use is it? It is of no use here. Only as an 
instrument, it too, of a machine, to serve, to 
move these hands. And so with the head: only 
to think of what these hands may need. And 
gradually I am filled with all the horror of the 
necessity that impels me to become a hand myself 
also, and nothing more. 
It is a refuge from his superfluity and yet this very superfluity, 
"wretched" though it is, is also, in some way, a relief. 
When, finally, I am restored to myself, that is 
to say when for me the torture of being only 
a hand is ended, and I can regain possession 
of the rest of my body, and marvel that I have 
still a head on my shoulders, and abandon myself 
once more to that wretched superfluity which 
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exists in me nevertheless (...) 
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Serafino does not wish to admit it, but his friend Simone Pau 
tries to convince him that the superfluity which he is trying to 
escape through impassivity, is life itself. 
It is true that I shall not know what to do 
with these riches; but I shall not reveal my 
embarrassment to anyone; least of all to Simone 
Pau, who comes every day to shake me, to abuse me, 
in the hope of forcing me out of thi3 inanimate 
silence, which makes him furious. He would like 
to see me weep, would like me at least with 
my eyes to show distress or anger; to make 
him understand by signs that I agree with him, 
that I too believe that life is there, in the 
superfluity of his, I do not move an eyelid; I 
sit gazing at him, rigid, motionless, until he 
flies from the house in a rage. 
I have found salvation, I alone, in my silence, with 
my silence, which has made me thus - according to 
the standard of the times - perfect. My friend 
Simone Pau will not understand this, more and 
more determined to drown himself in superfluity 
187 
Serafino sees his passive silence a way to brotherhood in the 
suffering of mankind, 
If you knew how I feel, at certain moments, my 
inanimate silence! 
And I revel in the mystery that is exhaled by this 
silence for such as are capable of remarking it, 
I should like never to speak at all; to receive 
everyone and everything in this silence of mine, 
every tear, every smile; not to provide, myself, 
an echo to the smile; I could not; not to wipe 
away, myself, the tear; I should not know how; 
but so that all might find in me, not only for 
their griefs, but also and even more for their 
joys, a tender pity that would make us brothers 
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if only for a moment. 
But it is very difficult to give or to receive pity and one can 
really only look through one's own eyes. It is impossible to be 
perfectly disinterested. Worst of all, complete passivity keeps 
one from living, as we have seen in the chapter on freedom. 
But I? Was I of the same world? His journey and 
mine ... his night and mine ... No, I had no time, 
no world, no anything. The train was his; he 
was travelling in it. How on earth did I come 
to be travelling in it also? What was I doing 
in the world in which he lived? How, in what 
respect was this night mine, when I had no means 
of living it, nothing to do with it? (...) No, 
no world, no time, nothing: I stood apart from 
everything, absent from myself and from life; and 
no longer knew where I was nor why I was there, 
Images I carried in me, not my own, of things and 
people; images, aspects, faces, memories of people 
and things which had never existed in reality, 
outside me, in the world which that gentleman 
saw round him and could touch. (...) I, no, I was 
not there; albeit, not being there, I should have 
found it hard to say where I really was and 
what I was, being thus without time or space. 
I have derived one great benefit from it, as 
you can see, I have learned to draw back with 
an instinctive shudder from reality, as others 
see and handle it, without however managing to 
arrest a reality of my own, since my distracted, 
wandering sentiments never succeed in giving 
any value or meaning to this uncertain, loveless 
life of mine. I look now at everything, myself 
included, as from a distance; (...) 
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In the short story II lume dell'altra casa PiranriplTn illustrates 
the impossibility of living apart from others, impassively, in 
silence, through others. A man with no life of his own tries to 
live vicariously by watching a family which he can see across the 
alley way through the window. The wife of that family and he run 
off together, but she cannot bear to be separated from her family 
and they are incapable of having a life of their own, so they 
return, only to watch the little group - husband and children -
as they take their evening meal. They are as if suspended in 
time. They do not live and they cannot live passively through 
others. 
Serafino, in Si gira ..., accepts the result of his impassivity, 
lifter witnessing a particularly gruesome scene at which he assists 
passively turning the handle of his camera, he wraps himself 
completely in his silence and remains mute forever. 
I have lost my voice; I am dumb now for ever. 
Elsewhere in these notes I have written: 'I suffer 
from this silence of mine, into which everyone 
comes, as into a place of certain hospitality. 
X should like now my silence to close around 
me altogether.' Well, it has closed round me. 
I could not be better qualified to act as the 
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servant of a machine. 
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The reader is aware that Serafino's silence is his own deliberate 
choice. 
No, thank you. Thanks to everybody. I have had 
enough. I prefer to remain like this. The times 
are what they are; life is what it is; and in 
the sense that I give to my profession, I intend 
to go on as I am - alone, mute and impassive -
being the operator. 
Is the stage set? 
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Are you ready? Shoot ...' 
It saves him from the awareness of his superfluity but the 
result is that while he can exist, he can never live, 
E. Summary 
In this chapter we have compared the "absurd" as found in 
Pirandello, Sartre and Camus (Section B), then we have examined 
the moment of realisation of the absurd as described by these 
three authors, (Section C). In Section D we have seen several 
possible reactions to the absurd: acceptance of "common" morality 
or of God, suicide, rejection of the absurd and its concomitant 
responsibility, search for fraternal love, the affirmation of nature 
or life and refuge in silence. 
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While the rejection of the absurd and its concomitant 
responsibility is Sartre's classic example of "bad faith", it has 
been shown that other reactions to the absurd, i.e. acceptance of 
"common" morality or of God, suicide or a refuge in silence—are 
also forms of inauthenticity. A search for fraternal love is for 
Pirandello as it is for Camus a solace, a temporary refuge from 
the absurd but as long as it does not become a denial of the 
absurd neither writer seems to see it as a form of bad faith. 
It has been shown that Pirandello, like Camus, chooses as his one 
positive value life lived in the knowledge of its own absurdity, 
It must be noted, of course, that Pirandello seems to understand 
each one of the possible reactions to the absurd and exhibits 
a certain compassion towards people as they choose among them, 
a compassion perhaps greater than that of Camus or Sartre. It 
seems clear, however, that Pirandello's conclusions are perfectly 
existentialist ic. 
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CHAPTER IV - THE NATURE OF REALITY 
A. Introduction 
Pirandello's philosophy concerning the nature of reality is 
overwhelmingly Kantian and most probably based, in fact, upon 
the Italian's study of German philosophy while at the University 
of Bonn. He, like Kant, holds that objective reality (things in 
themselves) exist, but that they are essentially unknowable. The 
objects of our knowledge are things as they appear. All of 
the sense data (relating, of course, to these appearances) are 
organised by the individual into what he sees as a reality. The 
concept which he himself creates through his own organisation 
of these appearances is termed a "form". It is through the 
creation of these "forms" that we know "reality". Paradoxically, 
however, according to Pirandello, as we organise or create reality 
by fitting it, as it were, into forms, we begin to distort this 
reality by consciously or unconsciously ignoring those sense data 
which, like loose ends, do not fit neatly into the form(s) which 
we have already created and by being loathe to change the mold 
into which we have organised reality once we have so organised 
it. This distortion of reality, which of course will be extremely 
subjective and will vary from individual to individual, Pirandello 
expresses in the well-known phrase: form kills life. 
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The awareness of the unknowability of things in themselves 
and the consciousness of the subjectivity of the reality which 
we organise and thus create for ourselves is, for Pirandello, a 
primary path to the awareness of the absurd, 
At times Pirandello seems to contradict himself. On the 
one hand, he speaks of hiding from the "truth" or shouting the 
"truth" in people's faces. On the other, he seems to deny that 
truth exists. The inconsistency arises, however, from a confusion 
between ontology and epistemology, and from a fairly careless 
use of the word "truth". For Pirandello, there is an objective 
reality with which our subjective construction of reality may at 
times coincide—as, for example, in certain reasonably unimportant 
(to us) bits of factual information. But this objective reality 
seems to Pirandello very unimportant because it is rather the 
subjective reality which motivates people's feelings and actions. 
This subjective reality is so important to Pirandello that he would 
not even pose the question as to whether "A knows that p" entails 
that "p is true". One could well assume that if it were posed 
to him, he would answer that it does entail that "p is true for 
A". At the same time it could be false for B. Really true. Really 
false. —a maddening response for one attempting to do analytical 
philosophy, but as many analytical philosophers would be the first 
to point out, perfectly in character for an existentialist. What 
Pirandello is saying must be looked at at several levels: 1) he 
194 
seems to assume a naive correspondence theory of truth; 2) the 
subjective experience of this correspondence and the opposite 
experience of a non-correspondence with this objective reality do 
not differ from each other, hence my belief that "p" will motivate 
me, will cause me to think, to feel, to act in the same way whether 
or not "p" is true; 3) if, then, subjective reality has this power, 
then one might as well say that truth doesn't exist in that my 
construction of reality is as powerful, as capable of motivating 
as anyone else's. That is—yes, truth does exist, but that fact 
is simply less important to the running of the world than the 
paradoxical facts that we each have our own subjective reality, 
these various realities are at times extremely different one from 
the other—even contradictory, and yet they may be based on the 
same set of "facts". These realities co-exist, each one of us 
finding in "the facts" reason to believe that our reality is the 
"true" one. 
At a different level, one does in fact find some inconsistencies 
in Pirandello on the subject of truth, knowledge and communication. 
If it is through the creation of "forms" that we know "reality", 
which otherwise is a continual unstructured flux of sense data, 
and if these "forms" distort reality, how can we know even those 
small unimportant bits of true information which Pirandello takes 
for granted that we do know? How can it be that society labels as 
"insane" those people who speak about "truths" which are usually 
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hidden because of society's standards, values or deceptions? Why 
are these "truths" more "true" than others? 
It appears to this writer that what Pirandello is doing is 
similar to the idealist who opens the door, (even though it really 
doesn't exist!) That is, he is conforming at times to the naive 
demands of everyday existence. There is such a thing as truth 
and we do at times seem able to apprehend it. We do at least 
sometimes succeed in communicating with one another, if only at 
a superficial level. Therefore, Pirandello takes these things for 
granted. 
Ludovico Steidl of the University of Florence proposes a 
different solution. He suggest that by highlighting both the 
necessity of shattering the mask to get beneath it to the "truth" 
and the impossibility of doing this, what Pirandello is really doing 
is placing the emphasis on the method itself, on the attitude 
toward the absurd which it presupposes, rather than on the 
2 
feasibility of actually arriving at the truth. This too is a 
possible interpretation, 
Having recognised that we will encounter some inconsistencies, 
let us now turn to a more detailed look at Pirandello's ideas 
concerning the nature of reality and the ways in which he has 
illustrated these ideas in his plays, short stories and novels. 
1% 
B. The Subjectivity pr 'Relativity' of Reality 
The primary contention of Pirandello concerning the nature 
of reality is that it is "relative", and here again it must be 
noted that "relative" is the Pirandellian term for what would more 
properly be called "subjective". Consciousness cannot passively 
reflect an objective reality but organises its ever-changing flux 
of sense data into ideas, concepts, forms. In the essay Teatro 
e letteratura. equating "life" with our consciousness of reality, 
Pirandello writes: 
Life is a continuous and indistinct flux which 
has no other form outside of the one which time 
by time we ourselves give it, infinitely varied 
and ever changing. Each one really creates for 
himself his own life. 
We are not in the realm of pure idealism here, however, because: 
The world is not limited to the idea that we can 
have of it. Outside of us the world exists for 
itself and with us; and in our representation, 
therefore, we must resolve to realise it, as much 
as it is possible, forming a consciousness of it 
in which it lives, in us as in itself; seeing it as 
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it sees itself, experiencing it as it experiences 
itself. 
Nevertheless, despite this affirmation, the objective world in 
itself has very little importance for Pirandello. The goal of 
seeing the world "as it sees itself" is an unattainable aim. 
We can only know the reality which we see, which we experience, 
which we live. The emphasis in all of Pirandello, is all on the 
relativity, the subjectivity of this reality. As Serafino reflects 
in SX gira ...: 
(I) heard him say aloud in the silence of the 
night: 
'Excuse me, but what do I know about the mountain, 
the tree, the sea? The mountain is a mountain 
because I say: 'That is a mountain,' What are we? 
We are whatever, at a given moment, occupies 
our attention, I am the mountain, I am the tree, 
I am the sea. I am also the star, which knows 
not its own existence!' 
I remained speechless. But not for long. I too 
have, inextricably rooted in the very depths of 
my being, the same malady as my friend. 
The objective world exists, but we cannot know it as such. 
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The activity of nature, in fact, is nothing but 
the spirit which penetrates it, organising it. It, 
therefore, does not prolong nature, it prolongs 
itself: nature in itself and for itself remains 
that which is extraneous to him and irreducible 
for him. 
And again in the short story Guardando una stampa we find: 
Things, as they are, no one can know. 
Thus the blind poet in this short story believes that he is at 
no disadvantage, since everyone is, in that sense, blind. 
By trying to contain reality in concepts, forms, we organise 
it rather in the manner of the familiar Kantian active synthesis 
and in that sense create it. This extends to the forms which 
we impose upon ourselves to create a reality, a personality, 
an individual out of what otherwise would be no more than a 
consciousness aware and participating in a continuous flux of 
raw sense data. As the Philosopher explains in the unusual play 
All'uscita in which the shades of people recently dead gather at 
the entrance to the cemetery: 
(...) you, perhaps, poor man, imagined while you 
were alive that you could see those forms of 
yours, and touch them like real things; while 
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they were only illusions necessary to your being, 
as to mine, in order to exist in some way, 
understand? They needed (and they still do) to 
create for themselves an appearance. 
Thus it is we who give reality to things, to other people and 
to ourselves, in our fear of losing this reality we try all the 
harder to fit consciousness into forms. We read in La trappola: 
You hold precious above all things and you never 
tire of praising the constancy of feelings and 
the coherence of character. And why? But always 
for the same reason! Because you are cowards, 
because you are afraid of yourselves, that is, 
of losing - by changing - the reality which 
you have given yourselves, and of recognising 
thereby that it was nothing but an illusion of 
yours, that, therefore, no reality exists if not 
9 
that which we give ourselves. 
The paradox, however, is that by fitting experience, life, con-
sciousness into forms, we kill it. In the same story, we find: 
But what, I ask, does it mean to give oneself 
a reality, if not to fix oneself in a sentiment, 
to congeal, to become rigid, to encrust within 
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ourselves the perpetual vital moment, to make 
of ourselves so many little, miserable pools 
awaiting putrefaction, while life is a continuous 
flux, incandescent and indistinct. (...) Life is 
the wind, life is the sea, life is fire; not the 
earth which is encrusted and assumes a form. 
Every form is death. 
The man in the short story quoted, La trappola, like several 
others in Pirandello, such as the husband who has "understood 
the game" in Quando s'fe capito il giuoco or Serafino Gubbio in Si 
gira ... tries to encompass life in forms. This tends to bring 
one, as it were, outside of life, to cause the person to stand 
apart, unable to participate and hence, in a different way, to 
die. So, as the title of the story (La trappola) implies, we are 
all caught in a trap, at the moment of our birth, merely through 
the accident of being born in one time or place as opposed to 
another or into one set of circumstances rather than another. 
We wholeheartedly believe in our own conception of reality. 
From Si gira ...: 
I find myself assailed, at times, with such violence 
by the external aspects of things that the clear, 
outstanding sharpness of my perceptions almost 
terrifies me. It becomes so much a part of 
myself, what I see with so sharp a perception, 
that I am powerless to conceive how in the world 
a given object - thing or person - can be other 
than what I would have it to be. 11 
This is so important that at least in one sense it may be said 
that there is no other reality. 
If only there were outside of us, for you and 
for me, a Madame reality of mine and a Madame of 
yours, I mean for themselves, equal and immutable. 
There is not. There is in me and for me a 
reality of mine; the one which I give to myself; 
a reality in you and for you: the one which you 
give yourselves; ones which will never be the 
same neither for you nor for me, 
So, my friend, we must console ourselves with 
this: mine is no truer than yours, and yours 
12 
like mine lasts but for a moment. 
It is impossible for us to see any kind of reality from outside 
of ourselves. As soon as we try, we find "nothingness". In La 
distruzione deU'uomo we read: 
The difficulty comes when we want to see the 
aim of those inclinations and capacities and 
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intentions, of those sentiments and instincts, 
from the outside, for precisely because they are 
sought from the outside, they are not found, as 
nothing is found any longer. 
To the extent that form kills life, which cannot be grasped 
or held, there is no such thing as an "outward" reality. It is 
useless to point to "facts". They are as subjective as the rest. 
In the play Vest ire gl'ignudi we read: 
The facts! The facts! Dear sir, the facts 
are as one assumes them; and so, in the spirit 
(consciousness) there are no longer facts: but 
life which appears, this way or in some way. 
Facts are the past when the spirit gives in (...) 
14 
and life abandons them. 
To become aware of the relativity of reality is possible. To 
accept it and live with it, without, therefore, ceasing to live 
but only exist, is difficult, if not impossible. Serafino Gubbio 
remarks: 
There it is. Knowing quite well that places have 
no other life, no other reality than that which 
we bestow on them, I saw myself obliged to admit 
with dismay, with infinite regret: 'How I have 
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changed!' The reality now is this. Something 
different, 
I rang the bell. A different sound. But now 
I no longer knew whether this was due to some 
change in myself or to there being a different 
15 
bell. How depressing. 
One excellent illustration of the way each man creates his own 
reality is to be found in Pirandello's play Come tu mi vuoi, in 
which no one is sure of the identity of one of the characters, 
Each person finds "proof" for his own hypothesis in the "facts" 
and "evidence" around. In the end Pirandello makes it clear that 
there is no such thing as "facts" of the case, or "evidence" 
because everything hinges on one's own interpretation. 
Nor is reality constant through time even for one individual. 
Moscarda comments in Uno. nessuno e centomila: 
Why does it seem to you to be really a question 
of taste or of opinion or of habit; and you don't 
in the slightest doubt the reality of those 
dear things with which now you see and touch 
it. Go away from that house of yours; come back 
in three or four years to see it with another 
spirit than that of today; you will see what 
will have happened to that dear dear reality 
of yours. 'Oh, look, is this the room? Is this 
the garden?' (...) Now you say that everyone 
knows this, that moods change and everyone can 
make a mistake. Of course it's an old story in 
fact. But I don't pretend to tell you anything 
new. I'm only asking: 'why then, by God, do you 
act as if you didn't know? Why do you continue 
to believe that yours is the only reality, that 
of today, and you wonder, you become annoyed, 
you show that your friend is mistaken, he who 
no matter what he does will never be able to 
have in himself, poor thing, the same spirit as 
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yours? 
According to Pirandello we find the relativity (subjectivity) of 
reality very difficult to accept, but occasionally circumstances 
may force the realisation upon us. The result is a feeling of 
anxiety, an unstable state in which it is difficult to remain. We 
read in Un ritratto: 
(...) I am convinced that there is no other reality 
outside of the illusions which our feelings create 
for us. If a sentiment changes suddenly, the 
illusion collapses and with it that reality in 
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which we live and then we see ourselves lost in 
the void.17 
And in X nostri ricordi; 
That life had never existed except in me. And 
here, in the presence of things - not changed, 
but different because I was different - that 
life seemed unreal to me, as if it were a dream: 
an illusion of mine, one of my fictions of the 
past.18 
The theme of the short story JX capretto nero is precisely that 
time (and hence reality) passes differently for different people. 
This notion is of course related to the concept of life-flux versus 
form-death, in the sense that life, flux, experience, consciousness 
cannot be halted even for the moment it takes to label it with a 
concept, fit it to a form. The story is a humorous one concerning 
a wealthy English woman who is travelling in Sicily. She sees 
an adorable little black kid and wishes to buy it and bring it 
back home with her. Since she is on a long trip she cannot 
take it along and asks that it be sent in eight months time. 
Of course, by then it is a big, dirty goat and no longer an 
adorable kid. After the furor caused by the arrival of this 
beast, it is suggested that what should have been sent was an 
adorable little black kid, albeit a different one, since that form 
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is what the woman wanted and not the objective reality of the 
goat which her chosen kid had become. The arrival of the goat 
was, most likely, for the Englishwoman, the moment of collapse of 
her idealised fictions concerning reality. As Claudio Vicentini 
paraphrases Pirandello: 
Life appears as 'a continuous flux which we try 
to stop, to fix in stable and determined forms 
inside and outside of us'. The 'forms' into which 
we try to stop the flux 'are the concepts, the 
ideals to which we wish to remain coherent'. But 
inside of us the 'flow continues', and 'in certain 
tempestuous moments, beseiged by the flow, all 
our fictitious forms collapse miserably. 
In fact, at one time or another, almost everyone comes to the 
realisation of the relativity of reality, but this awareness -
like all the other components of the flow which is life - must 
remain dynamic, never static. It is an awareness which comes and 
goes. At the risk of remaining paralysed, silent, motionless in 
front of the appalling spectacle of our own ignorance of reality, 
we must believe in our illusions all the while knowing them to 
be just that. In Suo marito we read of the moments when the 
illusions would fall and then be taken up again. 
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Was a particular thing really that way? No, 
perhaps it wasn't even that way! Perhaps, who 
knows how others saw it ... if they even saw it! 
And that dreamlike aura would put things back 
in order.20 
In Non si sa come, a man realises how capable he is of burying 
reality beneath his own deception of self and of others, becomes 
conscious of the relativity of reality, of the possibility that he, 
like his betrayed wife, may be living an illusion. This awareness 
pushes him to the brink of madness. Ordinary life is not possible 
without illusions, hence the inevitability of what Pirandello calls 
"self-deception" and what Sartre calls "bad faith". In the same 
play we read; 
21 
Life depends on believing, not knowing. 
In Bella vita we find: 
Denora: When we don't want to know something 
- it takes no time at all - we pretend not to 
know it. - And if the pretence is more for us 
than for others, believe it, it is just, just as 
22 
if we didn't know. 
As has been mentioned in Chapter II on Freedom and in the section 
of Chapter III on the denial of responsibility, Pirandello does not 
208 
wish to take away our freedom or our responsibility, but he does 
believe very strongly in the inevitability of a certain amount 
of self-deception. In the play Come tu mi vuoi. the statement is 
23 
made that all of us never do anything but lie. Objective reality 
exists. We cannot know it as it is in itself, but only form a 
conception of it according to our own subjective consciousness of 
it, which conceptions cannot encompass reality since not only are 
they subjective, they are only static forms that are of themselves 
incapable of arresting the flow of experience. 
The obvious implication of the contention that reality is 
relative is that for different people, reality is different. The 
paradoxes that this involves are the subject of perhaps the 
most famous of Pirandello's plays: Cos! £ (se vi pare), Laudisi, 
attempts on several occasions to explain these views to the other 
characters: 
Laudisi: (...) I see you so anxiously seek-
ing to know who other people 
are and how things are, almost 
as if other people or things 
were one way or another. 
Signora Sirelli: But then according to you one 
will never be able to know the 
truth? 
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Signora Cini: If we're not to believe even 
what we see and touch! 
Laudisi: But yes, believe it, signora! 
However, I tell you: respect 
that which others see and 
touch, even if it be the con-
trary to what you see and 
This statement is relatively uncontentious, but Laudisi 
(Pirandello?) goes further. 
Laudisi: (...) Permit me, signora, to answer 
your husband. How, my dear 
friend, do you want your wife 
to be content with the things 
you tell her, if you - naturally 
- tell them to her as they are 
for you? 
Signora Sirelli: As they absolutely can't be! 
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Laudisi: Ah, no, Signora, please permit 
me to say that here you are 
wrong! For your husband, rest 
assured, things are as he tells 
you. 
But the way they are in reality. 




Not at all! You're always 
mistaken. 
You are mistaken, I beg you to 
believe! 
But no, my friends! Neither 
of you is wrong. 
We cannot know things as they "really" are, and even less, people 
Each person sees a different reality. 
Laudisi: 
Signora Cini: 
(...) You, too, are sure to touch 
me as you see me? You can't 
doubt yourself. - But for pity 
sake, don't tell your husband, 
or my sister, or my nephew, or 
this lady here -
(suggesting) - Cini -
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Laudisi; (Cini) - how you see me, because 
otherwise all four of them will 
tell you that you are mistaken, 
while in fact you aren't mis-
taken at all! Because I am 
really the way you see me. -
But that doesn't take away -
my dear lady, from the fact 
that I am also really as your 
husband, my sister, my nephew 
and the lady here see me. 
Nor does time pass equally for all. One person may live an entire 
lifetime in the space of a year while for another it seems as 
though time has hardly passed. This is the theme of the short 
story mentioned above, JX capretto nero. 
In Mondo di carta, a man who has done nothing but read all 
his life and who has formed all of his ideas about the world 
through books, is now blind. He hires a person to read to him 
from his extensive library. In order to "continue living", he 
needs someone to share his reality. This is impossible, since even 
in this case where all of his reality is codified, stable in books, 
just the tone of voice of the reader changes it. 
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(...) he understood that, more or less, it would 
have been the same with any other reader. Any 
voice that wasn't his would have made his world 
27 
seem another. 
As we have seen in the chapter on freedom, many people take 
refuge from the absurd, from the relativity of reality in history, 
In Uno, nessuno e centomila we read; 
Ah, the pleasure of history, gentlemen! Nothing 
more restful than history. Everything in life 
changes continually, right before our eyes; noth-
ing certain, and this ceaseless anxiety to know 
how things will turn out, to see how the facts 
will sort themselves out holds you in such rest-
lessness and such agitation! Everything deter-
mined, everything established at first sight, in 
history: no matter how sad the events (...) at 
least there they are, ordered, fixed in thirty, 
forty little pages of a book: those and that's 
it; since they will never change, at least until 
some wicked critical spirit has evil pleasure in 
overthrowing that ideal construction, where all 
the elements held each other so well connected, 
and you rested admiring how each effect followed. 
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Actually, there can be no real refuge in history since it is an 
idealisation and cannot capture the ever-changing flow of life, 
There are no such things as facts; that is to say, the world is 
not made up of facts which we can discover. Rather, facts are 
like the slices of a cake which have no existence antecedent to 
the cuts which we choose to make, thereby creating them. Indeed, 
the very language of cutting suggests the aptness of this simile. 
All of this is really antecedent fact. And yet not, perhaps. In 
Risposta we read: 
It is and it isn't. Because everything depends 
?9 
on where and how you cut the facts. 
The importance of a fact is only that which we give it. This is 
the theme of the short story Non £ una cosa seria. 
For Perazzetti, there were in principle no serious 
things. Everything depends on the importance 
that you give to things. Something ridiculous 
if you give it importance, can become something 
most serious and vice versa, the most serious 
thing ridiculous. Is there anything more serious 
than death? And yet, for so many who don't 
30 
give it importance. (...) 
214 
This is also the theme of the play by the same name. Memmo, the 
main character, puts it into these words: 
(...) Serious things, moreover, please be convinced, 
Mr, Barranco, are only those to which we give 
importance! Is there something more than death? 
Someone doesn't give it importance - it's nothing! 
On the contrary: your nose! Ridiculous thing, 
But for you serious unhappiness! Why? Because 
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you give it importance, 
The realisation of the relativity of reality must be accepted, 
but one must live with it without either taking one's own "reality" 
too seriously or, on the other hand, making a sort of refuge 
from this manifestation of the absurd by refusing to believe in 
the importance of any reality. Sartre calls this type of refuge, 
the "bad faith of quietism". Pirandello, in for example, Rimedio 
la geografia ridicules it as an impossible refuge and uses it to 
again create a contrast which will highlight the absurd. In this 
story, a man proposes as an infallible remedy for human distress, 
a forced awareness of other people's reality. By remembering the 
geography that one has learned at school, all of those facts 
concerning other people, their customs, their lives - so the remedy 
goes - we can put the distress of our own reality into perspective 
and, seeing how small it is, not suffer. Of course, this only 
serves to bring to light once again, the paradox of the absurd. 
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If we are to live, we must choose, react, experience. In order 
to do this, we must believe in a particular reality to which we 
can react, which we can experience and according to which we can 
choose - all the while realising that it is a very subjective 
reality created by ourselves and shared by no one. 
Over and over again Pirandello illustrates the unimportance 
of objective reality at least in the lives of men, in that it 
is unknowable. As Laudisi proclaims in the above-mentioned play, 
Cos! h (se vi pare); 
I? But I deny nothing! I carefully abstain from 
that! You, not I, need facts, documents to affirm 
or to deny! I wouldn't know what to do with 
them, because for me reality doesn't consist of 
those but of the minds of those two people, into 
which I cannot hope to enter, if not by that 
little bit which they tell me of it, (...) You 
can't tell, (who is right) No one can. And not 
because those facts which you are looking for, 
are annulled ... lost or destroyed - by some 
kind of accident - a fire, an earthquake - no; 
but because they themselves have annulled them 
in their own mind, understand? Creating, she 
for him or he for her, a spectre which has the 
same consistency as reality, in which they live 
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at length in perfect accord, reconciled. And 
this reality of theirs cannot be destroyed by 
any document, since they breathe it, they see 
it, they feel it, they touch it! - At the most, 
the document could enable you to get rid of a 
stupid curiosity. It's missing, and here you are 
damned to the marvellous torture of having in 
front of you, near you, here the spectre and 
here reality, and not being able to distinguish 
32 
one from the other. 
The document is missing, but just so that the audience or the 
reader shouldn't believe that in order to discover the "true" 
nature of reality it is merely a question of finding the objective 
facts, Pirandello constructs the play so that, in fact, there is 
one person who unquestionably knows the truth. Who is "right" 
depends totally upon the identity of this person. The people, 
unable to accept their "ignorance of the facts", contrive to find 
this out, The final scene of the play belongs to this unknown 
woman, who at last will resolve the mystery. But she says: 
33 
I am whomever you believe me to be. 
And Laudisi comments: 
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And that, ladies and gentlemen, is how truth 
speaks. Are you satisfied? 
There are three other plays in which the relativity of all 
reality is the major theme. They are: Come tu mi vuoi. Tut to per 
bene and All'uscita. In the first, the question of the identity 
of a particular woman depends entirely (as it does in Cos! £}. on 
each individual's interpretation of "the facts". In the second, 
Martino Lori is Palma's father, if and only if, she and others 
recognise him as such, irrespective of her actual biological origin. 
In All'uscita. shades of people recently dead congregate at the 
entrance to the cemetery. The relativity of reality is the subject 
of their conversation and they are led by the Philosopher to the 
recognition of this. 
The following are fourteen of Pirandello's short stories, which 
have as a major theme the relativity of reality. In La prova two 
young priests are "tested" before being sent off as missionaries. 
At least, this is the way they see it. For someone else, the 
incident would have nothing to do with "God" or "tests". La 
signora Frola e iX signor Ponza. suo genero is the short story 
version of Cos! £ _{se vi pare). In L'arnica delle mogli is Pia a 
friend to all the young wives or are all her actions directed 
towards the admiration of her by them and their young husbands? 
JX chiodo is the reconstruction of a murder. What were the "true" 
motives? X piedi sull'erba is the story of an old man involving 
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the contrast between what his actions appear like to others and 
how they seem to himself. Cinci is another story concerning a 
violent crime. We know that Cinci will never be accused even 
though he is the murderer. For his mother, as well as the rest 
of the world, he will remain the little innocent, just as for him, 
his mother is a good hard-working woman, struggling to raise him 
on her own - even though the reader is aware that, in fact, she 
earns her living from a dubious profession. PX guardia is an 
extremely humorous story in which all the evidence points to a 
particular situation, which we discover in the end not to be the 
case. What about the evidence? Dono della Vergine Maria, on the 
other hand, is a tragic tale in which the difference between the 
outward appearances of a man's action and his own beliefs and 
intentions causes the man's death, L'eresia Catara is the story 
of an old professor who, believing that he is about to settle an 
ancient question before an avid audience, gives an entire lecture 
to a hall filled only with chairs on which are draped students' 
raincoats. Le medaglie is one of several stories dealing with 
people claiming to be "Garibaldini" heros. In it is described 
the death of a man who, although he had never marched with 
Garibaldi, had lived his life pretending that he had. In Pena 
di vivere cos! Pirandello describes the situation of a deserted 
wife whose husband returns, along with three daughters by a de 
facto marriage. Everyone believes the husband to be entirely 
to blame while the woman is the ideal wife. Is this really the 
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case? In Accrua e Ji the theme of relativity is carried beyond 
the realm of personal relationships into the domain of science, 
In a small village there is a good doctor and a quack. Which is 
which? The one who is believed is the one who is able to heal, 
even though he does it with plain water. In Lo_ spirito maligno. 
the "evil spirit" is, in fact, this subjectivity according to which 
a man's indifferent or even good actions are often interpreted 
as evil. In Guardando una stampa we find a blind beggar who 
preaches that everyone is blind because no one can see things 
as they really are. 
If all reality is relative, subjective, is any one "construction" 
of reality as good as another? According to Gino Cucchetti in 
his article in the Proceedings of the (1961) International Congress 
of Pirandellian Studies: 
Pirandello would seem to accept openly that which 
was the ancient proposition of the sophists and 
of the sceptics: that it is possible for truth 
not to exist in itself and for it to only have a 
subjective value; to exist then only inasmuch as 
we believe in this existence. In this way there 
would be neither reality nor truth outside of 
ourselves, to be and to seem would be the same 
thing, two propositions contradictory to each 
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other could be equally true as long as they are 
recognised as such by the creative act of faith 
r 35 
of man. 
As we have seen above in the excerpt from Pirandello's essay 
Illustrator! at tori e. traduttori (Saggi p 221) for the author, 
reality does, in fact, exist outside of our conception of it, 
but the affirmation of this objective reality plays a very small 
part in the works of Pirandello other than saving him from being 
dismissed as "another idealist". Yes, objective reality does exist, 
but this fact has no importance. All of the emphasis is placed, 
instead, on what he calls the relativity, or what should more 
properly be called the subjectivity, of reality. The proverbial 
falling tree in the forest does make a noise, even though no one 
is there to hear it, but the unheard noise has no importance. Far 
more important, for Pirandello, would be the illusory noise which 
someone or some group of people believed that they heard. All but 
the "humorist" the absurd man, need to believe that their reality 
corresponds with objective reality. Awareness of the closeness 
of reality to illusion is too much for most ordinary people to 
bear. As the narrator says in La signora Frola e ii signor Ponza. 
suo genero: 
But I say, holding the entire population this 
way, in a nightmare, does this seem a small 
thing to you? Taking away every support to 
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common sense, so they can't distinguish any 
longer between phantasm and reality. An agony, 
a perpetual alarm. (...) Naturally, in everyone 
is born the pernicious suspicion that reality 
then is worth as much as phantasm, and that 
every reality could well be a phantasm and vice 
versa. This seems a small thing to you? If I 
were in the Prefect's shoes, for the well-being 
of the minds of the inhabitants of Valdana, I 
would immediately evict Signor Frola and Signor 
Ponza, her son-in-law. 
One of the clearest expositions of Pirandello's thoughts on the 
relativity (subjectivity) of reality is found in the short story 
nn EPl dX vino, which deals with an old man who, forbidden to drink 
alcohol, still goes often to the bar. Questioned, he answers that 
his reason for doing this is to remind himself of the relativity 
(subjectivity) of reality. His sadness can't be so real if a tiny 
drop of wine would make it disappear. He states: 
(...) I console myself, proving to myself that this, 
my great sadness, yes, now it is real, but all I 
would have to do is to drink a little wine for it 
not to be. You could object that then my gaiety 
wouldn't be real either, since it would depend 
on the little bit of wine which I would have 
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drunk. I don't say no. But let's go back to the 
beginning; what is true, dear sir? What doesn't 
depend on what we put inside of ourselves in 
order to create for ourselves now this and now 
that truth?37 
Of even more significance for Pirandello than our subjective 
construction of "facts", occurrences or events is our construction 
of the reality of ourselves as well as of other people. This 
construction will be dealt with in the next chapter on the self 
and others. It is interesting to note, as a conclusion to this 
chapter on the nature of reality, that for Pirandello, there is 
a unique parallel between reality in life and reality in art. As 
he says in his essay on humour: 
(...) one could say that not only for the artist, 
but there exists for no one a representation, 
either created by art or even that which we 
make for ourselves of ourselves, of others and 
of life, which can be believed to be a reality. 
They are, at the bottom, the same illusion, that 
of art and that which commonly comes to all of 
38 
us from our senses. 
It must not be concluded, however, that Pirandello thinks man 
must therefore step back and believe nothing. It is clear that 
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the paradox would disappear if we were not to believe in the 
reality which we have, each of us, created. We would all finish 
like Serafino Gubbio in Si gira ...! —mute in a world of silence, 
existing but not alive, 
Sartre's position regarding the nature of reality is not 
identical with, but certainly similar to Pirandello's. Sartre too 
admits the existence of objective reality, which he calls the 
"brute existent" or the "brute being of the in-itself". However, 
it is through the freedom of the "for-itself" (man) that this 
brute being reveals itself. Hence, in any given instance it will 
not be possible to separate or even to determine what comes from 
the brute given and what comes from man's freedom. Sartre cites 
the example of a crag by the side of the road: 
Here I am at the foot of this crag which appears 
to me as 'not scalable'. This means that the 
rock appears to me in the light of a projected 
scaling—a secondary project which finds its 
meaning in terms of an initial project which is 
my being-in-the-world. Thus the rock is carved 
out on the ground of the world by the effect 
of the initial choice of my freedom. But on the 
other hand, what my freedom cannot determine 
is whether the 'rock to be scaled' will or will 
not lend itself to scaling. This is part of the 
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brute being of the rock. Nevertheless the rock 
can show its resistance to scaling only if the 
rock is integrated by freedom in a 'situation' 
of which the general theme is scaling. For the 
simple traveler who passes over this road and 
whose free project is a pure aesthetic ordering 
of the landscape, the crag is not revealed either 
as scalable or as non-scalable; it is manifested 
only as beautiful or ugly. 
After further examples Sartre states: 
Thus we begin to catch a glimpse of the paradox 
of freedom: there is freedom only in a situation, 
and there is a situation only through freedom. 
Sartre has very carefully reminded us in the same work, in 
the chapter on transcedence that he has already rejected both 
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the "realist" and the "idealist" solutions. Pirandello is more 
dramatic, if less precise, fascinated as he is by the paradox 
of man's "power" to "structure" his own reality—in fact by the 
necessity of his doing so. 
In Sartre there is no parallel to Pirandello's idea concerning 
form killing life. As well, the Frenchman is more precise in his 
explanation of the relationship between the "for-itself" and the 
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"in-itself" and how in one sense man creates his own situation and 
in another it must be said that he does not create it, but rather 
discovers it. Nevertheless, Pirandello's ideas concerning the 
nature of reality seem to be consonant with Sartre's particularly 
since his works manifest very clearly the relationship between 
the nature of reality, existentialist freedom and the absurd. 
C. Summary 
We have seen in this chapter Pirandello's view of reality as 
"relative", or more properly "subjective", based on each individual's 
organisation of sense date into "forms", thereby facilitating their 
subsumption under concepts - though whether he operated with 
a considered distinction between "form" and "concept" is by no 
means clear. We have seen both the positive and the negative 
function of these forms. Through examples and illustrations from 
Pirandello's plays, short stories, and novels we have seen how 
the writer draws the conclusions that it is possible to become 
aware of what he calls the "relativity" of all reality and that 
this awareness is a path to the consciousness of the absurd. We 
have seen how these ideas are similar to Sartre's. Let us now 
proceed to an examination of how Pirandello's ideas concerning 
the "relativity" of reality affect his views on the nature of the 
"self" and its relation to the "other". 
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CHAPTER V - THE SELF AND OTHERS 
A. Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter IV, all reality, for Pirandello 
is subjective. While he does not deny the objective existence of 
things, he stresses the unimportance of this objective reality. 
Because of this, it is not the world of "things" which interests 
Pirandello, but the world of people. While it is true that a man is 
tall or he is not; he has red hair or he does not; he is born into 
a particular set of historical, social and physical conditions some 
of which he can change but some of which he cannot; these objective 
"facts" take on importance for Pirandello - as for Sartre - only in 
relation to a person's consciousness of and attitude toward them. 
Given each person's individual awareness of and interpretation 
of his own reality and reality of others, who am I? Who is the 
"other" person? What relationship is possible between us? These 
are the questions of most interest to Pirandello. In accord with 
his views on the "relativity" of reality, he rejects any but the 
most ephermal "human nature". We "construct" ourselves as well 
as others. How is this accomplished? Section B of this chapter 
will deal with the self: D the individual's search for identity, 
2) the construction of the self and 3) the problem of "masks" 
or "roles". Section C will deal with the relation of the self 
to others: 1) the other's construction of us, 2) the mirror and 
the other's look. Section D will treat of the "other": 1) forms, 
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2) the paradox of the reality (or irreality) of death. Section E 
will deal with the possibility of communication between individual 
"selves". 
As we have seen in previous chapters, life may be understood 
as a continuous flux, as pure experience, 
Man does not have an absolute idea or notion 
of life but rather a varied changeable feeling, 
according to the times, the instances, chance, 
Now logic, abstracting ideas from feelings, tends 
rather to fix that which is mobile, changeable, 
fluid; it tends to give an absolute value to 
that which is relative (sic!) 
Each person has an infinity of possibilities which are then limited 
by his own self-concept ion or the conception which others have 
of him. Thus emerges another aspect of the absurd: the conflict 
between the fluid, purely experiential nature of life and man's 
consciousness which tries to conceptualise it. While it is in 
the realm of experience, sense data, that man has an infinity of 
possibilities of being, any attempt at living within this realm 
gives rise to a host of difficulties, primary among which is 
the problem of what Sartre calls "quietism". Aside from the 
conception which others have of us, we are constructed also by 
the conception that we have of ourselves as well as the facts 
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of our birth and our historical and social condition. Also, our 
acts become a prison for us, in which our identity is shaped. 
In JX qiuoco delle parti. Silia is unhappy because she suffers 
from, but is unaware of, this aspect of the absurd. Her husband 
Leone, who has "understood the game" tries valliantly to fight 
against the limitation on his possibilities of being, to resist the 
"construction" of his "self". But falling into "quietism", passive 
acceptance of everything, which of course is a choice in itself, 
he realises that he cannot escape being "constructed", if only 
by the facts of his birth and his "role" in society. Seeing the 
inevitability of his situation he becomes Camus' absurd hero. 
Rest assured, this indifference will be enough 
for me to have courage, not just in front of a 
man who is nothing; but in front of everyone and 
always. I live in such a climate, dear, that I 
can be heedless of anything; of death as of life. 
Imagine then, of the ludicrousness of men and 
of their wretched judgments. Don't be afraid. I 
2 
have understood the game. 
Even our bodies "construct" us. Aside from fixing us in time 
and space and leading us from the moment of our birth inevitably 
toward the extinction of our personal being, they are the limiting 
form by which others recognise us, the image others have of us. 
In Trovarsi Donata states: 
Eh, if you then look at my body ... 
And what do you want me to look at? 
... here yes, you see? That really is a 
stranger to me then. (...) I am so little in 
my body. 
And where are you? 
When you think, where are you? You don't see 
yourself when you speak ... I am in life ... in 
the things which I feel ... which move about 
inside me ... in all I see outside - houses, 
street, sky .,. the whole world ... So much 
so that sometimes, seeing myself recalled by 
certain looks at my body, to find myself a 
woman ... - Oh God, I don't say it displeases -
but at certain times it seems to me an almost 
odious necessity, against which I could come 
to rebel. (...) I no longer see the reason 
why I should recognise my body as the thing 
most mine, in which I should really consist 
for others. 
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Sartre too was fascinated by the problem of the relationship 
between the "self" and the "body". He states that there are 
three ontological dimensions to one's body: 
I exist my body: this is its first dimension of 
being. My body is utilized and known by the 
other; this is its second dimension. But in so 
far as I am for others, the Other is revealed 
to me as the subject for whom I am an object. 
Even there the question, as we have seen, is of 
my fundamental relation with the Other. I exist 
therefore for myself as known by the Other-in 
particular in my very facticity. I exist for 
myself as a body known by the Other. This is 
4 
the third ontological dimension of my body. 
He, too, spoke of the feeling of discomfort within one's body 
because of the relationship between it and the Other. 
The explanation (of the wish to be invisible) here 
is that we in fact attribute to the body-for-
the-Other as much reality as to the body-for-us. 
Better yet, the body-for-t he-Other is the body-
for-us, but inapprehensible and alienated. It 
appears to us then that the Other accomplishes 
for us a function of which we are incapable and 
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which nevertheless is incumbent on us: to see 
ourselves as we are. 
In Pirandello's Uno. nessuno e centomila. Moscarda reflects: 
Living, I didn't represent to myself any image 
of me. Why then should I see myself in that 
body there as in a necessary image of me? It 
stood there in front of me, almost non-existent, 
like a dream apparition, that image. And I could 
very well not recognise myself that way. If I 
had never seen myself in a mirror, for example? 
(...) What did my thoughts have to do with that 
hair, of that colour, which could have been no 
longer there or white or black or blond; (...) I 
could very well even feel a profound antipathy 
for that body there; and I did. 
In art, the "construction" of a character is totally free. 
In life one's construction of oneself is conditioned by others' 
perception of us, by our historical and social condition and by 
our past acts. Yet one must create oneself in order to find 
one's own identity. In Trovarsi we read: 
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And this is true ... and nothing is true. ... 
The only truth is that one must create oneself, 
create! And only then does one find oneself. 
Still the paradox remains. We must create ourselves, our own 
identity, but if we try too hard, we find ourselves caught in the 
death of a "form" and as we watch ourselves we stop living. From 
Trovarsi: 
You want to 'find' yourself. But you have to find 
yourself in life, time by time without searching; 
because by force of searching, if in the end 
you manage to find yourself, do you know what 
happens to you? You find nothing anymore and 
you can't live any longer: nice and dead, with 
8 
your eyes open. 
Here one is reminded of Sartre's views on the curious inevitability 
of "bad faith". We can never "be" anything in the same manner 
that a stone is a stone. The nature of being-for-it self is not to 
be what it is. On the other hand, when we construct ourself we 
define what we are and what we are not, but it is the nature of 
the human reality to be what it is not. By "finding ourselves", 
we find only a part of ourselves which we surpass in the very 
act of being conscious of it. 
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Given that despite his efforts to live life rather than think 
about it, man is conscious of his "self" at the same moment that 
he lives it, how does man construct himself? 
B. The Self 
L The individual's search for identity - awareness of 
the problem 
Pirandello's major work concerning the self and others is 
Uno, nessuno e centomila. which chronicles the search for personal 
identity of one man, Vitangelo Moscarda, from his first consciousness 
of the problem to his provisional solution. Like Roquentin's 
understanding of being which springs from the contemplation of 
the chestnut tree root, Moscarda first becomes aware of the 
whole problem of personal identity through a most insignificant 
incident. One morning, as he stands in front of the mirror, his 
wife asks him what he is looking at and remarks, "Oh, I thought 
you were looking to see which side your nose leans towards," 
Never having noticed that his nose wasn't absolutely straight, at 
first he denies it. Then looking closely, he realises that indeed, 
his nose does lean slightly to the right. In fact, his wife can 
list for him a whole series of hitherto unnoticed little defects 
of which he wasn't aware: eyebrows like circumflex accents, " A , 
one ear which stands out more than the other, one leg ever so 
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slightly more curved than the other about the knee. Moscarda 
gives no importance to these tiny defects but: 
(...) a very great and extraordinary importance 
to the fact that I had lived for so many years 
without ever changing nose, always with that 
one, and with those eyebrows and those ears, 
those hands and those legs; and I had to wait 
to take a wife in order to realise that they 
10 
were defective. 
He thus realises that - is it possible? - he doesn't even know 
his own body well; the things which are most intimately his. 
From this began my suffering. That illness which 
was to reduce me shortly in conditions of spirit 
and body so miserable and desperate that I 
certainly would have died of it or gone crazy, 
11 
if I hadn't found (...) a remedy. 
And so Moscarda becomes aware of the problem: I am not for others 
what I am for myself. Furthermore, one cannot brush aside the 
"self-for-another" as some sort of misapprehension. It has a 
reality of its own and it is to this reality that the other person 
reacts. 
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Moscarda's wife has a nickname for him. She always calls 
him Genge. The way his wife sees him, the way she perceives her 
"Genge" is so far removed from Moscarda's own self-concept ion, 
that it is as if she were in love with and married to another 
man. He begins to feel rage and jealousy of this "other" man. 
I loved her, despite the torture of being perfectly 
conscious of not belonging to myself in my own 
body as the object of her love. And yet, the 
sweetness which came to this body from her love, 
it was I who tasted it. (...) even if sometimes I 
was almost tempted to strangle her seeing her 
(...) tremble a stupid name: Gengg, 
Not only does the other person's conception of a person take on 
a reality all its own, but one's own self-conception is seen to 
be as ephemeral as the "self-for-another". 
(...) think on it well: a moment ago, before this 
happened to you, you were another; not only, 
but you were even a hundred others, a hundred 
thousand others. And believe me there is nothing 
to be surprised at. See, rather, if it seems 
that you could be so sure that from today to 
tomorrow you will be that which you assume to 
be today. My dear, the truth is this: they are 
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all fixations. Today you determine yourself one 
13 
way and tomorrow another, 
Moscarda finds himself at a moment of crisis. This multiplication 
of his "self" leaves him not with a hundred thousand identities, 
but with none, since in the eyes of others, "I as I, was nothing." 
He feels an icy solitude as he cannot penetrate another's reality 
and cannot communicate his own to another. He looks strangely 
at those around him and thinks: 
(...) we should all look like this all the time, 
each with his eyes full of horror at his own 
15 
inescapable solitude. 
He purposely acts very differently from his usual manner in order 
to break the conception others have of him. He struggles to find 
out who he is. 
But I, one, who? who? If 1 no longer had eyes to 
see me myself as one even for me? The eyes, the 
eyes of everyone else - 1 continued to see them 
on me, but equally without being able to know 
how they would see me now in this my newborn 
will, if I myself didn't know yet in what I would 
consist for myself. No longer Genge. 
Another. 
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I had really wanted this. 
But what else did I have inside if not this 
torment which revealed me as one and a hundred 
16 
thousand. 
Thus no more "truth" can be ascribed to one's own conception of 
himself than can be ascribed to another's conception of one. The 
former changes in time and the latter, not only in time but from 
"other" person to "other" person. Thus if I am not, as previously 
assumed, one, I am a hundred thousand - different in each moment 
in time and a different person to each "other" person who sees 
me. If I am a hundred thousand, no one more real or even more 
Stable than the other, then I am no one. Here Pirandello bases 
himself on the psychology of Alfred Binet and Gabriel Seailles, 
and he states in Scienza e critica estetica: 
Our spirit, then, consists of fragments, or 
better, of distinct elements, more or less in 
relationship with each other, which can disperse 
and reorder themselves in a new ensemble, so that 
from it results a new personality (...) With the 
elements of our ego we can therefore compose, 
construct in ourselves other individualities, 
other beings with their own consciousness with 
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their own intelligence, alive and acting. 
Based on this theory of the personality, we find in the 
story L'Avemaria di Bobbio; 
That which we know of ourselves is however only 
a part, and perhaps a very small part, of that 
which we are unbeknownst to us. Bobbio indeed 
said that that which we call consciousness is 
comparable to the little water which is seen in 
the neck of a bottomless well. And he meant 
perhaps to say by this that (...) there are 
perceptions and actions which remain unknown 
to us (...) but which at the sudden call of a 
sensation, be it taste, colour or sound, can still 
show signs of life, showing still alive within us 
another unsuspected being. 
And in the novel Suo marito we find: 
(...) perhaps because she had never been able to 
hold herself, compose herself, fix herself in a 
solid and stable concept of self, she had always 
been aware with lively disquiet of the extra-
ordinary disordered mobility of her interior 
being, C..)19 
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Vitangelo Moscarda, made aware of his own numerous "selves" 
reasons that this being the human condition,; 
Julius Caesar, one, didn't exist. Yes, there 
existed a Julius Caesar such as he, in so many 
parts of his life, represented to himself; and 
this had without doubt, an incomparably greater 
value than the others; not however, with regard 
to reality, I beg you to believe, because no 
less real than this imperial Julius Caesar was 
the tender, fastidious, shaven and beltless and 
most unfaithful one of his wife Calpurnia; or 
that lewd one of Nicomede, King of Bitinia. The 
trouble is this, always, gentlemen: that they all 
had to be called Julius Caesar, and in a sole 
body of masculine sex there had to cohabitate 
The same multiplication of personalities, of selves is noted in 
Trovarsi: 
One, no; so many women! And for herself, perhaps, 
21 
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In fact, it is precisely the doubling of selves which is the major 
theme of La signora Morli. una £ due. Neither "self" has more 
reality than the other. 
2, The construction of the self 
Nevertheless, one cannot be in the abstract. Being must be 
encased in form. Like forms are people'3 acts. Moscarda comment: 
When an act is accomplished, it is that; it no 
longer changes. When one, however, has acted, 
even without later feeling himself and finding 
himself in the completed acts, that which is 
done, remains: like a prison for him. (...) the 
act is, rather always and only of one of the 
many that we are or that we could be, (...) 
because no reality has been given to us and 
none exists, but we have to make it for ourselves, 
if we want to be; and it will never be one for 
all, one forever, but continuously and infinitely 
changeable. The faculty of deluding ourselves 
that today's reality is the only true one, if on 
the other hand, it sustains us, on the other, 
it precipitates us into an emptiness without 
end, because the reality of today is destined 
22 
to show itself to be illusion tomorrow. 
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Here, Pirandello's ideas are in perfect accord with Sartre's, We 
are our acts. One cannot posit more than that which is given, and 
what is given is our acts not our intentions or our unrealised 
possibilities. The world sees us in our acts and limits us to and 
imprisons us in them. The man who has stolen is branded a thief, 
the man who has been courageous, a hero. But a man does not 
exhaust the possibilities of his being in such a name. The thief 
has forever open to him the possibility of honesty, the hero of 
cowardliness. So there is no unity of self to be found in our 
acts either. Moscarda summarises the problem: 
I didn't know myself at all, I had for myself 
no reality of my own, I was in a state as of 
continual fusion, almost fluid, malleable; others 
knew me, each in his own way, according to the 
reality which they had given me; that is, they 
each saw in me a Moscarda that wasn't I, I not 
being really anyone for myself; as many Moscardas 
as they were, and all more real than I who had 
23 
for myself, I repeat, no reality. 
Here, the obvious question is raised - is there not some 
"inner self", which we protect by keeping it hidden from others, 
or perhaps an "inner being" unknown or even unknowable to other 
people or even to ourselves, but an objective reality, nevertheless? 
There is a certain amount of evidence for this interpretation in 
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such passages as the one in Suo marito describing the "inner 
being" of the artist's father as a "bitter enemy inside of himself" 
which he forever tries to hide from the world. In her article La 
filosofia morale nel teatro pirandelliano Lina Passarella Sartorelli 
opts for this interpretation and says: 
Inevitably we construct ourselves (...) at bottom, 
inside of these constructions of ours, put as 
it were out front, behind the jealousies and 
the impositions there remain then well hidden 
our most secret thoughts, our most intimate 
sentiments, all that we are for ourselves, outside 
24 
of the relations that we want to establish. 
Sartorelli goes on to say: 
For Pirandello it isn't all unconscious: too many 
times it is something which we deliberately hide 
from the world, afraid that the world will spoil 
it and then too we suffocate it desirous of 
25 
destroying that which is too tormenting (...) 
Thus she concludes that the construction of the self is: 
(...) a construction of another apparent rself 
different from the 'self which remains hidden, 
26 
in fact, in contrast with the 'self (...) 
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It cannot be denied that Pirandello does deal with this sort of 
deception and even with cases where it becomes self-deception, 
as we have seen in the section dealing with "bad faith". 
However, conscious deception of others and even self-deception only 
constitute one aspect of the problem, and they do not imply the 
existence of an objective and static "self" beneath and deception, 
but only a perception of construction of the self which is in the 
first instance hidden from others and in the second inconsistent 
with or in conflict with another conception of ourselves which we 
have. In Humian terms: 
(The self is) nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other 
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 
27 
perpetual flux and movement. 
The "self" cannot be discovered but only lived because it is an 
infinite set of possibilities or, as Sartre would term it, complete 
freedom: 
In a sense there is no such thing as the 
self, if by that is meant some permanent and 
already constituted identity that lies behind 
our actions. My ego or self exists only through 
my actions and I have to be continually re-making 
28 
and re-affirming myself. 
244 
Thus we can see that Pirandello's ideas on the reality of 
the self parallel those on reality in general. One is forced, 
on pain of being labelled "insane" by society, to give a certain 
unity to our behaviour, to "construct" the self the same way as 
one "constructs" reality, all the while aware that the resultant 
entity, the ego or the self, remains only one construction in 
confrontation with the construction of ourselves by others. One 
device to accomplish this construction is the use of "masks" or 
"roles". 
3. The mask (La, maschera) 
Pirandello, the "humorist" (or the "absurd man", as we have 
seen earlier) is fond of unmasking people, of always distinguishing 
between the role which a person chooses to play or which society 
forces upon him, and the person himself whose total being cannot 
be encompassed by a role, or a mask. This theme is so common 
in Pirandello that his plays have been collected and published 
under the title Maschere nude (Naked Masks), 
In L'umorismo Pirandello states; 
The more difficult is the struggle for life, and 
the more one's own weakness in this struggle 
is felt, the more then is the reciprocal need 
for deceipt. The simulation of strength, of 
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honesty, of niceness, of discretion, in sum, of 
very virtue the principle of veracity, is a form 
of adaptation, a capable instrument of battle, 
The humorist immediately gathers these various 
simulations for the struggle of life; he amuses 
himself by unmasking them. 
Indeed, many examples are seen throughout Pirandello's work of 
people who, unable to deal with the amorphousness of their own 
"self" put on a mask to give a unity to their personality; and 
of society, unable to understand or deal with a person on the 
level of the infinity of his possibilities, imposes upon him a 
role which he must play, under pain of being labelled insane, in 
order to more easily deal with the "role" rather than with the 
person. Over and over again, caught in the strictures of Sicilian 
society - characters ignore their own feelings or desires and act 
according to the role which society has placed upon them, or in 
fact, deliberately create a role, a mask for themselves according 
to which the world will be able to judge them. Examples include 
Vest ire gl'ignudi. La guardaroba dell'eloauenza. and La patente. 
The imposition of roles or masks is the major theme of JX berretto 
a sonagli. A jealous wife has created a scandal concerning her 
husband and the wife of another man. In fact, there has been 
no justification for the scandal, but given that now, the entire 
town believes that adultery has been committed, the "wronged" 
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husband must take his revenge, fully aware that his only playing 
the role. The only way to avoid a double murder - and this is 
the solution which is finally accepted - is for the jealous wife 
to be branded insane and go away temporarily to a rest home. If 
she will play the role of the crazy person, the man can avoid the 
"responsibilities" of the role of "wronged husband" in Sicilian 
society. 
In Pensaci Giacomino an old professor, acting out of the 
goodness of his heart and for everyone's benefit is thwarted in 
his projects by the roles that people must play. He is aware of 
the concept of role and realises that any harm which will come to 
him will not be to his "person" but to himself as a "role". This 
is not sufficient because although he is aware of the distinction, 
society will not admit it, 
Even Leone in JX qiuoco delle parti finally comes to the 
conclusion that it is the role which must be played. 
(...) I'm sorry for you! But you have to play 
your part like I mine. That's the game. Even 
she has finally understood that! Each one his 
own, till the end; (...) I see myself and I see you 
play, and I am amused. 
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He must challenge his wife's insulters to a duel. All is arranged. 
But it is the lover who must fight the duel, for his part goes 
only so far. The lover is forced to play his role as well, 
Quando si & qualcuno concerns a famous writer who, however, 
in the play, has no name. The play illustrates the theme of the 
construction of the self according to the mask which society places 
upon one. The famous cannot live but are walled up, suffocated, 
turned into lifeless statues by the conception which the world 
has of them, the mask which is forced upon them. 
In JX piacere dell'onesta the characters suffer because they 
force the "form" of honesty to take life for them in the person 
of "the honest man", whose role, whose only function, is to play 
the part of honesty personified in order to save the reputation 
of a young woman and her married lover. The conditions imposed 
are merely those conditions commonly found in society by which 
a person is "respected" for the role he plays, for the masks 
he puts on. The "honest man" wishes to be respected for his 
role of honest husband of a well-bred young lady, but given the 
hypocritical circumstances of on-going adultery and deceipt, this 
is of course impossible even though it is precisely to be respected 
that the "honest man" has been called in. The entire problem 
of the distinction between the role or the mask, and the person 
is highlighted. It is seen that no solution to the problem of 
personal identity can really be found through the use of masks. 
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Perhaps it is in the relationship between ourselves and 
others that our identity can be found. 
C. The Relation of the *5eJff te 'Others' 
L The 'other's' construction of us 
As was stated at the beginning of this chaper, it is because 
of Pirandello's view on the relativity of all reality, (at least 
at the epistemological level) that the question of individual 
identity, the "self" takes on such importance. If we look at such 
short stories as L'altro figlio. JX figlio cambiato, Un ritratto or 
Benedizione we see reality's "relativity" as applied to people and 
their personal identity. In Section B of this chapter we have 
already seen the difficulties raised in regard to the individual's 
perception of himself, his own self-con struct ion and his use of 
masks or roles. Both Sartre and Pirandello hold that the "self" 
cannot be identified or "constructed" without reference to the 
"other". To a certain extent, we need others in order to see 
ourselves. In fact, Pirandello sees as an interesting result of 
this, that we never cry for another's having died. Since that 
person lives for us in our own creation of him, he is still there 
before us alive. Rather, we cry because we can no longer, through 
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his creation of us, give life, reality to us, The play La vita che 
ti diedi and the short story X Pensionati della memoria illustrate 
this theme. 
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We need others in order to be able to construct ourselves, 
to "confirm", as it were, our own construction of reality. Our 
conscience is "the other" within us. Similar passages on this 
topic are found in the novels Uno. nessuno e centomila. II fu 
Mattia Pascal and L'esclusa: in the play Come prima meglio di 
prima: and in the short story Mondo di carta. 
Since each "self" has an infinity of possibilities, it is 
"others' " confirmation of one reality rather than another, which 
not only creates or constructs that very reality but also helps 
us to a certain extent, form our own self construction. Numerous 
illustrations of this are to be found in Pirandello's works'. In 
Tut to per bene (both the short story and the play) a man's 
identity as "the father" depends not on biological fact but on 
his being recognised as such by his wife's daughter. La signora 
Morli, una e_ due has as its major theme a woman's identity based 
on the "others" around her. The same theme is illustrated by 
Come tu mi vuoi. in which a character is simply designated as "the 
unknown one" because the entire play is devoted to establishing 
her identity. Is she the long missing wife who disappeared in the 
chaos of the war, or is she an impostor? It is found to depend 
precisely on what the "others" believe. She herself states: 
To be? To be is nothing! To be is to create 
oneself. 
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In context, this is understood to mean, to construct oneself for 
others. Asked if she would then admit that she might not be Cia, 
she replies; 
I admit that and more! I admit that Cia could 
even be this one (She indicates the Insane Woman) 
- if you wanted to believe it. 
The "other's" creation of us is so strong that we may begin to 
live the reality which others have given us. In Tut to per bene 
we read; 
Martino Lori remained astonished at the concep-
tion of him which his wife went along little by 
little forming for herself, at the interpreta-
tion which she gave of his acts, of his words. 
Sometimes he almost began to doubt whether in 
fact he wasn't as his wife thought, as she 
had always thought and whether he didn't have, 
without realising, all those defects, all those 
vices with which she reproached him. 
In La carriola a man actually feels himself to be re-entering into 
a different existence each time he goes home. Vicentini writes: 
If the world finds its own reality in the 
representation, the personal perspective, the 
interpretation confers reality, under the object 
'alive'. In this conception an individual acquires 
reality in the perspective of the person who 
knows him and loses it when that person is no 
more. (...) 
Since the perspective confers reality, erroneous 
opinions of people constitute an actual defor-
mation to which they are forced to submit. Not 
only, in the most obvious sense, that they con-
dition our actions forcing us to act in a way 
which we don't want to, but actually because 
they modify our own individuality. 
Moscarda, facing this problem of his need for others in order to 
construct himself and aware of their "deformations" of his being 
states: 
(...) there really wasn't a view for me, to be able 
to say in some way how I saw myself, without 
the view of others, for my own body and for 
every other thing how could I imagine how they 
should see it; and so my eyes, for themselves, 
outside of the view of others, could no longer 
know really what they saw. (...) 
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Where the view of others doesn't help us to 
constitute in any way in us the reality of that 
which we see, our eyes no longer know what they 
see; our consciousness is bewildered, because 
this which we believe to be the most intimately 
ours, consciousness, means the others in us: and 
39 
we cannot feel ourselves alone. 
In Vestire gl'ignudi Grotti expresses precisely this need for 
others as mirrors for ourselves; 
(...) Because you didn't believe it! I felt that 
you didn't believe that I could have been so 
good solely to make you happy. See, see ... And 
by not believing this, you ruined everything! 
Because I had more than ever a need that you 
should believe it, in order to hold me, in order 
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to overcome each temptation. 
L'uscita del vedovo is the story of a man who becomes the image 
that his wife had of him. All her life, the woman complains of 
all the faults of men in general and especially of widowers. The 
husband is forever falsely accused or wrongly held in suspicion. 
Upon her death, the widower begins to be haunted by her image 
of him and despite all of his protestations while she was alive, 
he now begins to live up (down?) to her conception of him. 
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Our need, according to Pirandello, for others' conceptions of 
us is so great that without the "other" we no longer have an 
identity. In Da s£ ... we read: 
Who was he anymore? No one. Not only because 
he had lost all he had; not only because he was 
reduced to that miserable degrading condition 
of errand boy, (...) No, no. He was no longer, 
really anyone, because there was nothing any 
more in him, aside from the appearance, (and even 
that so changed, unrecognisable) of that Matteo 
Sinagra that he had been up to three years ago. 
In this errand boy, just now gone out of the 
house, neither did he feel himself nor did others 
recognise him. And so? Who was he? Another, 
who didn't live yet (...) Matteo Sinagra, the real 
Matteo Sinagra was dead, absolutely dead, three 
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years ago. 
Even if we are unaware of its existence, the "other's" creation 
of us begins to take on a life of its own and the result is the 
" sdoppiamento" (doubling) of personalities which Pirandello seems 
to have taken from the psychology of Alfred Binet and for which 
he is so well-known. Having an infinite number of possibilities of 
being, but capable at any one moment in time of apprehending a 
finite group of these, a group of actions or attributes which will 
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be compatible among themselves, we organise and construct our 
self-conception out of these. Simultaneously, using sometimes the 
same set of attributes but organised and arranged differently, 
perhaps seeing an overlapping set of characteristics or possibly 
even one which in no way coincides with our own chosen set, others 
construct their own conception of us, a construction which acts 
and reacts, moves and speaks - in short - becomes a live person 
which, given the subjectivity even of each individual's perception, 
does not even fully coincide with "us" under a physical description. 
As soon as we realise that the process is the same by which we 
construct ourselves and by which others construct us, and that 
the resultant "creations" are equally valid (invalid) but mutually 
incommunicable, we become aware that we have discovered another 
aspect of the absurd. Pirandello is fascinated with this and 
makes it the subject of many of his books. 
In the short stories: I nostri ricordi. Musica vecchia. Con altri 
occhi. Risnosta and Gioventil to cite five examples, the protagonist 
of each story is confronted with an "alternate reality", either 
of himself or of another which he must realise has the same 
"validity" or "correspondence to truth" as his own construction 
has. 
In the play Come prima, meglip di prima, a woman who had 
deserted her family years before, is reconciled with her husband 
and returns. Her husband had raised their daughter in the belief 
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that her "sainted" mother was dead. The woman is caught in the 
unusual situation of being compared unfavourably with "herself". 
The "sainted mother" has such force of reality for the daughter 
that "she" has taken on a life of her own, one with which it is 
impossible for the woman to interfere, 
Silvio: But how could I imagine that this 
would happen! Excuse me, but it's 
strange! You speak of her as if you 
were jealous of her ... 
Fulvia; Oh. Yes, in the heart of my daughter. 
Silvio: But think, at bottom it is you 
yourself! 
Fulvia: That's not true! That's not true! 
Myself? I touched it! I felt it! 
I'm dead! really dead! I stand in 
front of her and I am dead! It is 
not I, here alive; it is another, her 
mother ... there ... is dead! (...) 
(...) 
Fulvia: Really for me? You want to remain 
silent in order not to offend her 
mother, that's why! 
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But if that's you! 
It's not true! I for her am - that 
one - and I can't be her mother! 
I've come to the point of believing 
it myself! She seems to me, she 
really seems to me the daughter of 
that other one. It's frightful (...) 
- The shadow become reality! 
In the play Vestire gl'ignudi a young girl tries to "clothe 
herself" in others' illusions so that she may die with the shame 
of the nakedness of brute facts covered. But she discovers that 
in life as in art, the image, the other person's construction is 
always of "another". She cannot clothe her own construction using 
others' illusions, in fact they would have to be her own and they 
are not. Here the paradox is brought out again, that although 
to some extent we need the other's look, the other's construction 
of ourselves as a mirror for our own construction, there remains 
a tension between the other's construction of ourselves and our 
own, which cannot really be resolved. 
The works which deal specifically with this problem in detail 
are, as has been mentioned, the novel Uno. nessuno e centomila 
and the short story Stefano Giogli. uno e due from which the 




wife has a completely different conception of him than he does 
himself and is, in fact, married not to him - whom she doesn't 
know - but to this "other man". 
(...) Stefano Giogli had to become aware of the 
fact that his Lucietta, in the three months 
of their engagement, during which the fire by 
which he was devoured had reduced him to a soft 
dough at the disposition of those little restless 
and tireless hands, of all those elements of his 
spirit in fusion, of all of those fragments of his 
consciousness scattered in the tumult of frenetic 
passion, she had forged, kneaded, composed for 
her own use, according to her taste and her will, 
a Stefano Giogli which was hers alone, absolutely 
hers, who wasn't him at all, not only in spirit, 
but by God, not even almost in body. 
And, strange torment, Stefano Giogli becomes ferociously jealous 
- of himself because*. 
(...) this fool was loved by his wife, to this 
fool she gave all of her kisses - on his own 
lips. When Lucietta looked at him, she didn't 
see him, but that other one; when Lucietta spoke 
to him, she wasn't speaking to him, but to that 
258 
other one; when Lucietta embraced him, she wasn't 
embracing him, but that hateful metaphor of him 
that she had created for herself. -44 
It is in UnoT nessuno e_ centomila. however, that Pirandello 
develops these themes of self-identity to the fullest. The wife's 
name is no longer "Lucietta", but "Dida", and it is no longer 
Stefano Giogli, but Vitangelo Moscarda, but the story is simply 
a further development of Stefano Giogli. It follows the gradual 
awareness on the part of the protagonist of all of the problems of 
self-identity which we have been discussing. At first, realising 
that his wife has a different perception of him than he himself 
does, he ascribes it to her inability to understand, for example, 
some of his more complex ideas, 
I thought, in sum, that my ideas and my sentiments 
couldn't be understood unless they were reduced 
and diminished, in her little brain and heart; and 
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that my tastes couldn't adapt to her simplicity. 
This, however, wasn't the case. It wasn't she who distorted and 
made ridiculous all of his thoughts and feelings. Dida, too, found 
them foolish. 
And so who disguised and reduced them so? The 
reality of Genge, gentlemen! Genge, such as 
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she had fromed him for herself, could have such 
feelings as those, such tastes as those, A 
little fool, but dear. Oh yes, so dear to her! 
She loved him like that: dear little fool. And 
she really loved him. 
It begins to appear to Vitangelo that he is no one at all, that 
the reality which he had ascribed to himself belongs to "Genge". 
She had constructed him! And he wasn't any 
puppet. If anything, the puppet was 1 ... because 
that Genge of hers existed, while I for her didn't 
exist at all, I had never existed. My reality 
was for her in that Gengfe of hers which she 
had made, who had thoughts and feelings and 
tastes that weren't mine and that I couldn't 
have altered in the slightest, without running 
the risk of becoming immediately another whom 
she would no longer have recognised, a stranger 
whom she would no longer have been able either 
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to understand or to love. 
He became jealous not of himself, he insists, but of Genge. 
Understand? She was certain, perfectly certain 
that her Genge liked her hair better combed 
in that other way, and she combed her hair in 
that other way that neither she nor I liked. 
But Genge liked it; and she made the sacrifice 
(...) And I - now that everythig in the end had 
become clear to me - began to become terribly 
jealous - not of myself, I beg you to believe: you 
feel like laughing! - not of myself, gentlemen, 
but of one who was not I, of an imbecile who had 
stuck himself between myself and my wife; not 
like a vain shadow, no - I beg you to believe 
- because he, on the contrary, made me a vain 
shadow, me, me, appropriating my body to make 
himself loved by her. 
After becoming aware of the reality of his wife's construction 
of him and feeling as though he is no one, he then realises that 
it is not only his wife who has a different conception of him 
which in no way coincides with his own. He is not "no one". He 
is a hundred thousand - as many as there are "other" people 
to have constructions of him. In a room with other people, he 
realises that he is not one, but five. 
(...) believing that you speak to one Moscarda 
only, who is really one, yes, the one who is 
standing in front of you in such and such a 
way, as you see him, as you touch him; while you 
speak of five Moscardas because the other four, 
also have one in front of them, one for each, 
who is that one only, thus and so, as each one 
sees him and touches him. Five; and six, if poor 
Moscarda sees himself and touches himself, one 
also for himself; one and no one, alas, as he 
sees himself and touches himself, if the other 
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five see him and touch him differently. 
He is five people, and each one with a life of its own. 
Five imbeciles. One in each. Five imbeciles who 
stand in front of you, as you see them from 
outside, in me who am one and five like the 
house, all with this name Moscarda, nothing for 
himself, who, yes, all five will turn if you call 
"Moscarda!" but each one with that appearance 
that you give him; five appearances: if I laugh, 
five smiles, and so on. And will not each act 
which I accomplish be for you the act of one of 
these five? And can this act be the same if 
the five are different? Each one of you will 
interpret it, will give it a sense and a value 
according to the reality which you have given 
me. 
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He is five (six) people - but he can only know the sixth, that is 
himself as he creates or constructs himself. There is no way for 
Moscarda to come to know himself as others see him. The other 
five will forever remain strangers to him. 
Each person can know only his own "creation", his own 
"construction" of reality, although he is, at times, made pain-
fully aware that others have their own "creations", their own 
"constructions". Describing Stefano Giogli, Pirandello writes*. 
" - Who knows then how that one, or that thing, 
which now to me seems one way, really is?' Did 
he perhaps know some reality outside of himself? 
He himself didn't exist for himself except like 
and in as much as, time by time, he imagined 
himself. Well, his wife had created for herself 
a reality of him which didn't correspond at all, 
neither interiorly nor exteriorly, to that which 
he had created himself: a true reality; not a 
shadow, a spectre! 
And then, would Lucietta have loved the true 




From other sources we see that Pirandello's answer to this question 
is that not only would she not have loved him but she wouldn't 
even recognise any other Stefano Giogli than her own. In Uno, 
nessuno e centomila. Moscarda argues: 
I don't presume that you are the way X imagine 
you. I have already stated that you aren't 
even the one which you imagine yourself, but 
so many at the same time, according to all 
your possibilities of being, and happenstance, 
relationships and circumstances. And so what 
wrong do I do you? You do me a wrong believing 
that I don't or can't have any other reality 
outside of the one that you give me; which reality 
is yours only, believe: an idea of yours, that 
which you have made yourself of me, a possibility 
of being as you feel it, as it seems to you: since 
of that which I could be for myself, not only 
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can you know nothing, but not even I myself. 
(N.B. In this last phrase Moscarda is not referring to the general 
state of affairs. In context it is obvious that he cannot know 
what he can be for himself due to his own confusion about his 
identity because of his recent realisations.) 
!n Si gira ... we read: 
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(...) he could not be one and the same person to 
her and to myself, 
(...) We have all of us a false conception of an 
individual whole 
(...) And we ourselves can never know that reality 
which is accorded to us by other people; who we 
are to this person and to that. 
Paradoxically, although we cannot know directly or completely 
another's construction of our reality, we are to some extent 
indirectly aware of it and through this indirect awareness of 
it this other reality impinges upon us. This in turn forces us 
to submit to what he calls "deformation" of our own reality and, 
indeed, changes that reality not into a duplicate of the other's 
construction but modifies our original construction to resemble 
more closely our construction of the other's construction of us. 
In Una voce the parallel is drawn between a blind man who can 
only imagine what his wife looks like through his impressions of 
her voice, and the condition of any person who can only imagine 
what another is really like through his impressions of that other 
person's physical characteristics, actions, etc. Just as the blind 
man would be incapable upon regaining his sight, of recognising 
his wife, whom he had never seen, so different would she be from 
the construction which he had made of her; so would any man be 
incapable of recognising another reality apart from his own. In 
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this short story, the wife is wise enough to be aware of this 
incapability, of the impossibility of changing the reality which 
another has constructed for us. Knowing that her husband's sight 
is about to be restored by an operation, she leaves him, never 
to return. 
Vitangelo Moscarda is not as wise, at least not at first. 
Becoming aware of the existence of his "other" realities, he tries 
vainly to change them, to make them conform more closely to his 
own reality for himself. First he tries to destroy his wife's 
"Gengfe". Of course, he fails. 
And it was so real, this one, that when I at 
last, exasperated, wanted to destroy it, imposing 
instead of its reality, my own, not my wife but 
the wife of that one, found herself immediately 
horrified as if in the arms of a stranger, an 
unknown person; and declared that she couldn't 
love me any more, that she couldn't live with me 
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not even a moment and ran away. 
He can't bear the reality which others have given him and is 
tempted to do anything to change it. 
I would even, my God, suddenly stick out my 
tongue, move my nose making a sudden face, in 
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order to alter all of a sudden, as a joke and 
without malice, that image of me which he believed 
to be real. 
He discovers the tenacity of others' construction of us. 
Superficially, we usually call them false sup-
positions, erroneous judgments, gratuitous at-
tributions. But all that can be imagined of us 
is really possible, even though it isn't true for 
us. That it isn't true for us, others laugh. 
It is true for them. So true that it can even 
happen that if you don't hold tight onto the 
reality which for your own sake you have given 
yourself, others can induce you to recognise 
that more real than your own reality is that 
which they give you. 
So "real" is the other's construction of us that it cannot change. 
Finally Moscarda realises that the other's construction of himself 
might "go crazy" but it cannot be destroyed. 
Although we need the other's look in order to help form our 
own image of ourselves, the other's look is hateful to us because 
living our own lives the other's image of us is only indirectly 
accessible to us. It has a life apart from us, and by definition 
we cannot really see it as it is experienced by the "other". 
The conclusion of Come prima, meglio di prima is that Fulvia 
ceases trying to fight her daughter's image of her. She leaves 
her family taking with her her newborn baby for whom she will 
be able to create a different image of her. 
Vitangelo Moscarda states: 
I needed a mirror. On the other hand, just the 
thought that my wife was home was enough to 
hold me present to myself and it was just this 
2. The mirror and the 'other's' look 
We see ourselves as in a mirror. The mirror is for Pirandello 
a very special instrument by which we can become aware of the 
absurd. This is explained by Moscarda to his wife in Uno. nessuno 
e centomila: 
'All dead,' I told her, 
(...) 
'But dead, how, if I'm here, alive?' 
'Oh, you, yes, because now you don't see yourself. 
But when you stand in front of the mirror, at 
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the moment that you see yourself, you are no 
longer alive.' 
'And why?' 
'Because you have to stop life in yourself for a 
moment, in order to see yourself. Like in front 
of a camera. You strike a pose. And striking 
a pose is like becoming a statue for a moment. 
Life moves continuously and can't ever really 
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see itself.' 
In fact, Moscarda, among others of Pirandello's heroes, is fascinated 
by his mirror image and his inability to see himself live as others 
see him. The moment one accidentally catches sight of himself 
in a mirror, fleetingly, as one moves, he is horrified, (see for 
example Rimedio la geografia cit. page 226) It is like seeing a 
stranger. And then as soon as we stop to get a better look, 
the live image is fixed and dies. Seeing ourselves in others is 
like seeing ourselves in a sort of mirror, one in which we cannot 
recognise ourselves, (see for example L'uomo in frak cit. p77) 
The parallel goes further. The "other's look" fixes one, 
catches one in a pose, as it were, just like a mirror, and creates 
thereby a form into which the "other" then tries to fit and 
therefore limit all of one's possibilities of being. Knowing that 
our being overflows such a form and cannot but be killed by it, 
all the while needing the other's confirmation of our being, we 
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feel the "other's look" upon us and have an instinctive horror 
of it. 
In the short story Romolo. Pirandello discusses man's need 
for others as a cause for his unhappiness because of the above-
mentioned horror of the "other's look". 
(...) but civilisation means precisely the recog-
nition of this fact: that man, among so many 
other instincts which bring him to make war, 
has also that which is called the gregarious 
instinct, by which he must live with his fellows. 
- And so then you see from this, - you deduce, 
- if man can ever be happy. 
What, however, is the nature of this look which so disturbs us? 
Pirandello, like Sartre, believes that the problem lies in the fact 
that - as Vicentini explains, - our "egocentrism": 
makes us interpret and therefore perceive the 
reality of others exclusively in function of our 
needs, violating their intentionality, 
(...) 
The root of the difficulty is the same in-
dividuality of the person who, asserting himself 
as intentionality, with individual needs, deforms 
the reality of other individuals perceiving their 
reality in his own egocentric perspective. 
This conflict is inevitable since: 
One cannot, defending one's own, not violate the 
intentionality of others.62 
This violation is, of course, bound up with the limited way in 
which others perceive us (or we perceive others) contrasted with 
the infinity of possibilities of being that each person has and 
the way in which the individual himself interprets, organises and 
feels these possibilities. 
Examples of the effects of the "other's look" abound in 
Pirandello. The short story which has as its major theme precisely 
these effects is La maschera dimenticata. It concerns the amazing 
oratorical performance of a man at a town meeting where he is 
unknown and the extraordinary changes which take place as soon 
as he feels upon himself the eyes of someone from his own town 
who knows him. 
Even midst the enthusiastic fervor of the welcome, 
he felt himself wounded right from the outset 
by those little eyes. He tried to escape them, 
plunging himself into the middle of the confusion 
of the party. But from here, from there, from 
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nearby, from far away, from wherever he least 
expected it, he felt himself stung by the almost 
spasmodic fixedness of those little persecuting 
eyes; and when stung; frozen, perturbed, all 
confounded by an obscure feeling which furiously 
assaulted him and occupied his brain like a 
vertiginous darkness. 
Persecuted by the look of the one who knew him as he usually 
appeared, 
(...) he saw himself go back into himself with all 
his misfortunes and his misery (...) 
Completely changed, a different person from the night before, he 
mystifies those townspeople who had so admired him the previous 
evening. Was he an impostor? No, he had merely forgotten 
his habitual mask (maschera) and had begun living a different 
possibility of being. Strangers saw him and identified him with 
the "new mask", unable to imagine him in the old, unless they 
believed that one was "real" and the other "pretense". 
In Pensaci Giacomino (both the short story and the play), the 
point is made that certain things may be done only in secret but 
not in front of the "other's look". 
- Leave me be! don't make me say it! How can 
you not understand that certain things can only 
be done in hiding, and are no longer possible 
in the light, with you who know, with everyone 
laughing. 
In Da sfe it is the "other's look" which makes Matteo Sinagra 
realise that he has lost his identity, that his old self is 
completely dead. 
In Nel gorgo we see another effect of the other's look: the 
stirring of a bad conscience. 
(...) inside of us, the little machine of civilisa-
tion, and we let all of the dregs of all of our 
actions, of all of our thoughts, of all of our 
feelings, quietly deposit themselves, hidden, at 
the bottom of our conscience. But let someone 
whose little machine is broken begin to look at 
you the way I looked at you, no longer as a joke, 
but seriously, and without your expecting it, it 
removes from the bottom of the conscience all 
of the deposit of those dregs which you have 
inside, and see if you can tell me that you 
wouldn't be frightened. 
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Other examples of the effects of the "other's look" are to be 
found in the short stories". Frammento di cronaca di Marco Leccio. 
Romolo. La. paura. L'onda. La rosa and La ricca. 
Thus, we all feel a horror of the "other's look". Vitangelo states: 
(...) to feel on me people's eyes seemed to me 
to undergo a horrible oppression thinking that 
all of those eyes gave me an image which was 
certainly not the one which I knew myself to 
be but another which I could neither know nor 
prevent; (...) 
Not only of the look of other people in general, Moscarda had a 
special loathing for his wife's "look". 
And meanwhile I had a horror of her eyes which 
looked at me, laughing and secure; a horror 
of those cool hands of hers which touched me, 
certain that I was as her eyes saw me; a horror 
of all of her body which weighed on my knees, 
trusting in the abandonment of herself to me, 
without the faintest suspicion that she wasn't 
giving that body of hers really to me, and that 
I, holding her in my arms, didn't hold with that 
body of hers one who belonged to me totally and 
not a stranger (...) two strangers, held tight 
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thus - horror - strangers, not only one for the 
other, but each one to himself, in that body 
which the other embraced. 
In La balia signor Manfroni has a similar horror of his wife's 
"look". 
Mr. Manfroni could have a hundred thousand 
reasons, but he also had on his cheek bone a 
most ridiculous wart, onto which his wife would 
icily point her glance, more than ever spiteful, 
when she saw herself being forced to submit 
to those reasons. And Mr. Manfroni, seeing 
his wart looked at each time, experienced such 
an attack of nerves that in order not to do 
anything rash, he would immediately cut short 
the discussion. 
A first reaction is to try to escape the other's look. 
Vitangelo, in fact, as soon as his wife leaves him, begins 
to feel an exhilarating sense of freedom. In the short story 
Guardando una stampa we read; 
(...) blind men can have luck with 'good' women. 
Look, I would bet that Marco, handsome man, 
must have had his adventures. Because woman, 
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understand? It's all a matter of her being able 
to do it without being seen. 
But one cannot escape feeling the other's look. In L'esclusa we 
find; 
No one, it's true, had bothered her; but she felt 
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herself wounded by so many looks. 
In E due! we see; 
But don't you see, don't you see how you look 
at me even you? - I? - exclaimed his mother. 
- How do I look at you? - Like all the others 
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look at me. 
In La carriola we read: 
When I have someone around, I never look at her; 
but I feel her looking at me, she looks at me, 
she looks at me without taking her eyes off me 
for a moment. 
Not only do we inevitably feel the other's look upon us when they 
are present even if they are not, in fact, looking at us, but 
we are haunted by this look even when we are alone, This is 
illustrated in the play JX giuoco delle parti. Silia is haunted by 
her husband's "look", even though they no longer live together. 
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She can always feel it upon her. Even the furniture begins to 
personify this "look" and she cannot bear being in the same room 
with the chair her husband used to sit in. The reason for this, 
of course, is that our conscience, as we have already seen, is 
nothing but the "other" in us. It is the other's look upon us, 
or rather, our interpretation of the other's look, which becomes 
our conscience, which helps us to form our own construction of 
ourselves. 
Thus we have seen in these previous two sections how our 
"self" is formed, what the function of the "other" is in the 
formation of this "self", and what relationship obtains between 
the "self" and the "other". Let us now turn to the opposite 
question and deal with our conception of others, 
D. The Other 
3. Forms 
Just as others "know" us through their construction of us 
and their fitting of us into categories, roles, or forms, so too 
do we "know" others through the same process. Again it must 
be noted that Pirandello is not an idealist. He affirms the 
existence of an objective reality which, in order to avoid falling 
into solipsism, we must try to have our representation of the 
world resemble. Beyond the abstract knowledge of the existence of 
an objective reality of things and of people, we cannot progress. 
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On the experiential level, this objective reality can never touch 
us, and since it is with this experiential level which Pirandello, 
like the other Existentialists, deals, the objective reality has no 
importance other than the purely philosophical one of rejecting 
solipsism. 
It is only through "forms" that we can know reality. That 
is, it is only through the categorisation of sense data that 
the world can begin to have some meaning for us. But it is the 
"forms" which we know and not the objective reality. 
Do you believe that you know yourself if you 
don't construct yourself in some way? And that 
I could know you if I don't construct you in my 
own way? We can only know that to which we 
succeed in giving form. But what knowledge can 
it be? Is this form perhaps the thing itself? 
You, for you as for me; but not in the same 
way for me as for you: so much so that I don't 
recognise myself in the form which you give me, 
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nor do you in the one X give to you; (...) 
The first "form" which we are given and into which we must 
forever fit is our name. It brands us. It becomes not our name but 
the name of the form into which the other tries to fit us, the role 
which the other sees us play. According to Pirandello, the very 
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special function of a proper name is not fulfilled. Rather, he sees 
names taking on the meaning of whatever "form" people ascribe to 
that person, the way the name Shy lock has become synonymous with 
"usurer" or Solomon with "wise-man". This is not, according to 
Pirandello, a general association but rather a very individual one. 
That is to say, once known a person is labelled with one or more 
"forms" which represent the way another individual has organised 
the sum of that person's appearances, his "reality". In time, the 
person's name becomes merely a convenient way of referring to 
these forms, a sort of a mental shorthand which, like all other 
concepts or "forms" distorts reality precisely because of their 
inherent limitedness. As we read in Uno. nessuno e centomila: 
A name is nothing but this, a funeral epigraph. 
It suits dead people. People who have finished. 
I am alive and I'm not finished. Life doesn't 
'finish'. And life admits of no names. 
Life isn't fixed in a form. Life is a continuous flow of sensations, 
experience which the moment they are conceptualised freeze, solidify 
and thus die. Vitangelo Moscarda wished that he could have 
thousands of names, each one for the thousands of his thoughts, 
feelings or actions, rather than having each of his individual 
acts branded with his name and his body as if that individual 
act involved his entire being and not merely a fraction of it, 
only one of his possibilities of being. Of course, he is so used 
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to his name that he is able to live with it, but he does recognise 
it as a sort of a seal, a brand, a stamp. 
We are branded by each of our words. Others hear and 
construct a form for us according to their interpretation of 
these words. In Come tu mi vuoi we read: 
I couldn't be serious! I couldn't be serious! It 
is frightful, sir, how one of these things, even 
stupidity, that is said to provoke laughter, in 
passing, - see? - it is fixed into a concept 
- forever - I am that, and I can't be anything 
else - branded - a clown. 
Not only our words, but of course, also our actions brand 
us, force us into a mold, a form, a concept. In Si gira ... we find: 
We may easily fail to recognise ourselves in what 
we do, but what we do, my dear fellor, remains 
done: an action which circumscribes you, my dear 
fellow, gives you a form of sorts, and imprisons 
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you in it. You seek to rebel? You cannot. 
Donata, the actress in the play Trovarsi explains that as long 
as one can remain suspended: 
280 
... able to turn with the mind ... here, there ... 
to any recall in us of a sensation, an impression 
... to so many images that a momentaneous desire 
might awaken ... or re-evoke a memory ... with 
this breathing within us ... yes, of indistinct 
memories ... not of acts, perhaps not even of 
appearances ... but, precisely, of desires almost 
vanished before they arise ... things of which 
one thinks without wanting to, almost hidden 
from ourselves ... dreams ... the suffering of 
not being ... like flowers which weren't able to 
bloom ... - that's it, yes, as long as one remains 
thus, sure one has nothing; but one has at least 
this fullness of freedom (...) Now, to commit and 
act, it is never the whole spirit which commits 
it ... the whole of life which is in us ... but 
that which we are only in that moment ... - and 
yet, there, that act of a moment - committed -
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imprisons us, stops us here (...) 
The short story La patente is a parody of this situation, 
A man about whom it is whispered that he is a "iettatore" (one 
capable of putting the "evil eye" on people) based on one of his 
actions and a series of coincidences, sees that he cannot escape 
this branding. So, he seeks legal recognition of his title of 
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"lettatore" so that at least he will be able to use it to extort 
money from the superstitious inhabitants of his town. 
In JX dovere del medico we see the torment of a man who 
has been branded by one of his acts. Caught in a frivolous 
act of adultery he kills the husband in self-defence and then, 
in remorse, shoots himself. The doctors save his life, and he -
who has already taken upon himself the harshest punishment but 
has been saved from it by others - feels that he is reborn. He 
has paid, nearly with his life, for his act, an act which began 
foolishly and which he had no intention of committing. But it is 
only he himself who feels that he has been sufficiently punished. 
Society requires that he be tried and sent to prison as soon as 
he recovers. He protests: 
- I washed myself, with my blood! (. ••) I am 
another, now* I am reborn! How can I remain 
suspended at a single moment of that other life 
of mine that no longer exists for me? Suspended, 
hooked to that moment, as if it represented my 
whole existence, as if I had never lived for 
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anything else. 
The short story JX Professor Terremoto has as its major 
theme precisely this fixing of a person into a form by the other, 
based on an act of that person. In this work a professor is 
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disgraced because he had been branded a hero due to his acts of 
heroism during the Messina earthquake and afterwards could not 
live up to the label. The professor explains: 
- And yet please believe that for me dear sir, - he continued 
shortly after with a sigh - this woman who died was not as 
unfortunate as all of those who, after one of these heroics, 
remained alive. 
'Because you have to admit that an act of heroism 
is the business of a moment' (...) 
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'Life is not made of these moments. 
The similarity here is obvious between this example and Sartre's 
example found in L'existentialisme est un humanisme in which the 
French existentialist speaks of the "bad faith" involved in calling 
anyone a hero or a coward (in the way that one calls a stone, a 
stone,) since there is always a possibility for the hero to cease 
being a hero or the coward to cease being cowardly. 
Just as Sartre speaks of the nature of "being-for-itself" 
not to be what it is and to be what it is not, Pirandello, despite 
his speaking of any "form" as a kind of death, a concept which 
cannot capture or encompass life, recognises (as we have already 
seen in the section of this chapter dealing with masks) that in a 
certain sense, the form takes on reality, at least for the person 
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who has constructed it and sometimes even for the person onto 
whom it has been placed, and that person becomes what the form 
dictates. If one believes in the form, the mask, the role, then 
the other person is as you see him. 
In La favola del figlio cambiato we find: 
Change this one of paper and glass into one of 
gold and gems of value 
the coat into a mantle 
and the king for fun becomes in earnest, 
to whom you bow down. 
There is need of nothing else, only 
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that you believe it. 
Taking the identification between the person and the form one 
step further, we find in Pirandello many examples of people's 
behaviour being influenced by the form or role which society 
(or they themselves) have placed upon them. In Ieri e. oggi the 
sadness of a mother at the departure of loved ones going to war 
is contrasted with that of a prostitute. In the one case the 
tears are blessed, as it were, by society. In the other they are 
held to be cheap and the people involved must act accordingly. 
In the short stories Certi obblighi. La verita. and L'uomo solo 
the protagonist of each has known for years that his wife is 
unfaithful to him. Because society does not know and hence the 
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role of the cuckold has not been assigned to him he chooses to 
ignore the situation. As soon as society knows and the role is 
assigned, each man must then play his part. He is forced to 
"become aware" of his wife's infidelities and act accordingly. In 
the novel L'esclusa we see the example of a man who believes in a 
"fate" (rather than society) which assigns to each person a role 
or form. His own, he believes, is that of the betrayed husband. 
This way of thinking of his had become so fixed 
that if by chance someone, urged by need, came to 
ask help of him, he, even feeling himself sometimes 
inclined to give in, already moved, he would stop 
himself, sigh loudly, then he would open his lips 
in his usual sardonic smile and advise the poor 
devil to address himself to someone else: to 
so and so, for example, the good philanthropist 
of the town: - Go to him, my friend: he was 
born expressly to help people. I wasn't, you 
see. To me this office does not belong. I 
would be offending that worthy gentleman who 
has fulfilled it for so many years and can't do 
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without it. 
Of course, his belief is self-fulfilling and in one of Pirandello's 
usual ironic twists, as soon as he is in fact betrayed by his 
formerly unjustly accused and faithful wife, he becomes convinced of 
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her innocence, thus by belief in his assigned role, he is condemned 
to play it out. Of course, quite apart from the ironic turn of 
the plot (which one may or may not ascribe to the biographical 
consider at iona concerning the author's insanely jealous wife) we 
can see another example of "bad faith" or self-deception in which 
a person denies his own freedom and blames everything on fate, 
another example of a man wishing to be - in this case a cuckold 
- "in the same way", (as Sartre would have it), "that a stone is 
a stone". 
A form "catches" life in an instant, rigidifies it, freezes it, 
and represents it just the way a camera stops the action and 
records a particular moment in time. For this reason Pirandello 
is particularly interested in the camera. He uses this analogy 
throughout his novel SX gira ... the protagonist of which is 
Serafino Gubbio, cameraman at a (silent) movie studio. 
In exile, not only from the stage, but also in a 
sense from themselves. Because their action, the 
live action of their live bodies, there, on the 
screen of the cinematograph, no longer exists: 
it is their image alone, caught in a moment, 
in a gesture, an expression, that flickers and 
disappears. They are confusedly aware, with 
a maddening, indefinable sense of emptiness, 
that their bodies are so to speak subtracted. 
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suppressed, deprived of their reality, of breath, 
of voice, of the sound that they make in moving 
about, to become only a dumb image which quivers 
for a moment on the screen and disappears, in 
silence, in an instant, like a unsubstantial 
phantom, the play of illusion upon a dingy sheet 
of cloth. 
They feel that they too are slaves to this 
strident machine, which suggests on its knock-
kneed tripod a huge spider watching for its 
prey, a spider that sucks in and absorbs their 
live reality to render it up an evanescent, 
momentary appearance, the play of a mechanical 
illusion in the eyes of the public. And the man 
who strips them of their reality and offers it 
as food to the machine; who reduces their bodies 
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to phantoms, who is he? It is 1, Gubbio. 
The camera, like the form, imprisons life, kills it. Serafino Gubbio 
feels the hatred of actors for his machine, parallel to the hatred 
of the man aware of the absurd for the form. 
It is not so much for me, Gubbio, this antipathy, 
as for my machine. It recoils upon me, because 
I am the man who turns the handle. 
287 
They do not realise it clearly, but I, with the 
handle in my hand, am to them in reality a sort 
of executioner. 
The reason, of course, as has been mentioned, is that the 
person becomes identified with the form and limited to it. The 
play Quando si k crualcuno deals precisely with this problem. In it, 
a famous author feels himself imprisoned in the image that others 
have of him. Having just written, under an assumed name, a new 
book, one which repudiates his old "self" and is young, alive with 
ideas and very popular, he realises that he can never acknowledge 
the book because rather than see in him another facet, another 
possibility of his being, people would sooner hold on to the image 
of his old self that they already have and dismiss the new self 
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as a mask, a fiction which he has placed upon himself as a joke. 
He has no life outside of the form under which he is seen by 
others. 
Because I now must not think anything else -
imagine anything else - feel anything else. -
What! - I thought that and I thought (according 
to them) and that's enough! - They don't accept 
any more images of me. - I expressed what I felt 
- and there - stopped there there - I can't be 
different - alas if I should try - they no longer 
recognise me - I must no longer move myself from 
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the precise concept; determined in every minimal 
part, that they have made for themselves of me: 
there, that, immobile, forever. 
Thus we form a concept of the other. We determine him by 
any individual word or any particular action. We construct a 
form into which he must fit, a role which he must play. What 
happens if the other person becomes aware of that form, that role 
and rather than accept it and second it, he tries to change it 
for us? According to Pirandello, rather than change it we often 
believe that the person has become insane, since he no longer is 
consistent, no longer lives up to society's or our expectations 
of his behaviour. We read in Uno. nessuno e centomila: 
In fact, wasn't I perhaps going up to Sig, 
Vitangelo Moscarda in order to play a dirty 
trick on him? Eh, gentlemen, yes, a dirty trick 
that is, to make him commit an act completely 
contrary to him and incoherent: an act which 
suddenly destroying the logic of his reality 
would annihilate him in the eyes of Marco di Dio 
as in so many others? Without understanding, 
wretched as he was! that the consequences of 
such an act couldn't be those which I imagined; 
to present myself, that is to ask everyone after: 
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'see now, gentlemen, it isn't true at all that I 
am the usurer that you want to see in me?' 
But these others, instead: that everyone should 
exclaim amazed: 
'Oh! You know? the usurer Moscarda has gone 
mad!89 
In fact, that is what everyone believes when Moscarda no longer 
acts as they expect. 
'Mad! Mad! Mad!' 
It was the same cry of the whole crowd there 
in front of the door: 
'Mad! Mad! Mad!' 
Because I had wanted to demonstrate, that I 
could, even for others, not be what they believed 
me to be. 
Moscarda becomes aware of the impossibility of changing the concept 
which others have of him. He realises that they all think him 
mad and he speaks to the husband of a woman who is in an insane 
asylum: 
And I touched the ground with my forehead. 
'You, not I, understand? in front of my wife, 
understand? 
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You should stay like this! And I, and he, and 
everyone, in front of the so-called insane, like 
this!' 
(...) 
"New words!' I cried. 'Do you want to hear them? 
Go, go there, where you keep them locked up: go, 
go and listen to them speak! You keep them 
91 
locked up, because it suits you that way!' 
Why is it that we should listen to the so-called insane? We find 
the answer in, among other places, the play Come tu mi vuoi; 
The unknown one; Oh yes, I know! Only the insane 
have the privilege of shouting - clearly - in 
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front of everyone - certain things. 
What are these "certain things"? As we read in JX berretto a 
sonagli - the truth. There is no surer way to be thought crazy 
than to shout the truth in people's faces. 
In Ouand'ero matto the protagonist learns that his reasoning 
can only go so far. One can reason about other people's feelings, 
needs, etc. but you can only live your own life and take care of 
yourself. All the reasoning in the world - unless you're a saint 
perhaps - can never equate your experience of others and their 
own of themselves. If one isn't wise to this,; 
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there is no middle road: either one is a saint 
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or he is insane. 
The exact same statement is found in the play Lazzaro 
So, we accord to the "other" a form which under most 
circumstances we do not change. As soon as one becomes 
encapsulated in a form he no longer lives. In order to know 
oneself (or an "other") we (or he) must be defined by a form. Thus 
we find in the play Non si sa come: 
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To know oneself is to die. 
The form is intollerable because it stops the "flux" of life. 
In Quando si fe, qualcuno we read; 
Second journalist: Oh yes, others ... Respect ... 
admiration 
Natasha: All things that kill. And even 
in front of an object of someone 
killed that way, even in front 
of you, if they recognise you 
as his son, so many stop to 
look at you. When a life stops 
... or is stopped by others ... 
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The consequences of fame. That's 
why one stays' 
And no longer lives. 
The writer in this play feels as though he were becoming a statue, 
one who can no longer move. He has become famous. He is Someone, 
but for this he must die because: 
Someone, alive no one can see. 
We find another parallel between a man who has been given 
(or taken on) a form, and a statue in Si gira ...: 
But his dignity, so long and so strenuously 
defended, has now settled upon him, like the 
mould of a statue, immovable. Cavalina feels 
himself empty inside, but outwardly incrusted 
all over. He has become the walking mould of 
this statue. He cannot any longer scrape it 
off himself. Forever, henceforward, inexorably, 
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he is the most dignified man in the world. 
Ironically, while the form distorts or kills life, it itself 
remains vitally alive even if the person on whom it was placed 
really dies physically, so long as the person who has constructed 




our next consideration which is the paradox of the reality (or 
irreality) of death. 
4. The reality (or irreality) of death 
As we have seen, we make our reality in a sort of mirror-like 
exchange with the "other's look". We see ourselves in others' eyes 
and this reflection influences our own self-concept. Thus it is 
that it is the other's look which gives us existence. Here "life" 
is understood, not as the indistinct flow which each person feels 
within himself, but "life-in-the-world", existence. It of course 
follows from Pirandello's ideas concerning the relativity of reality 
that while a person's sentient life does not depend on others, 
his existence as a particular individual does because he needs 
the other's look in order to create himself. In Come prima meglio 
di prima Pirandello's ideas concerning this mirror-like exchange 
are illustrated. The long-straying wife and mother has returned, 
thinking that she can take up her old life. Since she has been 
reconciled with her husband, she can do this at least to a certain 
extent with him; but her daughter believes her to be dead. She 
realises that because of this she and her daughter can no longer 
reciprocally give each other life. 
(...) my dear, if you can't make me live again for 




It is here that the paradox of the irreality of death arises. 
If it is the other's look which gives life (understood in the sense 
of existence-in-t he-world), then it follows that as long as that 
"look" continues, that person is "alive", existent-in-the-world, 
whether or not he is physically alive or dead. We find this 
general theme illustrated in the story lines of three short 
stories; Colloaui coi nersonaggi. Vista and La camera in attesa. 
Even more specifically, we read in La camera in attesa: 
The truth is that you don't recognise in your 
son or daughter, returned after a year, that 
same reality which you gave to them before they 
left, (...) Your son, the one that you knew before 
he left, is dead, believe it, he's dead. Only there 
being a body (and even that so changed!) makes 
you say no. But you observe it well that he 
was another, the one who left a year ago, and 
who didn't come back anymore. (...) 
You know it well, now, that reality doesn't depend 
on there being or there not being a body. There 
can be a body and it be dead for the reality 
which you gave it. That which makes life, then, 
is the reality which you give to it. 
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As long as I who give reality to a person, live, that person 
continues to have a life-in-the-world. In I pensionati della memoria 
we find: 
(...) that which was my reality, solely mine, which 
can neither change nor perish, as long as I 
live, and which can even live forever, if I have 
the strength to immortalise it in a page, or at 
least, for a hundred million years, according to 
the calculations just made in America concerning 
the duration of human life on Earth. 101 
In the play La vita che ti diedi. Pirandello paints the picture 
of a mother whose son has just died, but who is well-aware of 
this paradox of death's reality or irreality. She states; 
I don't need to believe in shadows. I know that 
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he is alive for me. I m not crazy. 
Nevertheless, she really knows that her son is dead and she 
cannot make him live for herself when she is aware of that fact. 
Her only comfort is in knowing that as long as there is a woman 
who knew and loved her son and who doesn't yet know that he is 
dead, he remains alive. 
For Pirandello, what constitutes "death" (that is, the ceasing 
of our " exist en ce-in-t he-world") is the death of the reality that 
2 % 
we have given to a particular person, however that is brought 
about. When a child goes off to a boarding school, for example, 
that child never returns. When the child that was that child 
goes home, that child (the one of times past) dies for the parent, 
because the reality which the parent used to give him is recognised 
as an illusion. In La camera in attesa we read; 
- Didn't your son or daughter die when they 
left for school in the far off big city? 
(...) 
- Calm yourself, yes, go on, I know it well. But 
how is it, at the end of the year, when your 
son or your daughter comes back a year older 
from the city, you remain astonished and amazed 
before them; and you, yes you, with hands open as 
if to parry a doubt which alarms you, exclaim: 
- Oh God, but is it really you? Oh God, how she 
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has become another! 
When a person goes away and changes, they, that is, the reality 
which we gave them dies. We do not cry because for us that 
reality is still alive, The mother in La vita che ti diedi realises 
that it was when her son went away that he "died", not at the 
moment of his physical death. 
- Well, life can act so cruelly toward a mother: it 
tears from her a son and changes him. - Another; 
and I didn't know it. Dead and I continued to 
make him live in me. 
The dead, like the living, depend on the other's look for 
their reality. In X pensionati della memoria Pirandello explains; 
Their reality is vanished; but which? the one 
they gave themselves. And what could I know of 
that reality of theirs? What do you know of it? 
I know that I myself give to them. Illusion, mine 
and theirs. But if they, poor dead ones, have 
been totally disabused of theirs, my illusion is 
still alive and it is so strong that I, I repeat, 
after having accompanied them to the cemetery, 
I see them come back to me, all of them, just as 
they were, outside of the coffin, next to me. 
- But why, - you say, - don't they return to 
their own houses, instead of coming to yours? 
Oh beautiful! because they hardly have any 
reality for themselves, to be able to go where 
they please. Reality is never for the self. And 
they have it, now, for me, and with me then, per 
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force, they have to come away. 
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If the "dead" continue to live in the reality that we continue 
to give them, why then do we weep at the death of a friend? 
They still have the reality which they always had, namely, the 
one which we have constructed. We weep because the giving of 
reality is reciprocal. We weep because the dead can no longer 
give reality to us. In effect, since the reality of the dead 
person lives on in us, it is we, not they, who die! In La vita 
che ti diedi we read: 
And I here? - This is what death is, my daughter, 
- Things to be done whether we want to or not 
- and things to be said ... - Now, a time-table 
to consult - then, the carriage for the station 
- travel ... We are the poor busy dead. 
And in the same play: 
Anna: (...) My God, one should also understand that 
the real reason we cry also in front of death 
is a different one from what one believes, 
Giorgio: One cries for the one whom we'll miss. 
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Anna: Right! Our life in the one who dies: that which 
we don't know! (...) Yes, yes: for ourselves we 
cry; because he who dies can no longer give 
any life to us, with those dead eyes which 
no longer see us, with those cold and hard 
hands of his which can't touch us anymore, 
(...) - And you instead mean that he isn't 
alive for me any longer. But of course he is 
alive for me, alive with all of the life which 
I have always given him; mine, mine; not his 
In Colloquii coi personaggi we find the same example. 
Mama! I cry because you. Mama, you can no longer 
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give me a reality. 
In X pensionati della memoria we find the same explanation of 
our tears when a loved one dies, namely, the destruction of the 
reciprocity of our illusions. We need the other's look as a support 
for our own illusions. Here it must be noted that Pirandello is 
not making any philosophical statement regarding physical death. 
Although Pirandello demonstrates a certain interest in spiritism 
or "theosophy", as was in vogue in his day, and speculates on the 
possibility that there may remain some sort of consciousness after 
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death, it is obvious that these possibilities are not particularly 
important to him. These beliefs or speculations remain isolated 
from the rest of his work and at no time does he accept that 
a belief in an afterlife should influence one's choice of values 
in this life. The subject remains for Pirandello an interesting 
speculation but an unimportant one. What Pirandello is doing is 
using that subject of death and the paradox of its reality (or 
irreality) to illustrate once again his beliefs in the relativity 
of all reality. 
I suppose that a dead person has as much reality for us as 
a live one and that this reality collapses at the moment when 
we know that we will no longer feel the other's look upon us, is 
to say something about the possibility of communication between 
people. Let us now explore this possibility, 
E. Communication 
Lina Passarella Sartorelli in her article La filosofia morale 
pel teatro priandelliano states; 
And then in Pirandello there is also another 
contrast: men, all preoccupied with themselves, 
with this intimate part of them, with this 
expression, don't have the energy to give to 
know their neighbour, and that is why they 
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don't understand each other. 
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While it is certainly true and can easily be seen in Pirandello 
that people are preoccupied with themselves and rarely if ever 
try to know or understand others, Pirandello's statements and 
examples illustrate a much deeper reason for this lack of mutual 
understanding. The reason is because real communication between 
people is impossible due to the subjectivity of each person's 
world-view. Not only do we hide our most intimate selves from 
others and retreat behind a role or a mask, but even when we 
wish to communicate our own construction of reality to others; we 
find this impossible. In JX piacere dell'on est a Baldovino explains: 
I come in here, and I immediately become that 
which I must be, that which I can be - I construct 
myself - that is, I present myself to you in 
a form suitable to the relation that I must 
contract with you. And you do the same to 
yourself when you receive me. But, deep down, 
inside of these constructions of ours placed 
thus face to face with each other, behind the 
jealousies and the shutters remain hidden our 
most secret thoughts, our most intimate feelings, 
all that we are for ourselves, outside of the 
110 
relations which we want to establish. 
From this we might be led to believe that if only we didn't 
deliberately hide ourselves we could understnad one another. But 
302 
in Uno nessuno e centomila we read how Vitangelo discovers the 
subjectivity of reality and the impossibility of communication. He 
states: 
The trouble is that you, my friend, will never 
know, nor will I ever be able to communicate to 
you how that which you tell me is translated 
within me. You haven't spoken Greek. We have 
used, you and I the same language, the same 
words, But what fault have we, you and I, if 
words, for themselves, are empty? Empty, my 
friend. And you fill them with your meaning, 
in saying them to me; and I in receiving them, 
inevitably, fill them with my meaning. We believe 
that we understood each other; we haven't at 
all. Oh, this too is an old story, we all know it. 
And I don't pretend to be telling you anything 
new. Only I go back to asking you: 
'But why then. Holy God, do you continue to 
act as if you didn't know? To speak to me of 
yourself, if you know that in order to be for 
me what you are for yourself, and I for you 
what I am for myself, it would be necessary that 
I, inside of myself, give you that same reality 
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that you give yourself, and vice versa; and this 
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isn't possible. 
It is also impossible, for the same reason, Vitangelo discovers, 
to see myself as the other sees me, but only as X see him seeing 
me. 
In X qiqanti della montagna Cotrone explains: 
(...) each one of us speaks, and after having 
spoken, we almost always recognise that it has 
been in vain, and we go back inside ourselves 
disillusioned, like a dog in the night to his 
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bed, after having barked at a shadow. 
Vitangelo speaks of the impossibility of his communicating with 
the person whom he thought knew him best: 
I was astonished. 
It was obvious that the sense which I gave to 
my words was a meaning for me; that which they 
then assumed for her, as Genge's words, was 
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completely different. 
It is a lonely world which Pirandello describes, however, 
the possibility of a certain solace being derived from common 
experience, a sort of communication without words, is left open. 
This is the theme of the short story Notte. 
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It is clear nevertheless that our reality remains precisely 
that, our own personal construction of reality, unapproachable for 
others, incapable of being communicated or expressed by us. This 
is the discovery of Vitangelo Moscarda and this is the discovery 
of Serafino Gubbio (in S_i gira ...) which leads to their silence. 
(This leaves aside for the moment, other considerations of this 
silence which have already been discussed,) Their "selves" are 
incommunicable to others but so is the very discovery of this 
incommunicability. 
F. Summary 
In this chapter concerning the self and others we have 
discussed Pirandello's views on life as pure experience, one's 
construction of his own "self", the use of roles or masks, the 
importance of the other's look, the construction of the "other", 
a unique definition of insanity, the paradox of death's irreality, 
and the impossibility of communication. Let us see how these 
coincide with the well-known views of Sartre, particularly as 
he has expressed them in his major philosophical treatise Being 
and Nothingness and his short essay: L'existentialisme est un 
human isme. 
When Pirandello speaks of life as pure consciousness he 
is describing man's way of being. Sartre speaks of man as 
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consciousness of objects and of itself. Consciousness (or man) 
has no essence. Sartre states in Being and Nothingness: 
Now as we have seen, consciousness of being is 
114 
the being of consciousness. 
In other words, man's mode of being is that of being conscious 
of the being of objects. Now Sartre situates this consciousness 
in the world as totally free - as he would say, surrounded 
by nothingness. Man himself orders everything around him and 
perceives things in his own way. He chooses his manner of 
perceiving and ordering things and is responsible for his choice. 
(See also L'existentialisme est un humanisme p31 for a practical 
example). 
Not only does man "choose" or construct his reality, but 
he chooses and constructs himself. Sartre states quite clearly 
that: 
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Man is nothing but what he makes himself. 
The use of the mask or role is for Sartre, as for Pirandello, 
a form of bad faith because one's whole being cannot be expressed 
in that role. For Pirandello it is a denial of the infinity of 
one's possibilities. For Sartre, it is a denial, a restriction of 
one's total freedom. Nevertheless the role constitutes in some 
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sense our being. 
Sartre does not discuss the multiplication of "selves" which 
so fascinates Pirandello, but he does state that; 
(man) can be nothing (...) unless the others 
recognise him as such. To obtain any truth 
about me, I must pass through the other. The 
other is indispensable to my existence, as well 
moreover as it is to the knowledge which I have 
of myself.117 
Thus we see in Sartre as well as in Pirandello the need for the 
other's look. Sartre writes in Being and Nothingness: 
I am a slave to the degree that my being is 
dependent at the centre of a freedom which is 
not mine and which is the very condition of my 
being. In so far as I am the object of values 
which come to qualify me without my being able 
to act on this qualification or even to know it, 
I am enslaved. By the same token, in so far as 
I am the instrument of possibilities which are 
not my possibilities whose pure presence beyond 
my being I cannot even glimpse, and which deny 
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my transcendence in order to constitute me as 
a means to ends of which I am ignorant - I am in 
danger. This danger is not an accident but the 
permanent structure of my being-for-others. 
I need the other's look in order to construct myself and yet I 
apprehend it as a danger, an unpleasant experience because: 
To be looked at is to apprehend onself as the 
unknown object of unknowable appraisals - in 
particular, of value judgments. 
Again Pirandello and Sartre agree. 
Our construction of others, apart from the communication of 
their "look" is always in the mode of an object. In their "look" 
we become aware of their subjectivity, but since by definition 
we cannot enter into that subjectivity, the other is always 
constituted as an object of our subjectivity, seen in the light 
of his relation to me. While Pirandello goes further and explains 
how we approached the other in a particular role or at a certain 
moment in time or in one specific action and try to limit his 
being to that role or that moment or that action, and thus do 
not apprehend his whole being, the entire set of his possibilities; 
Sartre speaks more of each individual's subjectivity, his total 
freedom and the impossibility of our participating in that in any 
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way. I construct the other in my own way, and he constructs me 
in his, but apart from the other's look on which I depend, the 
construction of others by me or of me by others does not have 
importance for Sartre as it does for Pirandello. The reason for 
this difference lies in the attitudes of these two authors toward 
the absurd. For Pirandello, our awareness of others' construction 
of our "self" and the consequent doubling or multiplication of 
this "self" is another way in which we become aware of the 
absurd. The important thing for Pirandello as for Camus is to 
live with this awareness. For Sartre what is most important is 
the affirmation of our total freedom and hence he doesn't worry 
about our construction of others or their construction of us 
except in so far as it might influence the use of our freedom. 
For the same reason, Sartre is not concerned with insanity 
except as it can be a form of bad faith which we use to mask 
from ourselves our freedom, 
The paradox of death's irreality is another subject with 
which Sartre does not deal at length. While sharing Pirandello's 
views concerning the reality of one's "being-for-others": 
My being-for-others is a real thing. If it 
remains in the hands of the Other like a coat 
which I leave to him after my disappearance, this 
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is by virtue of a real dimension of my being - a 
dimension which has become my unique dimension 
- and not in the form of an unsubstantial 
120 
specter. 
Sartre does not play, as it were, with the paradoxical consequences 
of this, namely, that I exist as long as I am thought to exist. 
He does state, however, that 
the very existence of death alienates us wholly 
in our own life to the advantage of the Other. 
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To be dead is to be a prey for the living. 
and again 
Now that his life is dead, only the memory of the 
Other can prevent Pierre's life from shrivelling 
up in its plenitude in-itself by cutting all its 
moorings with the present. 
The unique characteristic of a dead life is that 
it is a life of which the Other makes himself 
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the guardian. 
Taking into account these statements as well as Sartre's 
treatment of related topics, such as the "Other" as an object, or 
the necessity for the "Other's look", it is clear that Pirandello's 
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treatment of the paradoxical irreality of death is in complete 
accord with these views, 
Sartre's views on the possibility of interpersonal communica-
tion seem to be slightly more optimistic than those of Pirandello. 
It is through the word that we are made aware to some extent 
of the nature of our "being-for-others". However he states: 
,.. all this I am for the Other with no hope of 
apprehending this meaning which I have outside 
and still more important, with no hope of changing 
it. Speech alone will inform me of what I am; 
again this will never be except as the object 
of an empty intention; any intuition of it is 
forever denied me. 
He also indicates that the meaning of a sentence "is not in itself 
to be considered as a given but rather as an end chosen in a 
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free surpassing of means". And also; 
Since the verbal unity is the meaningful sen-
tence, the latter is a constructive act which 
is conceived only by a transcendence which sur-
passes and nihilates the given toward and end. 
To understand the word in the light of the sen-
tence is very exactly to understand any given 
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whatsoever in terms of the situation and to 
understand the situation in the light of the 
125 
original ends. 
If this is the case, then we are not at all far from Pirandello's 
insistance on the difficulty or perhaps even impossibility of 
communication, the difference being Sartre's emphasis on the 
primacy of the Being-for-itself and Pirandello's fascination with 
the self-for-others giving rise to a multiplication of the self (Uno. 
nessuno e_ centomila). One must note here a certain inconsistency 
in both writers in that they each seem to take for granted at 
least a certain level of communication while at the same time 
stressing the difficulty or even impossibility of it! 
Thus we may conclude from this chapter that Pirandello's 
views concerning the self and others are consonant with those 
of the existentialist movement. 
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
Since the evidence in support of the conclusion that Pirandello 
be recognised as an Existentialist avant la lettre is cumulative 
and has appeared throughout this work, these concluding remarks 
will not state any new conclusion but will be confined to a brief 
summary of that evidence. 
The aim of this thesis has not been to defend those loosely 
related "systems" of philosophy or better, philosophical attitudes 
known as Existentialism, but rather, to show that Luigi Pirandello 
not only manifests in his works a philosophy so similar in its 
concepts and attitudes to those of Sartre and Camus as to entitle 
him to be rightly accepted as an Existentialist avant la lettre, 
but that by categorising Pirandello in this manner, we make the 
study of existentialism more fruitful through the acceptance of 
his extraordinarily clear elucidation and illustration of certain 
existentialist themes which otherwise remain slightly vague. Two 
examples of this latter are Pirandello's treatment of personal 
identity (see especially Chapter V Section B) —an area in which 
many critics have found Sartre unintelligible, and his contribution 
to the problem of other minds, an area not necessarily limited, 
of course, to existentialism, (see especially Chapter V Sections C 
and D). 
313 
It has been shown through an analysis of all of Pirandello's 
writings that his works clearly contain themes, the philosophical 
content of which, in Sartre's day, would come to be known as 
existentialism. More than merely themes, his works contain a well 
thought out if not a fully developed philosophy which chooses to 
express itself in plays, novels, and short stories and only rarely 
in essays, rather than in a formally written set of metaphysical 
theses. Is the evidence of these themes and this typically 
existentialist way of presenting them sufficient reason to accept 
Pirandello as an existentialist avant la let tret It is this 
writer's opinion that it is, but there are two further reasons 
which justify such a categorisation. 1) Not only does Pirandello 
develop themes which later existentialists also developed, but in 
certain instances he carries them further or in another direction 
from the other existentialists. Sartre sees man as rising up 
in the world and then choosing what he is to be. Pirandello's 
account of what it means to construct oneself is much more 
detailed and much deeper.(This has been shown in Chapter IV and 
V.) His whole discussion of the "self" is more well-developed than 
Sartre's description of the being-£or-itself. Sartre's description 
of bad faith is not at all as detailed and complete as Pirandello's 
innumerable examples of the numerous ways in which man seeks to 
deceive himself. (See Chapter III Section D.) As has been shown in 
Chapter IV, on the nature of reality, Pirandello's account of the 
nature of reality carries Sartre's ideas much further, 
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The second reason to categorise Pirandello with the existen-
tialists is that his literary production relative to existentialist 
themes was so much greater than either Sartre or Camus, that 
by sheer force of numbers, his examples of these themes elucidate 
existentialist concepts much more frequently and clearly than 
the other writers. Apart from the number of his illustrations 
of existentialist themes, they are clearer and more persuasive 
because, as should be clear from the very many illustrations cited 
in this thesis, they rarely deal with those abnormal psychologi-
cal conditions so typical of other existentialist literature, but 
rather with ordinary people whom one might accept more readily 
as typical or normal human beings. 
Since, then, we find in Pirandello all of the major existentialist 
themes as well as most of the minor ones, since he develops 
certain themes even further than the recognised existentialists 
and since his literary works elucidate these existentialist themes 
even better than some works by Sartre or Camus, let us recognise 
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